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2Abstract
This thesis explores how economic and institutional changes shape social preferences, in 
particular attitudes of wellbeing and unrest. The first chapter explores whether the 
welfare of women increased following the extension of women’s rights between the 
1960s and 1990s in Europe. Using individual-level data on life satisfaction, it shows 
through differences-in-differences that the extension of birth control rights is strongly 
linked to an increase in the welfare of women of childbearing age, while mutual consent 
divorce and maternity benefits proved less beneficial. Birth control rights also increased 
women’s investment in education, probability of working and income. The second 
chapter investigates whether the same link between individual rights and welfare holds 
in the context of India. Unlike in Europe, there is no strong evidence that abortion 
rights increased the wellbeing of women. Some positive association between rights and 
wellbeing is only found once the income, education and location of individuals are 
accounted for.
The third and fourth chapters examine which political and economic factors lead 
individuals to revolt against their government, creating conflict and property rights 
insecurity. Two innovative empirical approaches are introduced. Chapter 3 analyses the 
revolutionary preferences of over 100,000 people in 61 countries between 1981 and 
1997. It uses instrumental variables to control for the possible endogeneity of economic 
and political variables. It finds that restricting the level of political and civil freedom has 
a strong impact on revolutionary support, which economic growth can only partly 
compensate for. Chapter 4 examines the interaction of preferences for revolt and 
actions combining the analysis of survey data with a laboratory experiment. The findings 
are consistent with the collective action problem. The feeling by citizens that the 
government “operates in the interest of the few” increases both revolutionary 
preferences and actions; political repression increases preferences for revolt but 
decreases actual opposition.
3To my family, who gave me roots 
To Filippo, who gave me wings
but the reverse is equally true
To my family, who gave me wings 
To Filippo, who gave me roots
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Introduction
There is a consensus in the social sciences that institutions play a large role in shaping 
human actions. Economists recognise that it is fundamental to understand them in 
order to gauge the effects of economic policy on economic performance. In the words 
of North (1991), who gained the Nobel Prize for his study on institutions, they are “the 
humanly devised constraints that shape social interaction” and can be compared to “the 
incentive structure of an economy” for the actors playing in the various spheres of 
society. Countries with better economic and political institutions in the form of secure 
property rights, non-distortionary policies and competitive political processes tend to 
invest more in physical and human capital, use these factors more efficiently and achieve 
a greater level of income (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). While North made 
his argument theoretically, a new wave of economists is applying modem empirical 
methods to understand the role of institutions. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1999) showed the effect of institutional quality on growth using colonial origins 
and the adoption of different legal systems as indicators. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) made a further progress in disentangling the direct effect of 
institutions on economic performance from the effect o f reverse causality. Focusing on 
countries formerly colonised by Europeans, they devised an innovative approach to 
distinguish deeply rooted institutions from contingent features observable today, which 
could be the result rather than the cause of greater economic growth. They traced back 
the origins of the quality of the institutions we observe today to whether the colonisers 
set up minimal institutions for exploitation or richer institutions for populating the 
former colonies, which in turn depended on the mortality of colonial settlers in the 17th- 
19th centuries. They find a positive direct effect of “good” institutions, namely those that 
protect against government expropriation, on a country’s growth rate. These studies are 
part of a wider process in economics whose challenge is to build solid microfoundations
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for theories on macroeconomic aggregates. The new theories shift their focus away 
from the cross-country analysis of aggregate measures of economic performance and 
direct it to the study of what individuals do when institutions, i.e. their incentives and 
set of choices, change. As a research agenda it requires a continuous process of linking 
the macro events in a country to changes in the behaviour of its citizens.
This thesis is a contribution to this literature. I investigate how changes in economic 
conditions and in the institutions of countries shape the actions and the attitudes of 
individuals. In particular, I am interested in how changes in individual rights affect the 
well-being of individuals and how these compare to changing the economic status of the 
same individuals. Understanding how well-being is affected allows us to build a measure 
of the stability and the potential for unrest within a country. Ultimately, we can map the 
effect of changes in institutions into the welfare and the political stability of a country 
through the channel of its citizens’ behaviour. To assess these effects I take an empirical 
approach using surveys as well as data collected in laboratory experiments, which I 
analyse with advanced tools from microeconometrics, program evaluation and 
experimental economics.
Using micro data to understand macro phenomena can contribute to our understanding 
of why some countries enjoy social cohesion and stability and some do not. Some 
aggregate events are hard to understand and to predict. Although individual action may 
be worthwhile because it would entail an expected increase in utility, the possibility of 
free-riding may cause a collective action to fail. It is relevant to study how societal 
change affects individual preferences to the extent that they represent a prerequisite for 
collective action. Although the mapping of preferences into actions is less than perfect 
because of the possibility to free-ride, learning about preferences can help disentangle 
the role of individual incentives from that of external opportunities and constraints.
The study of reported preferences in surveys is also a useful complement to the classical 
study of “revealed preferences”. The quality and the richness of the data available on 
preferences are often much greater than on standard actions. The Eurobarometer and 
the World Values Survey, which I use throughout this thesis, are among the most 
studied surveys in academia because of their completeness, reliability and rigor. The 
Eurobarometer is compiled every year by the European Commission and the World 
Values Survey is collected in periodic waves by the Institute for Social Research at the
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University of Michigan. They contain an extensive list of questions on individual 
attitudes and preferences over several years, keeping a constant framing and collecting 
complete demographic characteristics of the respondent. The sheer number of 
observations (1,500-2,000) that they collect for each representative sample in a given 
country and year grants large statistical confidence on the significance of the effects 
found.
A burgeoning literature uses survey data to test for the determinants of individual 
preference parameters and much of it uses similar survey data. A number of papers 
focus on specific government policies. Di Telia, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001, 2003) 
infer welfare effects from policy changes (inflation, unemployment, GDP growth) using 
self-reported well-being answers. Gruber and Mullainathan (2002) analyse the impact of 
taxes on cigarettes or other addictive substances on the welfare of smokers. Frey and 
Stuzter (2000) show how institutional factors in the form of direct democracy and 
federal structure raise citizens’ well-being. Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) study 
preferences for redistribution using a question that asks whether “the government ought 
to reduce the income differences between rich and poor”. Luttmer (2001) uses the US 
General Social Survey to show that racial heterogeneity lessens support for welfare 
spending. Survey questions that ask people to judge the extent of corruption were 
exploited by Ades and Di Telia (1999) to study the effects of industrial policy.
One original contribution of this thesis is to enrich the study of public economics of an 
additional tool. Using self-reported indicators of welfare allows us to quantify more 
precisely the welfare effect from a policy on the individuals affected. Once it is known 
which individuals within a country were “exposed” to a certain policy, we can confront 
their self-declared welfare with that of individuals not affected by the policy. By 
computing differences-in-differences effects we can closely identify the effects of the 
policy on certain groups of individuals, defined by income, gender, education or other 
personal characteristics, as long as this information is available. The methodology and 
the identifying restrictions needed are explained in more detail in Chapter 1.
The study of institutions takes into consideration the role of religion, both as an 
institution and as an individual characteristic. Barro and McCleary (2002) study how 
economic performance and political institutions are related to religious participation and 
beliefs. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) use survey data to identify the relation
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between religion and attitudes judged favourable to growth. Iannaccone (1998) reviews 
a number of outcomes that in the literature are linked both with economically important 
social behaviour and religious attitudes. Religious beliefs are consistently associated with 
higher education levels, lower crime, good mental and physical health. One possible 
interpretation is that religious membership can be characterised as a club good. Rational 
individuals may wish to join the club even when self-sacrifice is demanded (in the form 
of restrictions on clothing and on other personal and social activities) in exchange for 
support, goods and services provided by other members. Similarly, Berman (2000) 
models social interactions within a religious community as a signalling device of 
commitment in order to participate in a mutual insurance arrangement. In this thesis the 
general finding is that people are worse off when their rights are restricted, regardless of 
whether they are imposed by religion or by the political power.
Two domains of social preferences and actions are investigated in this thesis: individual 
welfare and attitudes to conflict. I investigate how restrictions to freedom affect the 
well-being of individuals and whether and when they react to this. The first and the 
second chapters explore whether granting women individual rights affected their 
wellbeing as well as their investment in human capital and in the labour market. They 
study the effect of the same rights in two different institutional settings, developed and 
developing countries. The third and fourth chapters examine another indicator of well­
being, i.e. the attitudes of unrest and dissatisfaction with the society the person lives in. I 
investigate how restrictions to political and civil rights affect attitudes of unrest, whether 
this effect is exacerbated by living in a fast or slow-growing country, and which pattern 
o f revolt actions is likely to emerge.
The use of self-reported welfare allows us to build a richer model of the impact of 
institutions on welfare. As Gruber and Mullainathan (2002) stated, “To measure how 
policy changes affect social welfare, economists typically look at how policies affect 
behaviour and use a formal model to infer welfare consequences from the behavioural 
responses. But when different formal models can map the same behaviour to very 
different welfare impacts, it becomes hard to draw firm conclusions about many 
policies.” An example of this dilemma is the extension of women’s rights. Demographic 
statistics show that in the last thirty years in Europe women had fewer children, studied 
longer, worked more and earned a higher wage. The positive link between wages, 
education and welfare is generally assumed. The public debate instead tends to highlight
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that rights have changed, but the institutions that should facilitate them have not. 
According to this debate it is still difficult for women to exploit the possibilities allowed 
by the new rights. As a result, possibilities have increased only potentially, but actual 
welfare may not have changed or may even have decreased. Examining directly the 
impact of the policy on subjective well-being allows us to give an informed answer, that 
is, women did increase their welfare as a result of some (but not all) women’s rights. 
Similarly, in the area of conflict, the new approaches devised here help us understand 
the role of freedom and economic growth on the well-being of individuals, their 
acceptance of the society they live in and the potential for change arising from the 
individuals themselves. This is new in the existing literature on conflict and hopefully it 
will enrich the current debate.
The first chapter explores whether the welfare of women increased following the 
extension of women’s rights between the 1960s and 1990s in Europe. There is no a 
priori expectation on the size and direction of this effect. Demographic data show that in 
the last thirty years women had fewer children, studied longer and earned a higher wage. 
The academic literature as well the public debate have highlighted some perverse effects 
by which the welfare of women may has not have necessarily increased and may have 
even decreased (Akerlof, Yellen and Katz, 1996). This has been confined so far to the 
realm of theoretical speculations and informal discussions but it has not been subject to 
a scientific scrutiny. A quantitative evaluation can establish the direction and the size of 
the welfare effect, if any. The answers of nationally representative samples of individuals 
about their current life satisfaction are used as revealed subjective utility levels and 
compared to traditional revealed preference indicators. I focus on changes in birth 
control rights1, maternity protection and mutual consent divorce in twelve European 
countries. I focus on private benefits to individuals, rather than on societal or “public 
good” effects linked to assigning a moral connotation to these rights. Repeated cross- 
sections from the Eurobarometer provide demographic data and self-evaluations of life 
satisfaction of over 400,000 individual. After establishing with a number of robustness 
tests that the timing of the legislation can be reasonably treated as exogenous to the 
process determining women’s life satisfaction, I exploit the variation given by this 
staggered and uncoordinated legalisation of the different rights as a natural experiment.
1 The three main channels through which birth control rights can affect individual utility are a reduction in 
unwanted children, a general empowerment of women, and a better planning of education choices for 
women.
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This creates natural treatment and control groups. At the same point in time it is 
possible to find women (comparable for age and personal characteristics) who have 
access or not to women’s rights simply because of the country they live in. Similarly, 
when the analysis focuses on birth control rights, within the same country women 
coexist who could take advantage of the rights because they are of childbearing age and 
women who could not because they are over childbearing age. The treatment and 
control groups can be identified by the exogenous combination of gender, age and 
country of residence of the individual. Through differences-in-differences I show that 
the extension of both abortion rights and the pill is strongly linked to an increase in life 
satisfaction of women of childbearing age. The magnitude of the welfare gain is 
equivalent to the return from achieving higher rather than middle education and a third 
of the size of the gain from being married or cohabiting. It is approximately one tenth 
of the effect of going up one level on a 12-category scale of income, one tenth of the 
corresponding welfare loss from being unemployed and one seventh of the loss from 
being separated. Other women and men have not reported any significant change in 
welfare. The effect on women in the treatment group is stronger, the younger were the 
women when they received birth control rights and the longer they were exposed to 
them. Marginal returns start to decline after the woman is 35 years old, or after 21 years 
of p ill/13 years of abortion rights.
Life satisfaction effects are consistent with changes operating through economic 
choices. The data strongly confirm that birth control rights caused an increase in 
women’s investment in education, their probability of working and their income level. 
Women professing religions that are firmly against birth control rights did not exhibit a 
change in their welfare. At the same time, other women’s rights have been less 
beneficial. The analysis shows that mutual consent divorce laws have decreased 
women’s welfare (consistently with economic theories of divorce, see Becker, Landes 
and Michael, 1977), while granting high maternity protection in the workplace did not 
have significant effects, possibly because of negative feedback effects on the 
‘employability’ of women.
This analysis suggests a crucial link between providing individual rights like birth control 
to women, favouring their empowerment in other fields (education, work) and 
ultimately increasing their welfare. This could be an important tool in development, 
where the empowerment of women is increasingly a priority of action. A third o f the
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countries in the world, mainly developing ones, representing a quarter of the world 
population, do not have birth control rights at all. If the link between birth control 
rights and increased wellbeing holds in a different institutional setting such as that of a 
developing country, then promoting individual rights for women would be a valuable 
policy for development.
The second chapter of this thesis carries out the analysis of the effects of birth control 
rights on women in India. The investigation yields different results from those found in 
the European setting. Analysing the self-reported life satisfaction and demographic 
characteristics of over 4,000 individuals in 1990 and 1996 with the same methodology 
used in chapter 1, we do not find strong evidence that abortion rights significantly 
increased the wellbeing of women in India. While a clear and robust effect was found in 
our analysis on European countries, the estimated effects are very weak in India. A 
significant association between abortion rights and higher wellbeing of women is only 
found when the income, education and location of the individuals are taken into 
account.
One possible explanation could be related to the gap between the legal guarantee of the 
rights and the effective access to them. In European countries the rights were granted at 
a null or symbolic cost for the individual. India instead is characterised by very unequal 
access to health services, even in comparison with other developing countries of similar 
level o f development. In India income, education and location can constitute significant 
barriers to .access health care. The fact that we find a positive association between birth 
control rights, a basic level of education, high income, living in a town, and a higher 
welfare may suggest some role for policy to improve access to the rights for the less 
favoured groups in society. However, these results must be taken with caution. The 
analysis has two limits: first, we cannot rule out at this stage that some of the gain in 
wellbeing stems from the direct effect of income and education on utility, and not 
through the fact that they enable access to the rights. Second, we cannot measure with 
certainty for how many women the factors of income and education can be truly 
considered exogenous to the set of available rights. Therefore given the data we have we 
cannot go beyond stating a correlation, and not a causation, between rights, higher 
wellbeing and higher income or education.
INTRODUCTION 19
Chapters 3 and 4 apply a similar methodology to investigate whether changes in political 
and economic conditions affect the way people accept the society they live in or lead 
them to revolt against their government. Understanding what creates potential instability 
and how it breaks out in actual conflict is crucial for the protection of property rights 
and the good functioning of an economy. Whether restrictions of freedom and 
economic recession are the root causes of conflict and political instability is a 
fundamental and unresolved question in the literature. One strand of literature has 
argued that grievances (i.e., shared dissatisfaction of group members about their cultural, 
political and economic standing compared to other groups) and the lack of democracy 
play a fundamental role in creating the conditions necessary for civil conflict. These may 
stem from a failure to gain the expected benefits from modernisation, leading to 
‘relative deprivation’, or from discrimination and denial of a group’s rights and liberties 
(e.g., Gurr, 1971 and Gurr and Moore, 1997). Another strand of work describes conflict 
as a result o f opportunities for rent-seeking by interested groups. Opportunities are 
given by the discovery of natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), low economic 
growth, which may give incentives to invest in appropriative versus productive activities 
(Grossman, 1991, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000 and 2001, Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 
1996, and Hirshleifer, 1995), rough terrains and large populations (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003). These papers emphasise the constraints that geography and money may place on 
the opportunities for rebels to overthrow a regime. Unless revenues from trading 
diamonds or oil, for example, are available to fund the rebels’ movement and there is a 
reservoir of poor young men who can be recruited as foot soldiers, revolts may fail 
regardless of the grievance held. For instance economic and political liberalisation may 
increase the chances of a revolt occurring if they create opportunities for outsiders to 
gain influence on the government. These theories generally go further in arguing that 
there is no relationship between the lack of civil liberties or democratic freedoms and 
the likelihood of a civil war.
The existing literature is not conclusive because of several problems affecting the study 
of conflict. On one side are the sparse data on conflicts and the little knowledge of the 
underlying factors and preferences. Not all potential situations of unrest erupt in 
conflict, and because of the multiple equilibria possible in collective action, we miss an 
important piece of information on the nature and development of conflict. The lack of 
counterfactual is evident: we never observe the same situation with and without a
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conflict erupting. Combined with the fact that revolts happen in small numbers, we also 
have very few events that are comparable. Furthermore, when we have enough detailed 
data on the circumstances of a conflict that has broken out, we usually lack the baseline 
data which describe the situation before the conflict was triggered. These difficulties 
translate in the empirical analysis into problems of measurement, endogeneity and 
omitted variables.
Two innovative approaches are designed to overcome these limits. The third chapter of 
this thesis, which is an account of joint work with Robert MacCulloch2, presents the 
first approach. After providing evidence of how individual attitudes to revolt map into 
individual and collective action, I analyse micro-data on the revolutionary tastes. Over 
100,000 people in 61 countries between 1981 and 1997 answered the question: “On this 
card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society in which we live in. Please choose the one 
which best describes jour own opinion The three possible response categories were: ‘The 
entire way our society is organised must be radically changed ly revolutionary action”, “Our society must 
be gradually improved by reforms>} and “Our present society must be valiantly defended against all 
subversive forces ” I relate each individual’s attitude to society and preference for revolt to 
the level of political freedoms, civil rights, aggregate and personal income and religiosity 
that the person enjoys, combining individual level data with macro data relative to her 
country. There are various possible explanations as to why revolutionary support may 
increase as freedoms are taken away. First, freedom may have the quality of a public 
good and belong direcdy in people’s utility function. Alternatively it may constrain the 
desired levels of consumption of other goods such as food, alcohol and clothing, so that 
it enters people’s indirect utility function. To the extent that lower freedoms increase the 
expected gain from a revolution which would relax these restrictions, a greater 
proportion of the population may support a revolt.
Examining the effect of freedom and economic growth on attitudes to revolt cannot 
avoid taking into account the possibility of reverse causality. Increased unrest may result 
in changes to the freedom that the government allows, either towards more freedom if a 
revolt is successful or towards less freedom if repression prevails. Similarly, strong 
attitudes in favour of revolt may be disruptive for economic activity or deter foreign 
investment, ultimately undermining economic growth. To deal with these concerns I
2 Now at Imperial College, but the paper was written when he was a postdoc at LSE with a desk next to 
mine.
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draw on the literature that studies the determinants of the quality of government and 
institutions across countries. The relevant theories can be categorised along economic, 
political and cultural dimensions. The first holds that institutions are created when it is 
efficient to do so, the second that they are shaped by self-interested politicians to 
transfer resources to themselves, and the third that institutions reflect the beliefs and 
values of their society. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) argue that 
political and cultural theories offer good prospects for finding reasonably exogenous 
sources of variation in country characteristics to identify institutional quality. One 
strategy they suggest is to use variations in the legal system, which can be viewed as an 
indicator of the relative power of the government versus the property owners. 
“Common law has developed in England as a defence of Parliament and property 
owners against the attempts by the sovereign to regulate and expropriate them. Civil 
law, in contrast, has developed more as an instrument... for state building and 
controlling economic life. Finally, socialist law is the expression of the ultimate control 
of the economy by the State” (as in La Porta et al, 1999). Socialist and French civil law 
tend to be more interventionist and to regulate more.3 In this chapter I follow La Porta 
et al in using legal origin as an instrument for the degree of liberties and political 
freedoms that characterise the institutions of countries. In addition to legal origin I use 
the identity of the coloniser as an instrument to control for effects of reverse causality 
of the taste for revolt. Colonial origins are discussed by Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) as a determinant o f development. They argue that different institutions 
were set up in colonies depending on whether their purpose was to extract resources 
and transfer them to the colonisers (as the Belgians did in Congo) or of creating “Neo- 
Europes” where Europeans could migrate (like the US and Australia). In the latter type 
checks and balances against government expropriation were implemented. This affected 
in the long run the quality of institutions which are observed today. The authors explain 
GDP per capita by legal and colonial origins as well as an index of protection against 
government expropriation, which they instrument with settlers’ mortality rates between 
1600 and 1800. Their hypothesis is that high settler mortality led colonisers to 
implement “low-quality” institutions that subsequently slowed development. Across the 
countries in my study greater settler mortality is associated with lower political rights
3 See Djankov, la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), where regulations are proxied by number of 
procedures required to start-up a firm.
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and democratic freedoms. It would be interesting to use it as an instrument in my 
exercise but, being available only for a subset of colonial countries, over half of the 
sample would be lost. Therefore I use legal and colonial origins as instruments. 
Controlling for the possible endogeneity of the economic and political variables, the 
level of freedom is found to have a strong and robust negative effect on revolutionary 
support. The denial of either civil liberties or political rights significantly increases the 
support for a revolt. On average within the same country a change of one standard 
deviation in civil liberties explains 41 of the standard deviation in revolutionary support. 
The size of the estimated effect for political rights is virtually the same.
High GDP growth can buy off part of the increase in revolutionary support that arises 
when freedoms are constrained.41 compute the marginal rate of substitution between 
democratisation and GDP growth that would on average keep revolutionary support 
constant. A one standard deviation decline in Democracy would have to be compensated 
by an increase in the GDP growth rate of 14 percentage points. For example, the 
growth rate would have to rise from -4% to 10% per annum in order to keep the 
proportion o f people wanting a revolt unchanged in the face of a loss of Democracy of 
this magnitude. In other words, it seems feasible to fully offset a loss of democratic 
rights, but this requires rates of economic growth that are hardly sustainable over time. 
Finally, there is evidence that being religious reduces revolutionary tastes on average by 
2.8 percentage points. The size of the effect varies with the extent of freedom and 
disappears entirely in non-ffee countries. In countries with the lowest levels of political 
rights there are no differences between the religious and non-religious. These findings 
do not hinge on being part of a religious minority.
The fourth chapter proposes a complementary approach to assess the determinants of 
conflict. It studies the role of freedom of communication, repression of opposition and 
the government’s “selfishness” on preferences for revolt and revolutionary action. It 
combines econometric analysis of survey data with the observation of how individuals 
behave in a laboratory experiment. This is to my knowledge the first attempt to 
combine the two methodologies and it appears to be promising. Studying the 
preferences of over 50,000 individuals in a regression framework, I investigate the 
relative role of political and economic grievances in preferences for conflict. Survey data
4 This is consistent with the result found theoretically by Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) that growth is a 
politically stabilizing force.
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come from the World Values Survey as in Chapter 2. The previous analysis is enriched 
with further factors: the effect of freedom of communication, repression of opposition 
and the government’s “selfishness” on preferences for revolt. Overall an investigation 
on preferences for revolt highlights that the existence of repression, the freedom to 
communicate through the press and the perception that the country is run for the 
interest of the few are important to explain attitudes to revolt within a country. 
Generally speaking, higher levels of political rights and press freedom weaken the taste 
for revolutionary action, while a feeling of appropriation by the ruling parties 
strengthens support for revolt.
In collaboration with Klaus Abbink from the University of Nottingham, I then address 
the mapping from preferences to actions observing the interaction between Citizens and 
Governor in a laboratory experiment. In a laboratory we recreate an analogous, 
although stylised, set of conditions and incentives where we can analyse whether some 
economic and political factors lead to revolutionary action. The controlled environment 
solves the conventional empirical problems of endogeneity and omitted variables. To 
study the strategic interaction that turns revolutionary tastes into actions, we introduce 
an experimental paradigm that captures the essential features of a real dictatorship, yet 
keeping the situation as simple as possible. We model the political scenario as a game of 
eight players: one Governor and seven Citizens. The game consists of three stages. In 
the first stage, the Governor makes a choice in two dimensions. First, he decides on the 
level of exploitation of society, where he can implement either a fair distribution or an 
allocation in which he keeps most of the income for himself. This feature allows us to 
concentrate on economic grievances that are directly caused by the government’s 
behaviour. Simultaneously, he also decides on the punishment that Citizens will incur in 
case of non-obedient behaviour. This reflects the level of political repression. The 
second stage is essentially a communication stage. Citizens can send messages to fellow 
Citizens, indicating whether they are willing to support an uprising against the 
Governor. Sending a positive message, however, is risky. With a small but positive 
probability the message is intercepted and the messenger incurs a punishment. This 
reflects the freedom of communication in a country. At the third stage the Citizens 
decide whether to revolt against the Governor. To be successful, a sufficient number of 
Citizens must choose to revolt. If fewer than the critical number decide to do so, those 
who have revolted receive a punishment. If the critical mass of supporters is reached,
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the Governor is overthrown and is replaced by one of the revolutionaries. In this case, 
those Citizens who did not support revolt are worse off than those who did (as they 
sympathised with the former Governor). If the revolt fails, the Governor stays in power 
in the following repetition of the game. In game theory, this creates a situation with two 
equilibria on the third stage subgame: one in which no-one supports revolution, and one 
in which everyone revolts. In reality, we observe what is generated as an equilibrium. 
The game is played repeatedly to model the long-term interaction between citizens and 
the government. The last round of each game is excluded to avoid interference by end­
game effects on behaviour.
This experiment is useful to study the effect of political repression and economic 
grievance on revolutionary action by comparing the Citizens’ actions as they follow the 
initial allocative choice by the Governor. It is possible to observe directly whether the 
choice of an exploitative rather than egalitarian allocation increases the number of 
Citizens actually choosing revolt. The messaging stage makes it possible to study the 
effect o f communication and, in particular, the extent to which the Governor impedes 
free communication within society. This can be done by running control experiments 
without the communication stage (thus focusing on the co-ordination problem as such), 
in which risk-less communication is allowed. Finally, one can observe the extent to 
which repression is effective in breaking the coordination needed for a revolt to be 
successful. The experiment was carried out at the Centre for Decision Research and 
Experimental Economics (CeDEx) of the University of Nottingham. The results show that 
the feeling by citizens that the government “operates in the interest of the few” increases both 
revolutionary preferences and actions. The lack of freedom to communicate and 
political repression increase a taste for revolt but decrease actual opposition, consistently 
with the collective action problem encountered by any opposition to an autocratic 
government. Additional insights from the experimental data are that even benevolent 
autocratic governors face a severe threat to be forced out of power and tend to protect 
themselves with some form of repression. This indicates that to some extent revolts can 
be driven by the citizens’ attempt to reach power themselves.
These findings have their limits. Being the first experimental study on revolutionary 
action, the model is kept simple and has to sacrifice some of the detail of real life. For 
example, the experiment cannot explain how the transition from one government to the
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next takes place. Analysing the effects of different transition mechanisms is in the 
agenda for future research.
Another limit is the issue of external validity of experimental data. Field data have the 
advantage of being gathered in real life, but they suffer from noise, identification 
problems, and lack of control. The laboratory, on the other hand, allows the set up of a 
controlled environment in which individual factors can be tested while keeping all 
others constant. Endogeneity problems do not arise. The effects may also be affected by 
the fact that the experimental game is naturally played on a rather small scale, with 
stakes being relatively low. Previous evidence suggests that the qualitative effects 
observed in experiments are generally robust to transformations into environments with 
even very high stakes (Slonim and Roth, 1998, Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougareva, 2002). 
So despite the small scale, the results should be informative for many political situations 
in question. The parallelism between the experiment and the real-world scenario may 
find its limits when the revolt turns into an open military conflict and the choice of 
behaviour becomes a question of life or death. Nevertheless, we have observed cases in 
history in which citizens forced their government out of office by means of civil 
disobedience, as it happened, for example, in the Eastern European revolutions of the 
late eighties and in the three recent cases discussed in the introduction.
The experiment identifies only qualitative effects o f the relevant variables. The 
magnitude of these effects is bound to depend on the strength of the relative incentives. 
In the experiment those parameters were invented so we cannot derive stringent 
quantitative predictions. Hopefully future research will help shed light on the relative 
size of these effects.
The results found are relevant to a broader range of issues. Industrial action can be seen 
as a form of rebellion against the firm’s management. Conflict can arise over wages, 
working conditions, or participation in the management’s decision making process. 
Many companies try to impede workers’ ability to go on strike, e.g. by refusing to 
employ workers organised in a union. The potential for dissent is also inherent to the 
relationships within firms (examples are the forced resignation of Michael Eisner from 
the position of chairman of Walt Disney in 2004 or the shareholder rebellion at 
Eurotunnel in 2003) and in other hierarchical organisations (e.g. dissent between players 
and the coach in team sports often leads to the forced resignation of the latter).
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Despite these limitations, laboratory experiments can provide useful insights in the 
study of civil conflicts, both in gathering empirical data as well as testing theoretical 
models. The combination of field and experimental data seems to bear a fruitful 
approach. The methods are complementary and one method’s weaknesses are the 
other’s strengths. Together they can lead to deeper insights into the factors driving 
conflict and co-operation, shifting from the traditional study of aggregate variables at 
the macro-level to a more detailed microeconomic-founded analysis of how political and 
economic changes affect the behaviour of individuals.
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Chapter 1
The effect of women’s rights on women’s 
welfare: evidence from Europe
This chapter opens the analysis of how extending or limiting individual rights affects the 
wellbeing of the people. The first question is whether women’s parity rights have an 
effect on the wellbeing of women, and if so, in which direction. Between the late 1960s 
and the 1990s social norms and institutions related to women’s role in society quickly 
changed. Women’s rights became a political issue. Equal treatment and reproductive 
rights laws were enacted in the majority of Western countries with the goal of improving 
women’s welfare. There is no bet a priori on the direction and the size of these effects. 
With some exceptions, economists generally expect an increase in welfare from policies 
that remove binding constraints on choices. In the public debate the opinion is 
fragmented. Some qualitative evaluations report that women ended up with a double 
burden from being both the primary caregiver in the family and a worker and that 
ultimately women “could not have it all”. After ten to thirty years of such public 
policies, we can evaluate their effects.
The data show that in the last thirty years women had fewer children, studied longer, 
worked more and earned a higher wage. The positive link between wage, education and 
welfare is generally assumed. Instead of imposing this assumption, I direcdy explore the 
perception of welfare based on self-evaluation by the subjects treated. I focus on the 
policy of extending birth control rights, i.e. abortion rights and the pill, on women’s 
welfare in Europe, and confront their effects with those from other women’s rights.
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Most Western countries legalised abortion between the late 1960s and 2000 with 
considerable variation of timing across countries.1 The pill was invented in the 1950s, 
marketed for the first time in the US in 1960, and embodied in national health systems 
in Europe later (some countries never adopted it). Although contraception has always 
existed, “promoted as almost 100 per cent effective, the pill altered people’s 
expectations about contraception and what it would achieve” (Marks, 2001). Its 
availability as part of the nationally financed public system meant that reliable 
information became available to all women and that they could have access to it 
regardless of age, marital status, and financial constraints.
I exploit the variation given by the staggered and uncoordinated legalisation of abortion 
and the pill in twelve European countries between the 1960s and 1990s. The timing of 
the legislation could in principle be related to national characteristics, like the dominant 
religion or the share of women in parliament, but none of these factors are by 
themselves good predictors of the actual law changes. A number of historical conditions 
have played a considerable part in the process. Therefore I can treat the legislation as 
exogenous to the process determining women’s life satisfaction. In the course of the 
analysis I explicitly address this issue and conduct a number of robustness tests.
The recent availability of surveys of life satisfaction on repeated cross-sections of 
individuals makes it possible to directly evaluate the welfare effect of policies. The 
answers of nationally representative samples of individuals about their current life 
satisfaction are used as revealed subjective utility levels and compared to traditional 
revealed preference indicators. I focus on how women changed their set of incentives 
and choices and derived private benefits from the policy changes. The identification of 
the welfare effect comes from the fact that the exposure of an individual to birth 
control rights varied by gender, country of residence and date of birth. A differences-in- 
differences estimator allows me to identify the effect of laws passed at different times in 
each country and which affected particular groups of individuals, women of 
childbearing age, with respect to women who were not exposed to abortion rights. This 
could be either because they lived in countries and years with abortion rights, but had
1 Reproductive rights were perceived as a path-breaking right in 1960s and 1970s but they had been a 
privately regulated issue for almost two thousand years, from the ancient Greek to the eighteenth century. 
Only in the nineteenth century abortion and contraception became discouraged if not prohibited in most 
Western countries.
CHAPTER 1. WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND WOMEN’S WELFARE 29
completed the fertility cycle, or because their country did not legalise abortion. 
Treatment and control groups are comparable once age effects are controlled for.
The main finding is that women of childbearing age when the policy was introduced 
consistently show an increase in welfare, according to all specifications used. It is robust 
to a number of alternative specifications and the effect is sizeable. Additional sources of 
variation in the policies are considered, like the number of years that women have been 
exposed to them, their age when the rights were introduced, the distinction between 
partial and full abortion rights, and the possible role of religion in the adoption or the 
application of the laws. Concerns about the role of concurring policies in favour of 
women are addressed, examining the effect of changes to divorce law and the 
interaction of abortion rights with maternity leave policies.
The next section reviews how the paper relates to the literature and describes the 
channels through which birth control rights may affect welfare. Section 2 describes the 
data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the main results and section 4 some 
extensions. Section 5 concludes.
1 B ackground
There are two opposing theoretical perspectives on the link between welfare and birth 
control rights. The prevalent one is that birth control and abortion rights have shifted 
out the frontier of available choices and increased women’s welfare. Goldin and Katz 
(2002) describe the pill as lowering the cost of delaying marriage by allowing sex without 
commitments. It allowed young and single women to invest more in graduate and 
professional education and achieve better careers. At the same time it allowed them to 
keep a good match in the marriage market, and possibly an even better one, due to a 
“social multiplier effect” that made the market for “career women” thicker. They find 
evidence that in the US access to the pill by women when they were 18 to 21 years old 
increased the likelihood that they went to university and married later. In a theoretical 
model, Siow (2002) shows that the welfare of women always increases with birth control 
rights, except in the rare case that the supply of marriageable men is extremely scarce, as 
fewer transfers are needed to induce women into commitments.
The other strand in the literature emphasises the adverse welfare effects on women 
from birth control. Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) set out to explain the “feminisation 
of poverty” in the United States. The idea is that birth control innovations weakened the
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bargaining position of women in the marriage market. Losing the possibility of 
demanding a “shotgun marriage” and the associated transfers, women end up with out- 
of-wedlock children and lower income. Akerlof et al argue that ultimately all women lose 
welfare. In their framework, when birth control became available, women invested more 
in human capital because of lower expected rents from marriage.
In this paper I maintain the focus on private benefits to individuals, rather than on 
societal or “public good” effects.2 The three main channels through which birth control 
rights can affect individual utility are a reduction in unwanted children, a general 
empowerment of women, and a better planning of education choices for women. In the 
first channel, birth control rights do not have any effect on the number of “planned” 
children and on the utility deriving from them (it does affect their timing and spacing 
only), while it affects the “production” of unplanned children. Introducing birth control 
rights reduces the probability of disutility from unplanned children. This prediction is 
difficult to test in the data for the lack of counterfactual.
The second channel is that of changing the benchmark of social norms. Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) describe the way that identity depends on the assigned social categories 
and on the extent to which one’s given characteristics match the ideal of the assigned 
category. Granting individual rights on birth control to women changed not only the 
individual choice of fertility, but also the benchmark itself. The social category of 
reference could then be different from the traditional one of primary caregiver in the 
family. A gain in utility arises when the distance between the actual choice and the 
benchmark diminishes. An attempt to identify this effect empirically is made when 
separating Catholic from Protestant countries, where social categories considered 
appropriate for women are likely to be different. Anticipating some results, the empirical 
analysis finds support for birth control rights changing the average welfare of all in 
Catholic countries, while in non-Catholic countries a significant effect is only found on 
treated women.
The third channel links birth control rights, education choices and welfare changes for 
women. It can be extended to include an effect on men and it lends itself to predictions 
that can be tested empirically. It is possible to write a simple model in which men and 
women derive utility from their income, which in turn depends on education. It is
2 Deriving (dis)utility from these rights on moral ground or because someone has a taste for individual 
rights is not analysed here.
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straightforward to show that without birth control rights (or when the woman does not 
want to exercise them) the optimal choice of education for women is lower than for 
men because the likelihood of unplanned fertility shortens the horizon over which to 
reap the benefits of education. Only if birth control rights exist and the woman is 
willing to use them, the optimal choice of education for men and women can be equal.3 
Under the standard assumption that income and welfare are positively related, the 
welfare of women increases with birth control rights.4
The effect on men is the result of two counteracting effects. A positive effect on welfare 
is given by the fact that, in an equilibrium based on assortative matching of 
income/education, their partner is more educated than without birth control rights. A 
negative effect on welfare could stem from lower bargaining power within the 
household as the partner’s income increases.
To my knowledge this is the first empirical study on the link between reproductive 
rights and welfare exists yet, although there is a vast literature on unintended 
pregnancies and negative effects on the mental and physical well-being of children and 
families (Gruber, Levine and Staiger, 1999). Other studies have used the staggered 
timing of the legalisation of abortion in the US as a source of variation to study fertility 
effects (Levine et al,’ 1999), the impact on female labour supply (Angrist and Evans, 
1998), and to examine the effect on criminality rates (Donohue and Levitt, 2001). This 
paper also connects to the literature on the analysis of the changing social structure of 
marriage. Edlund and Pande (2002) relate the decline in marriage to more left-wing 
voting for women through the shifting of the preference of the median female voter 
towards more redistribution. Finally, the paper relates to an emerging literature in 
economics that infers welfare changes from self-reported well-being answers. Among 
others, see Di Telia, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) and Gruber and Mullainathan 
(2002).
3 Assuming that women are the prime carers for children and that education does not affect their ability 
to care for them, the optimal choice of education for men and women is only equal when women choose 
not to have children.
4 In the empirical analysis I avoid imposing this assumption and I explore it directly in the data.
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2 D ata  and  em pirical strategy
2.1 Data description
I analyse individual-level data from the Eurobarometer survey for twelve European 
countries collected between 1975 and 1998. The Eurobarometer asks over 450,000 
individuals in repeated cross-sections the same question: “On the whole, are you 
very/fairly/not very/not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”. The answers are coded 
in four ordinal categories. The life satisfaction variable does not exhibit any systematic 
trend over the period, neither for men, nor for women. On whether subjective survey 
data can and do provide true signals of welfare (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), the 
fact that the “treatability” is not systematically correlated either with other observable 
characteristics or with the measurement error of welfare allows predictive power in 
explaining an attitude. Moreover, the framing is constant and any additive bias is 
controlled for by country and year fixed effects.
Detailed data on abortion laws come from United Nations (2002). Precise and 
comparable data on contraception policies have proved more problematic to find, 
especially on the year of licensing of the pill in each country. Data on the year that the 
contraceptive pill started to be provided through the national public health system are 
used in the analysis. The fact that Western Europe is relatively homogeneous with 
regard to the actual use of birth control rights ensures comparability. Abortion is mainly 
used as a tool of family and career planning rather than as a means to control family size 
as among married couples (Henshaw, 1990). Moreover, abortion and the pill are 
provided at a symbolic or null cost in all of these countries (David, 1992), eliminating 
concerns of rationing or budget constraints.
2.2 Em pirical strategy
By using the introduction of birth control rights as a treatment and the fact that such 
policies have been adopted at different points in time by the countries considered, the 
question can be addressed within the framework of a standard evaluation problem.5 
Since the policies exhibit a sizeable variation and affect a random selection of 
individuals chosen by demography, they provide a natural setting to estimate 
differences-in-differences effects.
5 See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999).
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A concern is that there may be a unifying theme underlying legislation that could make 
the policies endogenous to the other variables considered. The idea that the timing of 
abortion legislation followed a very clear set of motives, be them political or societal, is 
not supported by the data. The correlation between the timing of adoption of birth 
control rights and the life satisfaction in the country, the dominant religion or the 
number of women in parliament is generally low, as shown in Table A.2 in the 
Appendix. Certainly these changes did not happen in a vacuum, but no single factor is 
by itself a good, predictor of the law changes. Historical circumstances have played a 
large role.6 Table A.l reports the actual timing. In addition, most changes in laws 
occurred before the recording of life satisfaction and could not be affected by the 
dependent variable by way of reverse causation.
The combination of date o f birth, gender and country of residence determine who is 
exposed to the treatment, such that individuals cannot self-select into the policy. Birth 
control rights can only affect individuals of a certain gender and age, that is, women of 
childbearing age. Matching this information with the temporal and spatial variation of 
birth control policies in Europe naturally creates a treatment group, i.e. women who 
were of childbearing age7 when birth control rights were introduced, and a control 
group, which comprises either (i) women who were over childbearing age when the law 
changed or (ii) women of any age who were living in countries where birth control 
rights were not granted when they were interviewed.8 Since the timing of policies is 
different, different cohorts are contrasted in each country. The treatment is to be able to 
take advantage of the rights, and not to actually use them. Being able to plan one’s life 
with access to these rights is what matters.
The estimation compares the difference of self-reported life satisfaction between treated 
and control individuals when the policy was in operation to the same difference 
calculated at a point in time previous to the introduction of the policy. This is the effect
6 Germany passed full rights as the outcome of a negotiation with the more liberal East Germany's 
legislation following the unification. In Greece, Spain and Portugal it was an adaptation of the national 
corpus kgis to the European one at the time of the accession into the European Union (although it was not 
a required step, as the opposite behaviour of Ireland shows). In Italy a Constitutional Court ruling opened 
the way to a more open legislation.
7 I follow the medical literature in setting the end of childbearing age at 50 years. The results hold if an 
alternative age of 45 is adopted, as shown in the final robustness checks.
8 Distinguishing between these two sub-groups does not yield differences that are statistically significant 
and thus are gathered in the same group in the analysis.
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of treatment on the treated, i.e. the average difference between treated and untreated 
outcomes across the population and over time within the same country.
It can be written as:
e (a , |r  = i ) = e (if,r - i f /n r |r  = i )
where W represents the outcome of interest (welfare), R (for “Rights”) is the treatment, 
the superscripts R and NR refer to the treatment status (“Rights” and “No Rights” 
respectively), and R is the indicator for treatment.
The identifying restriction is that the average outcomes for treated and controls would 
have followed parallel paths over time in the absence of the treatment, i.e. the mean 
change in the no-program outcome measure is the same for treated and non-treated.
E ^ f *  -  |R = l) = E ^ f *  -  Wjf*- |R = o)
where t0 and tx are points in time before and after the introduction of the policy 
( * i  > ' < > ) •
The life satisfaction variable measured for women presents no cohort effects but 
marked age effects. The coefficients in a regression of life satisfaction on ten-year 
cohorts of women, plus the usual fixed effects, reveal that the effects from each cohort 
are not statistically different from one another. Figure 1 plots the of life satisfaction of 
women by ten-year cohorts, revealing a substantially flat pattern. Instead life satisfaction 
displays a U-shaped trend with respect to age, with a minimum around 55 years old, 
similar to previous studies.9 Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the 
systematic effect of age on life satisfaction.
If  we estimate the effect of age on life satisfaction allowing it to be country-specific, the 
equality of the coefficients cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level. Welfare can thus be 
described as a function of age and the participation in the program:
W  = g{age)+pi(R = \) + u
where is a general function of age of individuals, common across countries, is 
the change in welfare occurring for treated individuals, / is the indicator function for 
being in the treatment group and u is a country-specific unobservable.
9 Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) report a minimum in the late 30s-early 40s in Britain.
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The effect is identified by the differences-in-differences estimator:
I(r =o-14< * | I (R=°)
which is equivalent to:
e ( a , |  age„ R  = l) = E (n7,R -  W ™-1 age,,R = l)
This measures the average gain in welfare for women who were exposed to birth control 
rights compared to what they would have experienced in the base state.10
In the absence of individual panel data, the distribution of the benefits within the 
treatment group remains unknown. Characteristics that could be endogenously affected 
by the previous extension of rights (marital status, education, occupation) are only used 
descriptively (without claiming causation) to identify groups of individuals who exhibit 
higher levels of life satisfaction.
The base specification for the regression model is the following:
Wkt ~ a  +  A )  ' x a +  Pi * ilia  +  P i ' ilia  +  Pz ’ Vit +  P i  ' &c +
+ Ps 'Tt + P(> ‘ {$c ' Year) + £ia C1)
where Wict denotes a four-category indicator of welfare of individual i living in country 
c in year /, x a is an indicator for living in a country that has birth control rights at time
t, g lict identifies treated women, g 2ia 1S a dummy for the women in the control group
and 7jit are dummies for the age o f the individual at time / in ten-year spans.11
To control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, all regressions include country 
fixed effects (Sc) to capture time-invariant differences between countries that passed
such laws and those which did not; year effects (Tt ) to control for general trends in
extending abortion; a country-specific linear trend to allow country effects to change 
over time, to capture country-specific trends in attitudes towards women’s rights.12 Since 
observations are independent but not identically distributed, to correct for aggregation
10 The differences-in-differences estimator gives an estimate of the direct effects of the policy on 
individuals explicitly treated. It is possible that the rights operate with network effects and that access to 
rights by one’s neighbours affects one’s welfare, for instance that the welfare of a woman in the control 
group is enhanced by her daughter’s treatment. This idea is not developed here.
11 Dummies for being <19, 20-29, 30-39, ... 60-69, >70 years old. The results are robust to the inclusion 
of the continuous variables “age” and “age squared” instead of the above.
12 A quadratic trend yields no additional information.
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bias (Moulton, 1990) standard errors are clustered by country and year in all 
specifications.13
The fact that women may travel to a different country to have an abortion could 
confound the identification. If concrete, this possibility would only induce a downward 
bias in my estimates, which would then be conservative, without affecting their 
direction. Despite the publicity surrounding these cross-border movements, they are 
costly in terms of money, time and information and are really only available to a small 
fraction of the population. The UK and Ireland can provide an idea of the relevance of 
this effect. Ireland has never allowed abortion while the UK has legalised it since 1967. 
Travelling costs are low and the collection of information is easy thanks to the same 
language. Yet, even if all abortion performed on non-residents in the UK were carried 
out on Irish women, this would amount to treating 0.4 to 0.7 percent of women in 
Ireland (ONS, 2001).
All regressions have been run both as an ordered probit and as a linear probability 
model (LPM). Since the categories of the dependent variable are ordinal, the coefficients 
from the ordered probit model are more correct than those from OLS. On the other 
hand marginal effects are difficult to report parsimoniously for a four-outcome variable. 
Angrist (2000) shows that if the focus is on directly interpretable causal effects rather 
than on structural parameters, the two approaches are largely comparable. Thus I report 
marginal effects when describing the magnitude of the effect and results from the linear 
probability model in all other cases.
3 M ain results
3.1 T he effect on welfare
Table 1 reports the estimates of the effect of birth control rights on life satisfaction 
from the linear probability model.14 Column 1 shows the general result that women 
report on average more welfare than men, consistently with the previous literature.15 
Column 2 reports the differences-in-differences effect of having access to the pill. Tbe 
estimated coefficients show that women in the treatment group systematically report
13 The results are substantially unchanged when standard errors are clustered by country to address the 
other potential bias of potentially serially correlated outcomes (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2003).
14 All regressions control for age, country and year effects, a country-specific linear trend, and cluster the 
errors on country and year to obtain robust standard errors. The F-tests on each set of controls, including 
fixed effects, reject throughout all regressions that they could be jointly null.
15 See Blanchflower and Oswald (2003).
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higher levels of life satisfaction than the rest of the population. This is not true of other 
women, who report a negative and significant coefficient.16 The Wald test for the 
estimated difference between treatment and control group of women is significant at 
one percent level. This suggests there is not a well-being “fixed effect” from being a 
woman, but rather an historical effect of an increasing share of the women becoming 
more satisfied over time.
Column 3 investigates whether the treatment effect has been constant at the various 
ages at which women received access to the pill. Since younger women face a longer 
horizon over which to reap the benefits of education and fertility planning, the effect of 
birth control rights should be stronger, the younger the women when the rights are 
introduced. If instead the positive effect of birth control rights is merely one of 
psychological empowerment from having more individual rights, this effect should be 
constant at any age. Column 3 reveals that the largest part of the positive welfare effect 
is indeed on women who received access to the pill when they were less than 35 years 
old (the difference between receiving them before being 25 or 35 is small). Women who 
received the pill between 35 and 50 years old do not report any significant change in 
welfare. This is consistent with an effect going through better life planning of 
investment in education and desired fertility more than through a psychological 
empowerment of women.
In an alternative specification, column 4 defines the treatment group by the number of 
years that a woman had access to the pill while of childbearing age. Both a linear and a 
quadratic term are introduced. The estimates show that the welfare effect of having 
access to the pill is increasing and concave in the number of years. The maximum is 
reached after 21 years of access to the pill; after that it declines slowly. In Figure 2 the 
effect of birth control rights is plotted against the length of treatment.
Columns 5 to 7 apply the same regressions to the treatment “having access to abortion 
rights”. Both quantitatively and qualitatively the results are very similar to those of the 
pill. The main difference is that the women in the control group report a negative but 
not significant change in welfare. The coefficients on the treatment and control group 
are statistically different.
16 Estimates of the same specification where the control group o f women is broken down between 
women who did not enjoy abortion rights because of their age and those whose country did not provide 
abortion rights show that there is no difference in the welfare of the two groups.
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Table 1: The effect of abortion rights on welfare, differences-in-differences 
estimates
Depvar: Life Satisfaction Pill Abortion rights
(mean=3.043) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (V)
Pill in public policy at time of -0.165 -0.196 -0.196 -0.185
survey (3.79) (4.52) (4.54) (4.29)
Abortion rights at time of survey 0.080 0.076 0.077 0.083
(3.91) (3.74) (3.76) (4.11)
All women 0.016
(4.19)
Treatment group: women with 0.027 0.028
rights when childbearing age (6.75) (6.90)
Control group: women without rights -0.028 -0.034 -0.031 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
or not of childbearing age with rights (4.14) (4.80) (4.62) (0.72) (1.02) (0.73)
Treatment group: women who received 0.041 0.039
rights when less than 25 vears old (8.98) (7.81)
Treatment group: women who received 0.031 0.042
rights between 25 and 35 vears old (5.39) (7.30)
Treatment group: women who received -0.002 0.002
rights between 35 and 50 vears old (0.26) (0.42)
Treatment group: No. years that 0.004 0.007
women enjoyed rights (5.61) (7.00)
Treatment group: No. years that -9.40e-5 -2.71e-4
women enjoyed rights - squared (3.51) (5.39)
Age effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects, Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value of Wald tests:
Ho: Treated women = Control women 0.00 0.00
Ho: Treated (<25) = Control women 0.00 0.00
Ho: Treated (25-35) = Control women 0.00 0.00
Ho: Treated (35-50) = Control women 0.00 0.22
Ho: Treated (<25) = Treated (25-35) 0.08 0.58
Ho: Treated (<25) = Treated (35-50) 0.00 0.00
Ho: Treated (25-35) = Treated (35-50) 0.00 0.00
Ho: Treated (no.yrs) = Control women 0.00 0.07
Ho: Treated (no.yrs) = Treated (no.yrs sq) 0.00 0.00
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Obs 459,953 459,953 459,953 459,342- 459,953 459,953 459,476
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses from standard errors adjusted for clustering (250 country-year clusters). 
Sample period is 1975-1998 for 12 countries. Fixed effects are jointly significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. The bottom of the table reports the p-value of the Wald tests for the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the various treatment groups are not statistically different from one another and from 
the coefficient on the control group.
As with the pill, women reaped the maximum effect on welfare if they had abortion
rights before being 35 years old. After that the effect is negligible. The effect is concave,
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but with earlier gains and a faster decline with respect to the pill. The maximum effect 
of having access to abortion rights is after 13 years of treatment (see Figure 3 in the 
Appendix).
In all regressions, the estimated effect of abortion being allowed at the time of the 
survey is positive and significant whereas the effect of the pill being available is negative 
and significant. These effects are analogous to those of general public goods affecting 
the average level of satisfaction, independently of the private benefits at the individual 
level, but cannot be explained without further assumptions.
3.2 E conom ic significance
To describe the order of magnitude of the effect on welfare, I report the marginal 
effects from an ordered probit computed at the mean. Table 2 shows that being treated 
with access to the pill during childbearing age increases the probability of declaring to be 
very satisfied with one’s life by 1.5 percentage points. It decreases the probability to be 
fairly satisfied by 0.4 percentage points, to be not very satisfied by 0.8 points and to be 
not at all satisfied by 0.3 percentage points.
Table 2: The size of the effect of the pill on welfare
Marginal effects from being...
Women in Women in Married or Separated
Depvar: treatment group control group cohabiting
Y4: Very satisfied 0.015 -0.014 0.040 -0 . 1 0 1
Y3: Fairly satisfied -0.004 0.003 -0.008 -0.003
Y2: Not very satisfied -0.008 0.007 -0.022 0.069
Yi: Not at all satisfied -0.003 0.003 -0.009 0.036
Depvar: Unemployed Going up one income level
Having
higher
education*
Having low 
education*
Y4: Very satisfied -0.047 0.173 0.016 -0.021
Y3: Fairly satisfied 0.010 -0.040 -0.004 0.005
Y2: Not very satisfied 0.026 -0.093 -0.009 0.011
Yi: Not at all satisfied 0.011 -0.039 -0.003 0.006
Notes: marginal effects from two probit estimations, one on treatment and control groups and one on 
personal characteristics. Both include age effects, country and year fixed effects, country linear trend, 
^compared to middle education.
Comparing the estimated effect with those obtained from personal characteristics, the 
welfare gain from access to the pill is equivalent to the return from achieving higher 
rather than middle education and a third of the size of the gain from being married or 
cohabiting. It is approximately one tenth of the effect of going up one level on a 12-
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category scale of income. It is one third of the corresponding welfare loss from being 
unemployed and one seventh of the loss from being separated.
4 E xtensions
In this section the basic specification is extended to take account of possible elements of 
heterogeneity and econometric concerns.
4.1 Consistency w ith the econom ic m odel
The data allow a test of whether declared welfare matches revealed preference indicators 
that are associated with it. I apply the same policy experiment with differences-in- 
differences to observe whether women with birth control rights exhibit different choices 
of education, work and income, using the same specification as in equation l .17 I use 
probit when the dependent variable is the probability to achieve higher education or to 
work. The effects are shown in Table 3 and are largely comparable for the three 
dependent variables. Women always show a lower probability than men to study and to 
work and a lower income, but treated women perform better than the average and the 
control women fare worse. The differences between treated and control women are all 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Being a woman decreases the marginal 
probability o f attaining higher education by 5.5 percentage points but this probability 
falls to 3.2 and 4.1 percentage points for women who respectively had access to the pill 
and to abortion (columns 1 to 3). Control women are the least likely to achieve higher 
education.
In the second set (columns 4 to 6), women in general have 35.8 percentage points lower 
probability to be working than men, but this probability reduces to 34.9 for women with 
the pill and 32.3 for women with abortion rights. In the third set (columns 7 to 9) the 
dependent variable is personal income on a 1 to 12 scale. Women are more likely to end 
up in lower classes of the income ranking. Again, women with birth control rights have 
a much better standing compared to control women.
The estimates show that women who had access to birth control rights when they were 
“ y o u n g  enough7’ changed their education and work choices. The empirical results are 
consistent with the economic framework according to which birth control rights are 
expected to raise female investment in education, labour supply and income.
17 The only difference is that 20 years is the threshold age chosen for being “treated” when analysing 
education. This is to keep consistency between the timing of opportunities and choices.
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Table 3: Consistency with the economic model: the effect of birth control fights on education, probability of working and level of income
Depvar: Prob(having higher education) Prob (working) Personal income position
Treatment: Pill Abortion Pill Abortion Pill
Abortion
rights rights rights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pill in public policy at the time of the survey -0.015 -0.016 0.004 -0.003 2.561 2.291
(1.49) (1.30) (0.26) (0.20) (4.26) (3.97)
Abortion rights at the time of the survey 0.011 0.011 -0.026 -0.061 0.820 0.640
(1.44) (1.48) (2.62) (5.37) (2.99) (2.40)
All women -0.055
(24.50)
-0.358
(48.35)
-0.507
(27.57)
Treatment group: women with birth control rights when -0.032 -0.041 -0.349 -0.323 -0.411 -0.402
childbearing age (or when <20 years old for education) (11.66) (13.67) (44.94) (39.33) (18.69) (17.99)
Control group: women without birth control rights or had -0.063 -0.056 -0.382 -0.378 -0.858 -0.687
them past childbearing age (or >20 years old for education) (29.24) (22.87) (26.20) (40.65) (19.81) (16.02)
Age effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects, Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value of Wald tests:
Ho: Treated women = Control women 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo-R2/R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.19
Obs 445,706 445,866 445,866 459,953 459,953 459,953 337,017 337,017 337,017
Clusters 238 238 238 250 250 250 228 228 228
Notes: t-statistics reported in parentheses, from standard errors adjusted for clustering on country and year. Sample period is 1975-1998 for 12 countries. Columns 1-6 report 
marginal probabilities from probit estimations, columns 7-9 estimates from Linear Probability Model regressions. The personal income position is on a scale 1 to 12. The bottom 
of the table reports the p-value o f the Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the various treatment groups ate not statistically different from one another and 
from the coefficient on the control group.
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4.2 M en as a control group
To the extent that they are the partners of the treatment group, men could be affected 
by the policy changes and thus exhibit indirect welfare effects. An additional men 
control group can be identified, comprising men in the same cohort of age as the 
treatment group. They are directly comparable to women in the treatment group for 
being at the same stage of the life cycle, while they may differ for gender effects. When 
included in the base specification they do not show any significant difference with 
respect to other men, while the effects on treated and control women are unchanged. 
This could be interpreted as an indication that there is no effect, or alternatively that 
two effects counterbalance: higher welfare from more educated and more satisfied 
partners, lower welfare from lower bargaining power in the household.
4.3 Distribution o f gains and losses
It would be useful to derive some results on the distribution of the welfare gain within 
the treatment group. Unfortunately we do not know the characteristics of the same 
women before and after the treatment, thus we cannot say whether their choices of 
marital status, education, occupation were endogenous to the set of available rights. In 
the absence of longitudinal data on life satisfaction of individuals, it is only possible to 
give a descriptive, not causal, representation of some categories of women who have 
gained or lost from the institutional change.
Under both sets of birth control rights, women who are married or cohabiting, women 
who work and women with high or middle education (“women who could have it all”) 
gained the most in terms of life satisfaction. Treated women who are single are no 
different from the control group with regard to welfare. Treated women with low 
education and/or who do not work have lower welfare than average. Treated women in 
the two lowest categories of income show the biggest loss o f all (-0.24 percentage 
points), treated women in the two average categories report the average coefficient and 
treated women in the two highest categories report the largest gain (20 to 21 percentage 
points). All effects are statistically significant.
4.4 Other policies in favour o f  w om en
The possibility of omitted variable bias is investigated by including other policies in 
favour of women that changed in the same years: mutual, consent divorce laws and
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maternity benefits. Treatment and control groups are re-computed in an analogous way 
to birth control rights, according to whether women could take advantage of them when 
the law changed.18 The base specification is the same as in equation 1.
No-fault, or mutual consent, divorce laws removed the disparities between men and 
women in the event of a divorce. These laws might have increased women’s life 
satisfaction by removing a constraint on choices. On the other hand, since the existence 
of divorce is associated with being able to renege on a previous choice, its welfare 
effects may also be negative. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) point out some 
ambiguous effects of marital instability on utility maximisation. If marriage is a contract 
with various non-contractible elements, making it easier to break leads the couple to be 
“reluctant to invest in skills or commodities specific to their marriage if they anticipate 
dissolution: having, children and working exclusively in the nonmarket sector are two 
such marriage-related activities” (Becker et al’ 1977). Less time and fewer resources 
invested both in the search and in the marriage itself eventually lead to lower utility from 
marriage at the time of dissolution than expected at the time of marriage. Table 4 shows 
that the effect of no-fault divorce is negative and significant on treated women, and 
positive and significant on society as a whole.
For maternity protection policies, I examine how benefiting from “full-pay maternity 
leave”19 interacts with birth control rights. In principle, the two could be substitutes.20 
Women who benefit from good maternity protection do not need birth control rights to 
optimally plan their education and work choices because children, even if unplanned, 
would be neutral with respect to the decision to study for higher education and work. In 
this context birth control would be superfluous unless there is a taste for planning the 
timing and spacing of children. Table 4 shows scarce evidence that the two policies 
acted as substitutes. High maternity protection did not affect the welfare of women 
receiving it and no specific effects arise from the interaction of birth control rights with 
“high” maternity protection (where high means “above the average”). Nevertheless their 
effect should be seen in the context of a general equilibrium model, where disincentives
18 For divorce law there is obviously no threshold age for being treated.
19 Computed as the number of weeks of paid leave times the average wage replacement rate. The results 
are robust to alternative indicators of maternity protection (wage replacement rate, number of weeks of 
job-protected as well as non-protected leave).
20 Women are expected to bear the main impact of maternal leave changes as, even where parental leave 
equally applies to fathers, it is them who take the majority of the leave (95%).
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for firms to hire women of childbearing age are more relevant, the more generous 
maternity policies are.
Table 4: Other policies in favour of women
Treatments:
Mutual
consent
divorce
Maternity
policies
Abortion, 
rights and 
maternity 
policies
All rights
Depvar: Life Satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4)
All women 0.043 0.011 -0.003 0.006
(3.99) (1.94) (0.41) (0.44)
Abortion rights at the time of the survey 0.085 0.069
(4.36) (3.19)
Treatment group: women with abort. 0.031 0.016
rights when childbearing age (3.38) (1.99)
Pill in public policy -0.136
(3.41)
Treatment group: women with pill in 0.055
public policy when childbearing age C7.95)
Mutual consent divorce rights 0.172 0.127
(4.48) (3.21)
Treatment group: women with mutual -0.034 -0.056
consent divorce rights (2.98) (3.62)
High maternity protection ■ 0.040 0.050 0.044
(1.14) (1.73) (1.46)
Treatment group: women with high 0.004 -5.73e-4 -0.003
maternity protection when childbearing age (0.69) (0.05) (0.34)
T group (Abortion rights) * -0.005
T group (Maternity protection) (0.35)
Age effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects, Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value of Wald tests:
Ho: All women = Treated women 0.00 0.00
Ho: Treated (abort) = Treated (maternity) 0.01 0.00
Ho: Treated (abort) = Treated (pill) 0.00
Ho: Treated (abort) = Treated (divorce) 0.00
Ho: Treated (pill) = Treated (divorce) 0.00
Ho: Treated (pill) = Treated (maternity) 0.00
Ho: Treated (divorce) = Treated (maternity) 0.09
R2 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15
Obs 459,953 414,351 414,351 414,351
Ousters 250 227 227 227
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, from standard errors clustered on country and year. Sample period is 
1975-1998 for 12 countries. Fixed effects are jointly significant at 1 percent level in all specifications. The 
indicator of maternity protection used is the number of weeks of job-protected paid leave times wage
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replacement rate and “high” means above the average. Definitions o f  all variables are provided in the 
Appendix. The bottom of the table reports the p-value of the Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the various treatment groups are not statistically different from one another and from the 
coefficient on the control group.
When the four policies are included as different treatments in the same regression they 
show little collinearity. The welfare effect of birth control rights over and above the 
others remains positive and significant. The two effects of abortion and the pill are also 
statistically distinct
Another possible factor affecting the life satisfaction of women could be technological 
progress, which decreased the effort required to perform most tasks, including 
household tasks. This effect is captured by the country-specific linear time trend that all 
regressions control for. On the possibility that it is “feminism” that drove both 
women’s life satisfaction and the adoption of birth control rights, Becker (1981, p. 251) 
argues “the [women’s] movement is primarily a response to other forces that have 
dramatically changed the role of women rather than a major independent force in 
changing their role.” Without giving it empirical content, it is not observationally 
distinguishable from that of a general or country-specific linear trend.
4.4.1 Individual religiosity information as a test for omitted variable bias
Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Orthodox Jewish and Muslim religions explicitly ban birth 
control in the form of pill and abortion in all circumstances. The fact that some 
religions oppose outright birth control rights and that religious women may voluntarily 
give up these rights even when their country allows them provides another interesting 
natural experiment Within the same country we can find otherwise comparable women 
whose religion exposes them to different sets of rights. I f  treated women from these 
religions do not exhibit higher life satisfaction than the control group, while the rest of 
the treated women does, it further proves the causality of birth control rights on 
welfare.
The results in Table 5, column 3, confirm that treated women who define themselves as 
Jewish are not any more satisfied than the control group, i.e. women without rights. 
Muslim women report an additional loss of welfare compared to the control group. 
Greek Orthodox women report a positive but only weakly significant effect. This can be 
consistent with the idea of Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) that women who choose not 
to take advantage of rights may be worse off than without rights. Catholic women
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instead report a higher welfare, in line with rest of the treatment group. This is also in 
line with findings from the sociology of religion that on family planning even the most 
fervent Catholic women adopted a stance of independence from the doctrine and took 
advantage of these rights when their country allowed them. These results may be a 
farther test that the effects found so far truly arise from birth control rights and not 
from omitted underlying variables.
4.5 Variations in treatment effects by religion
The effect of the treatment may differ across institutional settings. Europe has deep 
institutional roots in Christianity. While the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox 
Churches see the pill as not acceptable and abortion as a crime to be punished with 
excommunication, the Protestant Church and the Church of England leave it to 
conscience. Consequently societies that are predominantly Catholic or Orthodox tend to 
have a polarised view of reproductive freedom. In the same countries may coexist non­
religious people who abide to the laws of the state, Catholics who abide to the Catholic 
Church law and Catholics who despite their religion choose to follow the state laws on 
this issue. Since the starker contrast between state and church law is on abortion, I 
examine whether the effect of abortion rights differs across the two settings.
Table 5, columns 1 and 2 show that, while the main results are unchanged in both sets 
of countries, Catholic countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal)21 present a much larger general effect of abortion lights at the time 
of the survey. The difference between treated and control women instead is not 
statistically different from zero. It may suggest that these countries, where women 
achieved economic and political rights later, experienced a wider societal effect of break 
up of social norms from the law change.
In non-Catholic countries (Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and United Kingdom) 
instead the effect was focused on private gains to the treated individuals. Concerns 
about whether the Catholic church has retarded the timing or the content of laws 
instead do not hold, as predominately Catholic countries are equally present among early 
adopters (France, Italy), as among late adopters (Belgium, Greece) in granting full rights, 
i.e. abortion on demand.
21 The classification is based on data from the CIA Intelligence Factbook 2002.
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Table 5: Variations in treatment effects by religious variables
Depvar: Life Satisfaction
Non-Catholic Catholic Individualreligious
denomin.country country
(1) (2) (3)
Abortion rights -0.033 0.126 0.081
(1.50) (4.93) (3.91)
Treatment group: women with abort, rights 0.049 0.010
when childbearing age (11.27) (1.72)
Treatment group and Catholic 0.032
(5.77)
Treatment group and Greek Orthodox 0.041
(1.71)
Treatment group and Jewish -0.036
(0.80)
Treatment group and Muslim -0.130
(2.61)
Treatment group and Protestant 0.044
(5.34)
Treatment group and other Protestant 0.074
(7.40)
Control group: women without abort rights or -0.014 -0.002 -0.006
not of childbearing age with abort, rights (1.32) (0.19) (0.91)
Age effects, Country effects, Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Country-specffic linear trend Yes Yes Yes
P-value of Wald tests:
Ho: Treated women = Control women 0.00 0.16
Ho: Treated & Catholic women = Control women 0.00
Ho: Treated & Greek Orth, women = Control women 0.00
Ho: Treated & Jewish women = Control women 0.72
Ho: Treated & Muslim women = Control women 0.04
Ho: Treated & Protestant women = Control women 0.00
Ho: Treated & other Protest, women = Control women 0.00
R2 0.09 0.09 0.13
Obs 178,618 281,335 459,953
Clusters 92 158 250
Notes: t-statistics reported in parentheses, from standard errors adjusted for clustering on country and 
year. Sample period is 1975-1998 for 12 countries. Countries are classified as Catholic is they have a 
relevant majority of Catholics. Fixed effects are jointly significant at one percent level in all specifications 
above. The bottom of the table reports the p-value of the Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the various treatment groups are not statistically different from one another and from the 
coefficient on the control group.
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4.6 Robustness checks
Table 6 reports some further tests.
1) Table 1 reports the basic regression where the control group is broken down between 
the women who were over childbearing age when the law changed, and the women of 
any age living in countries where birth control rights were not granted when they were 
interviewed. Distinguishing between these two sub-groups does not yield differences 
that are statistically significant -once the effect for having abortion rights at the time of 
the survey is accounted for; thus they are gathered in the same group in the analysis.
2) United Nations (2002) states that before abortion laws changed, Greece, Belgium and 
the Netherlands were known to have widespread underground abortion and not to 
enforce the ban. Thus we can distinguish “false” from “true” law changes. Indeed, a 
regression o f the basic model on these three countries in columns 2 and 3 shows that 
neither treated women, nor control women exhibit any significant effect of abortion. 
On countries where the law change was effective, instead, the basic model yields an 
even stronger positive welfare effect on the treatment group.
3) Abortion rights have been granted in two basic forms, “partial rights”, i.e. effective 
only in case of a health threat to the woman or to the child, and “full rights”, i.e. the 
right to abort on socio-economic grounds or simply on request. Some countries have 
granted partial rights only, others have later moved to full rights, others have leapt 
directly from no rights to full rights. A regression with an indicator for each set of rights 
shows that the effect is positive and not statistically different on the women treated. 
This is not surprising as partial rights often allow women to obtain full rights in practice. 
Once abortion is seen as a socially acceptable course of action and some rights are 
allowed for, the “mental health” protection ground for abortion can be extended to 
include wider reasons.22
4) Column 5 runs a sensitivity check on the age chosen as a threshold for childbearing. 
Setting it at 45 rather than at 50 does not alter the results. The same check has been run 
setting the age at 40 and the results are unchanged.
22 This is often argued in the case of Spain nowadays, which only grants partial rights, but where abortion 
is effectively available on demand in private clinics.
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Table 6: Robustness checks
Depvar: Life Satisfaction
Breakdown
control
groups
“False”
law
changes
“True”
law
changes
Partial vs. 
Full rights
Sensitivity: 
end childb. 
age at 45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Abortion rights at time o f survey 0.118 0.178 0.033 0.075
(5.82) (5.77) (1.42) (3.70)
Treatment group: w om en with 0.023 -0.006 0.065 0.033
abortion rights when childb. age (5.92) (0.36) (4.65) (7.93)
Control group: wom en without abort. -0.005 0.001 -3.78e-4 -0.008
rights or not o f childb. age with abort, rights (0.49) (0.13) (0.05) (1.27)
1 Control group: wom en in 0.055
countries with no abort, rights (5.61)
2 Control group: wom en with -0.057
abort rights only after childb. age (8.05)
Partial abortion rights 0.086
(2.29)
Full abortion rights 0.064
(2.69)
Treatment group with partial abortion 0.049
rights (3.98)
Treatment group with full abortion rights 0.040
(3.19)
Age effects, Country effects, Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value of Wald tests:
Ho: Treated women — Control women 0.94 0.00 0.00
Ho: Treated women = Control women 1 0.00
Ho: Treated women = Control women 2 0.00
Ho: Treated women w / partial r = Control women 0.00
Ho: Treated women w / full r = Control women 0.00
Ho: Treated w / partial r = Treated w / full r 0.17
R2 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13
Obs 459,953 122,867 337,086 459,953 459,953
Clusters 250 63 187 250 250
Notes: t-stats in parentheses, from standard errors clustered on country and year. Sample period is 1975- 
1998 for 12 countries. In colum n 1 ,1 create two separate control groups. In columns 2 and 3 ,1 separate 
countries that did not have an effective law change because had widespread underground abortion before 
the law changed (Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands). Column 4 examines whether partial and full 
rights have the same effect. In column 5 ,1 check the sensitivity of results to the threshold set for the end 
of childbearing age. The bottom of the table reports the p-value of the Wald tests for the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the various treatment groups are not statistically different from one another and 
from the coefficient on the control group.
5) Donohue and Levitt (2001) argued that the crime rate in the United States has 
declined significantly as a result of the legalisation of abortion as fewer unwanted 
children were bom. This could suggest that as a result the population contained a higher
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proportion of “happy” people, biasing the results. The positive effect of abortion rights 
on the treated is robust to excluding from the sample individuals bom  after abortion 
rights were introduced.
5 C onclusion
This paper evaluates the private benefits to women arising from changes to their set of 
incentives and choices from birth control policies: abortion rights and the endorsement 
of the pill in national public policies. It analyses answers by over 450,000 individuals 
from twelve European countries between 1975 and 1998 reporting a self-evaluation of 
their life satisfaction. The main finding is that following the introduction of birth 
control rights, women who could take advantage from the policy (that is, they were of 
childbearing age at the time the policy was introduced) consistently registered an 
increase in welfare. The magnitude of the welfare gain is equivalent to the return from 
achieving higher rather than middle education and a third of the size of the gain from 
being married or cohabiting. It is approximately one tenth of the effect of going up one 
level on a 12-category scale of income. It is one third of the corresponding welfare loss 
from being unemployed and one seventh o f the loss from being separated. Other 
women and men have not reported any significant effect. The effect on women in the 
treatment group is stronger, the younger were the women when they received birth 
control rights and the longer they were exposed to them. Marginal returns start to 
decline after the woman is 35 years old, or after 21 years of pill/13 years of abortion 
rights.
Life satisfaction effects are consistent with changes operating through economic 
choices. The data strongly confirm that birth control rights caused an increase in 
women’s investment in education, probability of working and income level. Women 
professing religions that deny birth control rights did not exhibit a change in their 
welfare. At the same time, other women’s rights have been less beneficial. The analysis 
shows that mutual consent divorce laws have decreased women’s welfare, while granting 
high maternity protection in the workplace did not have significant effects, possibly 
because of negative feedback effects on the 'employability’ of women. Econometric 
concerns of endogenous legislation are discussed but they do not appear to apply. A 
series of robustness checks and sensitivity analysis is presented.
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A question not addressed in this paper is why birth control rights are not always 
granted, if it is true that they generally improve welfare. It would be interesting to 
endogenise the law as part of a political economy process. One possible explanation 
could be linked to the median voter having different preferences from the “average” 
one, motivated by a political system where men are over-represented. Another extension 
of the analysis is to identify the distribution of the gains and losses from the policy. 
Panel data at the individual level would be required to estimate this effect. .
The next question which will be addressed in this thesis is whether these results hold in 
the context of developing countries.
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A ppendix 1: H istory  of legalised abortion
From classical antiquity to 19th century
Abortion was commonly accepted in the classical world, both by the Greeks, the Roman 
Empire and throughout the Middles Ages (David, 1992). David (1992) recounts that “in 
the Old Testament, abortion was a crime to be punished by a fine; it was not considered 
murder (Exodus 21:22)”. The early Christians followed in this route. In 13th century 
Pope Innocent HI wrote that abortion prior to quickening, i.e. until the moment the 
first movements of the foetus could be felt, was a minor sin, and only after quickening it 
became homicide. “Quickening” was usually around the sixteenth to eighteenth week of 
the pregnancy, but ultimately it was a distinction relying on a woman’s subjective 
experience. Pope Gregory XIV in 1591 wrote that early abortion did not constitute 
grounds for excommunication.
The first law restricting abortion was adopted in Great Britain in 1803. The concern at 
the time was not with the foetus, but with the dangers to the woman’s life from life- 
threatening abortions, which ended in death about thirty percent of the times (David, 
1992 and Brookes, 1988). Until then, and since 1307, common law had allowed women 
to have an abortion at will until quickening. In 1861 Great Britain further tightened the 
law by decreeing abortion at any stage a criminal offence, punishable by life 
imprisonment. For the first time, the woman herself was liable for prosecution. This 
was the most severe law in Europe, but similar laws restricting abortion were soon 
introduced in Europe and North America throughout the second half of the 19th 
century. In 1869 Pope Pius IX promulgated a marked change in Church law by 
eliminating any distinction between formed and unformed foetus and punishing any 
abortion, even if necessary to save the life of the woman, with excommunication.
Europe in the 20th century
At the beginning of the 20th century, abortion was restricted by law throughout the 
Western countries at any stage of the pregnancy. Nevertheless, the gap between statute 
law and accepted social practices started to widen. Abortion was increasingly a relatively 
safe and accepted social practice. Prosecution was only weakly enforced.23 Families from
23 Brookes (1988, p. 22, 26) reports that “the small number of convictions for the crime stand in sharp 
contrast with contemporary estimates of its prevalence”. In England, “although the death sentence was 
mandatory when the woman died, those convicted of murder resulting from a procured miscarriage were 
given reprieves.”
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all backgrounds were using fertility regulation, including abortion, to limit family size. 
Potts and Campbell (2002) report that “in Britain, 25% of women marrying in 1860 had 
eight or more children; by 1925, 40% were to have one or no children.” Middle and 
upper classes started to adopt long-term family planning in association with (men’s) 
career patterns and financial conditions, and the working class experienced a costly 
increase in the time-span of child dependency, due to compulsory schooling, restrictions 
on child labour, and the decline in infant mortality (Brookes, 1988).
Faced with the gap between statute law, which solved the moral problem of abortion, 
and the unfastened control of women over their fertility in practice, European countries’ 
legislation started to evolve in very distinct ways, related to their peculiar history, culture 
and ideology. The first effort at abortion liberalisation emerged in 1920 in the Soviet 
Union, which enacted a short-lived liberalisation of abortion aimed to recognize the 
equal status of women. It was overturned in 1936. In the other countries, “its 
association with Bolshevism could only confirm most doctors’ suspicions that it was 
immoral” (Brookes, 1988). In the 1930s some openings happened in Iceland (for 
medico-social conditions), in Great Britain (with the Rex vs. Bourne case there was the 
first recognition of “therapeutic” abortion to save the woman’s physical and mental 
health after a rape), in Denmark and Sweden (for socio-economic indications). The 
climax o f anti-abortion laws was during the Second World War, when all countries 
banned abortion in fears of decline of the national population and promoted family 
rhetoric, or “compulsory maternity” (Brookes, 1988, p. 91). Germany was the paradox, 
which forbad abortion on all grounds except eugenetic ones. After the end of the war, 
all countries in the socialist bloc except Albania liberalised abortion. In Western Europe 
starting in 1967 with the United Kingdom a new wave of liberalisation started. The 
timeline and a description of changes to legislation are given in table A.l and Appendix 
2 .
The rest of the world in the 20th century
The vast majority of changes to birth control rights in the past fifty years have been 
towards liberalizing it, not towards restricting it. In the United States, abortion was 
legalised in two stages, first in 1970 in five states and in 1973 in the rest of the nation 
with the Roe vs. Wade Supreme Court decision. In Canada it is legally permitted on 
request following a 1988 Supreme Court’s decision. Eastern European countries 
considered abortion as a fundamental societal right under the socialist regimes. People
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in East Germany indeed saw this right restricted when they adopted the West German 
code of law following the unification. Interestingly, the only East European country 
with a strong Catholic tradition, Poland, voted an Anti-Abortion Act in 1993 after it had 
been legal since 1956.
In India it was legalised in 1972 but its actual provision is highly unbalanced between 
urban and rural settings. The same is true in Bangladesh. In China abortion is explicitly 
linked to family planning'and population control. In  most African countries, abortion is 
still hampered by very restrictive laws. Legal systems are often still inspired by the 
British Law of 1861 or by the French law of 1920, in which abortion was condemned 
and persons performing it were prosecuted. In 1999, out of 54 African countries, 26 
allowed abortion only to save the mother’s life, in one country it was permissible in case 
o f threat to the mother’s physical health, and 23 also contemplate threats to the 
mother’s mental health. Only in Zambia abortion is permitted for socio-economic 
reasons. Three countries, Tunisia, Cape Verde and South Africa pose no restrictive 
conditions to the termination of pregnancy. Among Latin American countries, most of 
them put stringent legal limitations on abortion, often reflecting the Spanish colonial 
heritage in their legal codes. Induced abortion is punishable by law in almost every 
country except Cuba and a few other Caribbean nations, although in most countries it 
can be performed on the doctor’s initiative for health reasons or for victims of sexual 
crimes.
For Islam, the Koranic condemnation of killing children is generally understood as 
applying to abortion as well, although the majority of scholars usually interpret it after 
some “ensoulment stage”. Muslims are also commonly opposed to contraception. For 
Judaism, abortion for therapeutic reason is mandatory when the woman’s life is in 
danger, as her life takes precedence on the still potential life of the foetus. Beyond this, 
there is no unified Jewish position on abortion and rabbis’ positions may vary. 
Orthodox Jews strongly oppose it. Among Protestant denominations, there are deep 
divisions, which make it difficult to determine an official church policy.-24
24 • Childbirth by Choice Trust (1995), Abortion in Lunv, History and lisligion, at www.cbctrust.com/ 
abortion.html.
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A ppendix 2: Sum m ary of abortion laws in  E urope in  1975- 
1998
Belgium: The abortion law in Belgium was significantly liberalized in 1990, when the 
Belgian Parliament approved a law amending the 1867 Penal Code. Attempts to 
liberalize the abortion law of Belgium had begun in 1971. Between 1971 and 1990, 
various legislative proposals to permit abortions were introduced, always to be rejected 
or allowed to expire. Although the law remained unchanged, prosecution was rare, and 
those prosecuted were most often given short or suspended sentences or, in some cases, 
acquitted. The 1990 law permits abortion to be performed in the first 12 weeks of 
pregnancy when a woman who is “in a state of distress as a result of her situation” 
requests a physician to terminate her pregnancy. The woman is the sole judge of 
whether she is in distress.
France: France liberalized abortion in 1975. The law allows an abortion to be 
performed before the end of the tenth week of pregnancy by a physician in an approved 
hospital when a woman who is “in a situation o f distress” because of her pregnancy 
requests it.
Denmark: Until 1937, abortion was illegal in Denmark. In 1937, the Parliament enacted 
legislation allowing abortion to be performed in cases of a threat to life or health, rape 
or incest, and foetal impairment. The law was further liberalized in 1956 and 1970 to 
allow abortions for various social reasons, such as having four or more children or being 
over thirty-eight years of age. In 1973 the law was again liberalized to allow abortions to 
be performed on request during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
(West) Germany: The life satisfaction data refer to West Germany before the 
unification and to united Germany thereafter, and so the law changes. In 1975 the 
German Parliament voted to liberalize the country’s abortion law to permit abortions on 
request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, but shortly after the German Federal 
Constitutional Court held that it violated constitutional provisions protecting the right 
to life of the unborn. In response, the Parliament adopted legislation allowing abortion 
to be legally performed according in case of health reasons, rape or incest, or of 
intolerable distress for the woman, which could encompass socioeconomic grounds. 
The state of intolerable distress was to be determined by a physician other than the one 
performing the abortion and not by the pregnant woman herself. As a result of the 
requirement of the physician’s approval, access to abortion and abortion rates differed
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substantially in the country. In the North, physicians routinely approved and performed 
abortions on socioeconomic grounds, while in the South, in states such as Bavaria, the 
performance of abortions was less frequent. Following the unification, the problem was 
how to harmonize the law of West Germany with that of East Germany, which folly 
supported the cause of women’s rights and guaranteed abortion on demand during the 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy and thereafter for serious reasons. A compromise was 
reached in 1992 under which West German law would apply, but the pregnant woman 
was allowed to make the final decision, and not the physician, as was previously in East 
Germany. Abortion was also legal up to 22 weeks of pregnancy in case of child’s serious 
defects, and at any time to prevent a serious threat to the pregnant woman’s life or 
health. In 1993, the Constitutional Court of Germany gave an ad hoc ruling, which the 
Parliament embodied in the new legislation in 1995. It was declared that this law 
violated the right to life explicitly guaranteed by the German Constitution and that all 
abortions except those performed for therapeutic reasons were unlawful. At the same 
time, however, it ruled that if the woman was in state o f distress, an abortion was illegal 
but not punishable. The implication was that abortions would not be paid for by state 
health insurance, as was the case under the previous laws of both parts of Germany, 
except when the woman’s income fell below a certain threshold.
Greece: Until the Second World War, the government of Greece was strictly opposed 
to induced abortion. Under the Greek Penal Code of 1950, heavy penalties were 
imposed on both the woman consenting to the abortion and the person performing it. 
Abortion was permitted only for physical health reasons or in case of rape or incest The 
Greek Orthodox Church considers abortion to be a crime. The law was liberalized in 
1978 to include risks for the mental health of the mother and serious foetal 
abnormalities as grounds for abortion within 12 to 20 weeks o f pregnancy, but they had 
to be determined by a psychiatrist on the staff of a public hospital. In 1986 the legal 
framework for abortions was further liberalized, granting the right to abortion on 
request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy and within 24 weeks in case of serious 
foetal abnormalities. It is believed that the liberalization of the abortion law in Greece 
has made little difference in the abortion rate because, prior to its liberalization, a person 
performing an abortion or a woman undergoing an illegal abortion was rarely 
prosecuted.
CHAPTER 1. WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND WOMEN’S WELFARE 57
Ireland: Abortion in Ireland has been illegal since the founding of the Republic. After 
1967, when England liberalized its abortion law by statute, women could easily travel to 
England to have an abortion performed legally and safely. Approximately 4,000 Irish 
women did this each year, with a significant number of them aided by Irish family 
planning associations. A constitutional amendment in 1983 placed the lives of the 
mother and the unborn child on an equal level and obligated the State to adopt 
measures to protect the latter. In 1988 and 1990, the Supreme Court of Ireland issued 
permanent injunctions against the provision of information services on abortion in 
England by Irish family planning groups and student groups. In 1995 this decision was 
upturned following a referendum by which the Irish public approved the rights to 
information and to travel, but defeated the proposed wording on exceptions to the ban 
on abortions, thus allowing the decision of the Supreme Court on this issue to stand.
Italy: Until the 1970s, the Penal Code of 1930 prohibited publicity on contraception 
and the performance of abortions, except when the life of the pregnant woman was 
threatened. In 1971, however, the Constitutional Court ruled that the provisions of the 
Code relating to contraception were unconstitutional, and in 1975 it held that the 
abortion provisions were also unconstitutional in so far as they prohibited it in case of a 
serious threat to the pregnant woman’s health. A new law was enacted in 1978, regarded 
at the time as one of the most liberal abortion laws in Western Europe. This law 
provides such broad grounds on which abortion is permitted that it effectively allows 
abortion on request because it is the woman herself who attests that she is in one of the 
situations described by the law and the primary role of the physician is to certify the 
existence of a pregnancy. In practice, however, the situation varies to some extent from 
one region of the country to another. A major reason is the strong influence of the Holy 
See. When the 1978 law was approved, the Holy See immediately issued a warning that 
any person performing an abortion and any woman obtaining an abortion would be 
excommunicated. A large number of physicians have invoked the conscience clause.
Luxembourg: Abortion law was liberalized in 1978. Prior legislation dated from 1879 
and was based on the Napoleonic Penal Code of 1810. Both a person who performed 
an abortion and the woman consenting to the abortion were subject to severe penalties, 
including imprisonment. Under the 1978 law, abortion is legal during the first 12 weeks 
of pregnancy in case of risk for the physical or mental health of the woman; of child’s 
serious disease or malformation, or in case of rape. Despite the passage of a more liberal
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abortion law, there has been some reluctance on the part of physicians in Luxembourg 
to perform abortions, owing in part to the prevailing religious conservatism.
Netherlands: Under the Penal Code of the Netherlands (1886) and its 1911 
amendment, abortion was illegal except when performed to save the life of the pregnant 
woman. However, the law was not strictly enforced and abortion services were readily 
available. In 1981, a new law was enacted that permitted abortion on request at any time 
between implantation and viability if performed by a physician in a hospital or licensed 
clinic.
Portugal: The Portuguese Criminal Code of 16 September 1886 prohibited abortion in 
any circumstance. Termination of pregnancy was in practice permitted to save the life of 
the mother, despite the fact that there was no specific provision for such cases in the 
Criminal Code. The law was liberalized in 1984 to permit “partial rights”. Abortion 
could be performed in case of serious risk for the physical or mental health of the 
mother, child’s serious or incurable disease or malformation, or rape. In June 1996 the 
Communist Party proposed legislation to liberalize abortion and to make it legal up to 
12 weeks on demand, but the proposed law was narrowly defeated in February 1997.
Spain: Under Spanish criminal law provisions first enacted in the 1800s and in effect 
until 1985, abortion was prohibited without exceptions, except to save the life of the 
pregnant woman. After an attempt to introduce a more liberal legislation in 1983, 
immediately opposed by the Constitutional Court on the ground that it did not 
adequately protect prenatal life, in 1985 new abortion legislation was adopted. Under the 
legislation, an abortion can be legally performed in case of serious risk for the physical 
or mental health of the mother, child’s physical or mental defects, or rape. In reality, it is 
often argued that abortion is effectively available on demand in private clinics.
United Kingdom: Abortion in England, Scotland and Wales is currently regulated by 
the Abortion Act of 1967, as amended in 1990, which permits abortion to be performed 
on broad grounds, as certified by two physicians, of risk for the physical or mental 
health of the woman or any existing children of her family, or in case of child’s physical 
or mental abnormalities, within 24 weeks and the pregnancy. In assessing the risk to the 
health of the woman and her existing children, physicians may take into account the 
woman’s “actual or reasonably foreseeable environment”. Owing to this provision and a 
broad interpretation about what constitutes a threat to health, abortions are available
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virtually on request in the United Kingdom. The Abortion Act of 1967 does not apply 
in Northern Ireland. There the provisions of the “Offences Against the Persons Act” of 
1861 are still in effect, which rule out abortion unless necessary to save the life of a 
pregnant woman.
Largely adapted from United Nations (2002), Abortion Policies. A  Global Preview.
A ppendix 3: D ata descrip tion and sources
Eurobarom eter (version Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-99)
Countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
Years: 1975-1998 except Greece (1981-1998) and Spain and Portugal (1985-1998).
Life satisfaction: four-category variable based on the question: “On the whole, are you 
very/faidy/not very/not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”. The distribution of the 
answers is “Very satisfied” 27.63%, “Fairly satisfied” 54.09%, “N ot very satisfied” 
13.63% and “Not at all satisfied” 4.65%.
Personal characteristics: dummies on gender, whether the person is working, 
married/cohabiting or single, level of education25, personal income on a 12-point scale. 
Age: dummies for age less than 20, 20-29, 30-39,40-49, 50-59, 60-69, over 70.
Religious denomination: the Eurobarometer asks: “Do you regard yourself as belonging 
to a religion?”. Answers are coded separately for Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, 
Muslim, Protestant and Other Protestant (including Church of England).
Sources of policies
Abortion laws: United Nations (2002).
Date o f inclusion of pill in national health planning: Jones et al (1989), United Nations 
(2002).
No-fault divorce: Edlund, Haider and Pande (2003).
Maternity leave benefits: data kindly provided by Christopher Ruhm.
Percentage of women in parliaments: Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995), Women in 
Parliaments 1945-1995, Geneva.
25 Based on age when finished full-time education: low <15, middle 16-19, high >20.
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Table A.1: Women’s rights in Europe, 1960-1998
Abortion partial 
rights (health 
grounds)
Abortion full 
rights (on 
request)
Pill as part of 
public policy
No-fault
divorce
Belgium 1990 1973 1975
Denmark 1973 1973 1969
France 1975 1967 1975
West Germany 1976 1995 1975 1976
Greece 1978 1986 1980 1983
Ireland no no 1995
Italy 1978 1971 1971
Luxembourg 1978 1975
Netherlands 1981 1969 1971
Portugal 1984 1976 1975
Spain 1985 1978 1981
United Kingdom 1967 1961 1971
Table A.2: Correlation matrix
Abortion
rights
Pill in 
public 
policy
life
satisfaction
Women in 
parliament
High 
maternity 
protection 
at work
No­
fault
divorce
Pill in public 
policy -0.054
Life satisfaction -0.059 -0.051
Women in 
parliament 0.307 -0.023 0.267
Majority of 
Catholics -0.220 -0.316 -0.243 -0.718
High maternity 
protection at work 0.489 0.040 -0.011 0.356 -0.333
No-fault divorce 0.341 0.161 0.039 0.330 -0.347 0.786
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Figure 1: Cohort effects on life satisfaction for women
Figure 2: Age effects on life satisfaction for women
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Notes: coefficients from regression including personal characteristics and fixed effects as in main
specification.
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Figure 3: The effect of birth control rights over time
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C h a p te r  2
Women’s rights and wellbeing in India
This chapter studies the link between women’s rights, empowerment and wellbeing in 
India. Tracking the changes in women’s roles and rights within society in the last fifty 
years, development policy has elected female empowerment as a goal for the 
advancement against poverty. Increasing pressure has been exerted by the international 
donors’ community on developing countries to introduce programs targeted to women’s 
rights. Our evaluation carried out in the European context has shown a sizeable positive 
effect of birth control rights on the wellbeing of women, while maternity protection in 
the workplace seems to be neutral and no-fault divorce appears to have even worsened 
their position. These results seem to suggest that not all parity rights may be equally 
welfare-enhancing. Each legal right should be studied in its own respect defining 
explicitly its implications on preferences and behaviour. Moreover, rights may have 
different effects in varying institutional settings. Some countries may guarantee a legal 
right without putting in place the conditions for effective access. In this case a welfare- 
enhancing policy may have no effect in practice.
As part of a wider research agenda on whether and how individual rights affect 
wellbeing, this chapter carries out an assessment of the effects of abortion rights in 
India using individual-level data. The answers of nationally representative samples of 
individuals about their current life satisfaction are used as utility indicators and are 
compared between cohorts of women who had access to birth control rights at different 
stages of their life.
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Between the end of the 1960s and the 1970s a significant number of countries have 
granted abortion rights. The first piece of international legislation explicitly affirming 
“the reproductive rights of women” was the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the United 
Nations. The Cairo Conference in 1994 mentioned explicitly for the first time the 
problem of the high mortality rate among women due to unsafe abortion. The summit 
promoted the concept of making “reproductive health” a priority for development, 
without calling it a right. This was acceptable for the many countries where abortion was 
not legal. The Beijing conference in 1995 then made the connection between 
reproductive health and “physical, mental and social” wellbeing and promoted “the 
capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so”1. By 
2000 two thirds of the world countries, covering 75 percent o f the world population, 
had enacted reproductive rights laws.
The previous chapter has shown that birth control rights have played an important role 
in increasing wellbeing among women in European countries. In particular, having 
access to abortion rights during childbearing age has increased the probability for a 
woman to declare to be “very satisfied” with her life by 1.5 percentage points. It has 
decreased the probability to be “fairly satisfied” by 0.4 percentage points, to be “not 
very satisfied” by 0.8 points and to be “not at all satisfied” by 0.3 percentage points. 
Having access to birth control rights also enhanced the probability for women to study 
longer, to work and to earn a higher income. However, it is not clear whether these 
results could equally apply to developing countries, which typically have different 
institutions.
An important factor in the extension of birth control rights in Europe was the 
consensus in keeping the monetary costs for the individual at the lowest possible level 
and to encourage the dissemination of the information about their availability. Besides 
setting similar time limits across countries (12 weeks for voluntary abortion and 20 to 24 
weeks for late abortion), abortion rights and the pill are provided to everyone within 
public facilities at a null or symbolic cost. The distribution of public health facilities is 
extensive and the basic level of education approaches 100 percent. Effective access to 
the rights is very high.
1 “Strategic objective C3”, Fourth World Conference on Women 'Platform for Action^ Beijing 1995, as reported in 
http://www.un.org/wornenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/health.htm.
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In the context of developing countries access to information is known to be a crucial 
divide. There are substantial inequalities among the population in levels of education 
and access to newspapers, radio and television. These inequalities often run in parallel to 
inequalities in income. Lack of access to information frequently translates into unequal 
access to public policy facilities. Jalan and Somanathan (2004) find in the context of 
India that “being informed matters” even in the adoption of basic hygienic norms, and 
that being informed is a function of three factors: education;, wealth and the existence of 
specific programs to disseminate information. Therefore in the analysis of the effects of 
birth control rights, attention is given to the role of barriers that impede access to these 
rights in the form of income constraints, lack of information and regional disparities.
The first section describes the status of abortion rights in the law in India and how 
access to health services is effectively distributed among the population. Section 2 
explains the methodology used to study the effect of birth control rights on welfare, as 
measured by their self-reported satisfaction with life. Section 3 describes the results and 
section 4 concludes.
1 B ackground on In d ia
1.1 Abortion laws
Abortion was liberalised in India following the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 
of 1971, which took effect in 19722. Prior to this, abortion was only permitted to save 
the life of the woman according to the Indian Penal Code of 1860. Having an illegal 
abortion or performing one was subject to three years of prison (seven if the pregnancy 
was at an advanced stage) and a fine.
The 1971 Act formally allows abortions to be performed only if the life of the woman 
or her physical or mental health are at risk, if there is substantial risk that the child 
would be seriously handicapped or if the pregnancy follows from a rape. In practice the 
jurisprudence allows to take into account the woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable 
environment, as well as “the anguish caused by a failure o f the contraceptive method 
used” as long as it is within the context o f a married family.
The consent of the woman is always required. A pregnancy may be terminated within 
the first 12 weeks of pregnancy on the opinion of one registered medical practitioner
2 The reference used for this section is United Nations (2002).
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and between 12 and 20 weeks on the opinion of two. Abortions can only be performed 
by a registered medical practitioner in a public hospital or in a facility approved by the 
Government, or anywhere if the life of the woman is considered to be in serious danger 
by a registered medical practitioner.
The purpose of the legalisation of abortion was to reduce the incidence of illegal 
abortion and the related maternal mortality. However, United Nations (2002) reports 
that, according to government data, only about 1 million of legal abortions are 
performed each year, while the number of illegal abortions is estimated to be between 2 
million and 6 million per year and is thought to account for 20 percent of maternal 
deaths in India. Although the government repeatedly emphasises that abortion should 
not be viewed as a method of family planning, most women who have obtained an 
abortion (legal or not) tend to have at least two living children and to be non-users of 
contraception. One study estimated that up to 80 percent of abortion patients were not 
using any contraceptive method (United Nations, 2002).
While increasing women’s rights and their freedom from unwanted pregnancies, 
granting legal abortion has had in some regions the perverse effect of making sex- 
selective abortion more easily available (i.e. the choice to terminate a pregnancy if a girl 
is expected). Although forbidden by law, some private clinics provide cheap prenatal 
gender tests and then offer an induced abortion if the parents are dissatisfied with the 
sex of the foetus. This practice is more widely available in the states in the north and in 
the east and they are common even among the rural poor. A country-wide legislation 
enacted in 1994 restricts prenatal diagnostic techniques to cases involving serious 
diseases and abnormalities and prohibits entirely the advertising and the use of such 
techniques to determine the sex of a foetus. Facilities performing prenatal diagnostic 
techniques must be registered and it is prohibited to reveal the sex of a foetus in any 
manner. The law also prohibits family members of a pregnant woman from seeking or 
encouraging her to undergo prenatal testing to determine the sex of the foetus. 
Penalties for contravening the law include imprisonment and fines and, in the case of a 
registered medical practitioner, loss of registration, which can be permanent in the case 
of repeat offences.
Until 1996 women’s birth control rights have been strongly promoted as a means to 
reduce the overall country’s fertility rate, with targets like the two-child family and 
implicit sanctions for those exceeding the target (like not receiving maternity benefits
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after the second child or being excluded from political participation). The 2000 National 
Population Policy aims at increasing the outreach of reproductive services while 
eliminating the target component on those administering family planning services.
1.2 The use of health services as a function of status, access to information 
and location
There is evidence that inequalities in access to health are very pronounced in India, even 
with respect to countries with comparable levels of development. Dreze and Sen (2002) 
recount that health inequalities are based on region, class, caste and gender. They report 
the finding from a study by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (2000) 
which suggests that for every rupee of public expenditure on health services that reaches 
the poorest 20 percent of the population, three rupees reach the richest 20 percent. 
Table A.l in the Appendix reports selected statistics on access to health facilities 
collected by the World Bank.3 These data are broken down by gender, by income 
quintile and by urban and rural setting. There is a clear divide in the access to various 
measures of health facilities along the dimensions of income, location, education and 
access to information. Among lower income classes and in rural settings the fertility rate 
is generally higher and the use of contraceptives is lower. This could suggest that 
women from lower income classes and from rural areas have less access to health 
facilities, but it may also be consistent with them having different preferences over the 
ideal number of children.
Looking at how access to health is distributed among private and public facilities shows 
that a two-tiered system of health provision is effectively in place. Women from upper 
quintiles and from urban settings obtain a higher proportion o f contraceptive care as 
well as ante and postnatal care from private rather than public facilities. The divide 
along income, education and location is also present regarding access to information, 
power in decision-making and freedom of movement. Women from lower quintiles and 
from rural settings consistently show worse outcomes in terms of use of newspapers, 
radio and television. They have a lower probability than their counterparts in urban 
settings or from upper income quintiles to seek their own health care, to make large 
household purchases and to travel to visit family or relatives. On the other hand, in 
terms of education (i.e. completing fifth grade), women from rural settings seem to
3 www.genderstats.worldbank.org.
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perform better, although income still plays a strong role in favouring access to 
education.
On access to abortion services we lack precise statistics. United Nations (2002) reports 
that the implementation of the law has been slow and geographically uneven. Abortion 
services are often hard to access in rural areas and women are reluctant to utilize those 
services because of the lack of anonymity and confidentiality. It appears that the women 
who make use of legal abortion in hospital facilities are mostly educated, from an urban 
middle-income family, married and between 20 and 30 years of age. In contrast, the 
women admitted to public hospitals with complications from illegal septic abortions are 
more often illiterate and from poorer segments of the population. These observations 
are consistent with other findings that the level of awareness of the legality of the 
procedure is fairly low, and the existing facilities for the legal medical termination of 
pregnancy are either not available or not utilised by women who seek illegal abortions.
2 Analysis
2.1 Data on wellbeing in India
The source of data on individual wellbeing is the World Values Survey4. This is a long­
standing project by Prof. Ronald Inglehart at the Institute of Social Research at 
University of Michigan designed to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the 
world. The survey was carried out in India in 1990 and in 1996.5 A representative 
sample of 4,540 adults aged at least 18 were interviewed face-to-face in the two waves. 
O f these, 4,386 individuals answered the question: “All things considered, how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole these days?” and the person was shown a card with the 
numbers between 1 and 10, where 1 corresponded to “dissatisfied and 10 to “satisfied”.
Table 1: Summary statistics on life satisfaction
l i f e  satisfaction Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Men 2,398 6.612 2.487 1 10
Women 1,988 6.643 2.396 1 10
Source: World Values Survey.
4 Version obtained by tbe UK Data Archive.
5 A more recent wave was carried out in 2000. It has just been made available to the public and we plan to 
incorporate it in the analysis.
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics for life satisfaction. The mean life satisfaction is 
6.61 for men and 6.64 for women. The answers came from 2,461 individuals in 1990 
and 1,925 in 1996.
2.2 Identification of the wellbeing effect from abortion laws
We focus on how women changed their set of incentives and choices and derived 
private benefits from the policy change. The technique chosen is the estimation with 
differences-in-differences, following the original framework developed in chapter 1. As 
before, we estimate an average effect of treatment on the treated. The treatment is to be 
able to take advantage of the rights when planning one’s life, and not to actually use 
them. Nevertheless, we do not know which women effectively took advantage of the 
possibility to control their births and which ones did n o t In the absence-of individual 
panel data, the actual distribution of the benefits within the treatment group is 
unknown.
The identification of the welfare effect comes from the fact that birth control rights can 
only affect individuals of a certain gender and age, that is, women of childbearing age. 
An individual cannot self-select into the policy. We want to set the threshold age for 
taking advantage of these rights to the time in life when having abortion rights or not does not 
matter anymore. The standard in the medical literature is to take 50 years old as the 
threshold for childbearing age. In the previous chapter we have found that the effect is 
relevant in Europe if women receive the rights before being 35 years old. However this 
could still be relatively high in the context of a developing country where life expectancy 
is lower than in Western countries. In the 1990s Indian women had a life expectancy of 
60 years and English women had 78 years. Moreover, fertility takes place much earlier 
than in the Western context. In India on average 70 percent of women less than 20 
years old have one child and 20 percent have two children; 10 percent of the women 
between 20 and 30 years old have at least three children. Following this consideration 
we have chosen the age of 30 years old as the threshold where most women have 
completed their decisions on education, work and first child. The treatment group of 
the policy is constituted by women who received the rights before being 30 years old 
and the control group by women who received the rights after being 30. If the main 
effect of birth control rights on welfare is assumed to pass through a better planning of 
life choices, these are probably already set by the age of 30 in the Indian context for the
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vast majority of women. Sensitivity tests show that the results are robust to using 
different age limits.
As we focus only on one country and one law change, confronting women who 
received the rights up to a certain age versus those who received them after that age 
yields an effect that might be overlapping with cohort or age effects. Figure 1 plots life 
satisfaction separately for men and women bom  in different cohorts. The cohort of 
men and women bom  between 1900 and 1929 shows a parallel and decreasing trend, 
with women on a lower level. All other cohorts show very litde changes around the 
mean. It does not appear that younger men and women are happier than their parents. 
If  anything, we observe a slightly decreasing trend in life satisfaction for women bom  
between 1970 and 1978.6
Figure 1: Life satisfaction by cohorts o f women
cohort
Life satisfaction of men Life satisfaction of women
Source: World Values Survey.
The pattern of cohort effects is consistent with that of age effects. Figure 3 shows a very 
flat trend, identical for men and women, apart from some divergence between their life 
satisfaction after 50 years old, when men are significantly more satisfied than women 
and women’s wellbeing declines. This has probably to do with a higher probability of
6 The cohort born between 1900 and 1929 contains 4.6% of the sample, 1930-1939 contains 6.8% of the 
sample, 1940-1949 contains 12.7% of the sample, 1950-1959 contains 26.5% of the sample, 1960-1969 
contains 31.9% of the sample, 1970-1978 contains 17.5% of the sample.
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widowhood at this age and the fact that widows tend to receive little support, but 
further research is needed to explore this issue. The profile of wellbeing as a function of 
age stands in stark contrast to that found in European countries (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004, own research in chapter 1), which shows that life satisfaction displays a 
U-shaped trend with respect to age with a minimum around 55 years old.7 To ensure the 
comparability of the treatment and the control groups and guarantee the robustness of 
the identification, we control for the age of the individual in the analysis.
Figure 2: The pattern of life satisfaction following age
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The base specification for the OLS regression model is the following:
*<« * = A  + A  ' Tg* + h  • Q i  + ' 4?** + fit Year * + £,
where Wellbeingit is an ordinal variable that measures the wellbeing of individual i in year 
t on a 1 to 10 scale, Tgit identifies treated women and Cgk is a dummy for women in 
the control group. The continuous variable Ageu is taken in logarithm. Year introduces 
a control for the year in which the survey was taken. The vector Controlsit includes 
personal characteristics such as income, education and location. In order to account for
7 Another difference is that women in India are not any more or less satisfied with life than men, while in 
Europe women are on average more satisfied than men.
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the possibility o f heteroskedasticity we use robust standard errors. The baseline in 
comparison to which the coefficients are estimated is the omitted category of men, since 
the sum of the women in the treatment group and those in the control group exhausts 
the universe of women.
3 M ain results
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis. In the first column the. welfare of women 
exposed to abortion rights is compared to that of women without legal access to the 
rights. The coefficients show a positive welfare effect on women with rights and a 
negative welfare effect on women without rights, but they are not statistically significant. 
Their difference is also not significant. This result is not sensitive to the threshold 
chosen for childbearing age. We have experimented with thresholds from 20 to 50 years 
old and no effect has been found.8
Column 2 introduces controls for the level o f family income (high versus low5), the level 
of education (high/middle/low education10 versus none) and living in a village or in a 
town versus living in a city11. In principle these variables could be endogenous to the set 
o f available rights, but India has relatively little vertical mobility. The overlapping 
between the distribution o f assets and the position in the caste system, which is assigned 
by birth, is still very strong. This suggests that to a great extent the fact that a woman 
reports a large household income and a high level of education is more related to her 
family background than to her individual choices. Therefore in this particular context 
we can consider these variables exogenous to the existing rights. Once account is taken 
for these potential barriers to access abortion rights, it appears that women in the 
treatment group, who have received abortion rights before the age of 30, exhibit a
8 Also, a regression not reported here investigates whether the treatment had an effect only at a particular 
age. Breaking down the treatment group between women who received abortion rights before being 20 
years old, between 20 and 25 or between 25 and 30 does not uncover any significant pattern. None of the 
subgroups exhibits a welfare effect.
9 High income is measured as being in the sixth to tenth categories of the income ladder, which 
cumulatively comprise 23.8 percent of the sample, and low income is given by the first to the fifth 
categories of income.
10 Low education is measured by leaving school at the age of 14, middle education before the age of 18
and high education by leaving school after turning 18 years old.
11 AA  village is defined by having less than 10,000 people, a town between 10 and 50 thousand people and 
a city over 50 thousand people.
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positive change in welfare, significant at the 10 percent level. Women who received the 
rights after that age do not show any significant effect
Table 2: The effect of abortion rights on wellbeing in India
Depvax: life satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment group: women with abortion 0.071 0.150*
rights before 30 years old (0.93) (1.82)
Treatment group with high income 0.171
(1.19)
Treatment group with low income -0.01
(0.11)
Treatment group with high education 0.128
(1.21)
Treatment group with middle education 0.183
(1.16)
Treatment group with low education 0.383**
(2.0 6)
Treatment group living in a village -0.001
(0.00)
Treatment group living in a town 0.270*
(1.70)
Treatment group living in a village 0.011
(0.11)
Control group: women with abortion rights -0.292 -0.002 -0.381** 0.068 -0.236
after 30 years old (1.61) (0.01) (2.01) (0.37) (1.24)
Dummy: High income 0.656*** 0.766***
(7.14) (6.71)
Dummy: High education 1.064*** 1.183***
(7-55) (9.50)
Dummy: Middle education 1 114*** 1.015***
(7.52) (6.78)
Dummy: Low education 0.552*** 0.460***
(3.55) (2.90)
Dummy: Living in a village 0.228* 0.052
(1.90) (0.37)
Dummy: Living in a town 0.606*** 0.499***
(6.36) (4.17)
Controls:
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of the survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,386 3,643 3,883 4,386 4,137
R-squared 0.002 0.055 0.024 0.031 0.012
Note: Robust t statistics in brackets. * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. The baseline category for income is “low income”, for education is “no education” and for location 
is “living in a city”.
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Columns 3 to 5 in Table 2 run the base specification breaking down the treatment group 
according to income, education and location. The specification in column 3 shows that, 
once personal income is taken into account, women with abortion rights are not 
significantly different in welfare than men, while women who received the rights too late 
exhibit a lower welfare than the other men and women.
In column 4, controlling for the level of education, it appears that women with rights 
and a basic level of education (up to fifth grade) have a higher welfare than the 
remaining men and women. Finally, column 5 highlights a positive welfare effect on 
women who had abortion rights and live in a town as opposed to those living in a city 
or in a village. A medium-sized town may offer the balance of a good provision of 
health care services, good physical access (i.e. lower travel costs) and anonymity, whose 
lack is often cited as an impediment to using public facilities in rural settings.
Two main findings emerge. First, there is no welfare effect in India on the group of 
women who had legal access to abortion rights by the time they were 30 years old. No 
effect is found using other thresholds of age. Second, some positive effects can be 
found once account is taken for income, education and location o f the individual. In 
particular, it appears that there is some correlation between having the legal rights, 
enjoying a basic level of education, high income, living in a town, and a higher welfare. 
This may suggest some role for policy to improve access to the rights for the less 
favoured groups in society. Nevertheless these results must be taken with caution. As 
we cannot measure with certainty for how many women the factors of income and 
education can be truly considered exogenous to the set of available rights, we cannot go 
beyond stating a correlation, and not a causation, between rights, higher wellbeing and 
higher income or education.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the link between women’s rights, empowerment and wellbeing in 
India. India is characterised by a particular set of conditions whereby access to health 
services is very unequal even in comparison with other developing countries of similar 
level of development. From the analysis of the self-reported life satisfaction and 
demographic characteristics of over 4,000 individuals in 1990 and 1996, we do not find 
strong evidence that abortion rights significantly increased the wellbeing o f women in 
India. While a clear and robust effect was found in our analysis on European countries,
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which was conducted with the same methodology, the estimated effects are very weak in 
India. A significant association between abortion rights and higher wellbeing of women 
is only found when the income, education and location of the individuals are taken into 
account.
One possible explanation could be related to the gap between the legal guarantee of the 
rights and the effective access to them. In European countries the rights were granted at 
a null or symbolic cost for the individual, while in India income, education and location 
can constitute significant barriers to access health care. The level of awareness of the 
existence of reproductive rights appears to be rather low. If  this is true, then lowering 
the cost to the user and improving the dissemination of information could be as 
important as granting the rights in the first place. Nevertheless, it is hard to rule out at 
this stage that some of the gain in wellbeing stems from the direct effect of income and 
education on utility, and not through the fact that they enable access to the rights.
The issue of which rights are beneficial to individual wellbeing is an aspect that is little 
studied in development At first sight birth control rights appear important to the goal 
of empowerment, because fertility decisions impinge directly on the freedom of action 
of the woman. In addition, they have significant spillovers on infant mortality rates and 
children’s health. This paper sheds light on the fact that we need to ascertain under 
which conditions they are beneficial.
Moreover, this reinforces the argument that the comparison of the quantitative effects 
of different interventions should be an important tool o f public policy. If the normative 
objective is to promote individual and societal welfare, granting individual rights and 
promoting access to them might be found to be more effective than policies that aim at 
raising aggregate economic growth. These constitute at the moment very different 
priorities for development practitioners and are treated as separate spheres with 
different types of returns.
In the wider context of our study on the effect of institutional change on wellbeing, this 
analysis leads to two considerations. First, changes in institutions have to be effectively 
felt by individuals in order to change their incentives and preferences. Here we have 
seen that granting a legal right while leaving the individual either uniformed or bearing 
the associated costs largely limits the effects of the institutional change. Second, a 
change which has proven beneficial in one particular context may yield different effects 
in another environment, characterised by different strengths and problems.
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A ppendix 1: E m pow erm ent as a priority for developm ent
The trend in the worid has been towards liberalizing abortion rights for the past fifty 
years. Between 1985 and 1997,19 nations in the world have significantly liberalised their 
abortion laws; only one country, Poland, has substantially restricted legal access to 
abortion (Rahman et al.\ 1988). Despite the difficulty o f operating with over 180 
countries showing different and sometimes clashing sensitivities, the United Nations has 
proved an effective forum in gathering a consensus on the issue of human rights and 
women's rights. The first piece of international legislation explicitly related to women 
and discrimination affirming “the reproductive rights of women” was the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted 
in 1979 by the United Nations. The Cairo Conference in 1994 mentioned explicitly for 
the first time the problem of the high mortality rate among women due to unsafe 
abortion. The summit promoted the concept of making “reproductive health” a priority 
for development, without calling it a right. This was acceptable by the many countries 
where abortion was not legal. The Beijing conference in 1995 then made the connection 
between reproductive health and “physical, mental and social” wellbeing and promoted 
“the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do 
so”12. These actions of moral suasion by the international community have been 
effective both in exerting social pressure on those countries without rights, as well as in 
renewing the attention by those countries where family planning was already granted 
(like India) to devote resources to make it effectively accessible.
Over time, it is becoming an accepted notion that “the expansion of family planning 
facilities may appear to be just a demographic intervention, but the importance of 
improved family-planning opportunities can also be seen in the broader light of the 
decisional freedom of families in general and of vulnerable women in particular” (Dreze 
and Sen, 2002).
The following step was to make gender equality an acquired principle and not a goal in 
itself. In 2001 the United Nations declared gender equality and the empowerment of 
women “fundamental elements in the reduction of the vulnerability of women and girls
12 “Strategic objective C3”, Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action, Beijing 1995, as reported in 
http://www.un.org/ womemvatch/daw/beijing/ platform/health.htm.
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to HIV/ADDS” 13. The empowerment of women became an instrument of public policy, 
whose validity was not put in discussion anymore.
A p p e n d ix  2: T h e  d istr ib u tio n  o f  b ir th  co n tro l r igh ts in  th e  
w o rld
Today the spectrum of the legislation can be broadly grouped under three positions, 
following Rahman, Katzive and Henshaw (1988): whether abortion is banned 
altogether, it is only allowed for health reasons, or also on socio-economic grounds or 
on request.
The most restrictive legislation puts a ban on abortion that descends from the universal 
criminal code provision o f not killing. The only exception, stemming from criminal law 
general principles, is that it can be permitted when the life of a pregnant woman is in 
concrete danger. In 1997 this stance was held by 54 countries covering a quarter o f the 
world’s population, mainly in Africa and Latin America (see Figure 1). In addition, there 
are two general juridical indications for obtaining legal abortion that are often conceded 
(but not granted as a right). These are when a pregnancy results from rape or incest and 
on foetal impairment grounds.
_______ Figure 1: Abortion rights in the world in 1997___________________________________
By number of By population
countries
No rights
Partial rights 
14%
Partial rights 
28%
Source: Rahman, Katzive and Henshaw (1988).
13 Declaration of the General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, 2001.
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A second group of countries allow abortion for health concerns relating either to the 
woman or to the child. We label these “partial rights”. Within this group, some 
countries only protect the woman’s physical health (23 countries, 10 percent of the 
world’s population) while some also her mental health (20 countries and 4 percent of 
the world’s population). In practice and on a discretional basis, the category of “mental” 
health may or may not allow for some role to socio-economic circumstances in causing 
distress, but it is always the doctor to decide.
The third group comprises countries that allow abortions on socio-economic grounds, 
such as the woman’s economic resources, her age, marital status, and children. India is 
one of the six countries in the world taking this stance and together they cover 20 
percent of the world’s population. The group of “full rights” also contains countries 
where abortion is permitted on request of the woman, without restrictions as to the 
reason. This comprises 49 countries (including China) and represents 41 percent o f the 
world’s population. Even where abortion is allowed on request, access to it is generally 
subject to medical limitations that apply to other types o f medical care, such as to be 
provided by licensed medical personnel, with the consent of the woman, within 
gestation limits, with waiting periods, with varied costs and subject to counselling. In 
practice, a narrow or a liberal application of the law can lead to different actual levels of 
access to abortion services even within the same countries.
A ppendix 3: D ata  description and sources
World Values Survey (version provided by the UK Data Archive)
Years-. 1990,1996.
Life satisfaction: ten-category variable based on the question: “All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”. The person was shown a card 
with the numbers between 1 and 10, where 1 corresponded to “dissatisfied and 10 to 
“satisfied”.
Ager. continuous variable (taken in logs in the analysis).
Incomer. “high income” is a dummy for being in the sixth to tenth categories of the 
income ladder, which cumulatively comprise 23.8 percent of the sample, and ‘low  
income” is given by the first to the fifth categories of income.
Education: dummies for high/middle/low education, where the omitted category is no 
education. Low education is measured by leaving school at the age of 14, middle
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education before the age of 18 and high education by leaving school after turning 18 
years old.
Location: dummies for living in a village, in a town or in a city. A village is defined by 
having less than 10,000 people, a town between 10 and 50 thousand people and a city 
over 50 thousand people.
Abortion laws: United Nations (2002).
Appendix - Table Al: Status, location and use of health services. India, 1999
Indicator Description Lowest Second
URBAN Quintiles 
Middle Fourth Highest U-Avg Lowest Second
RURAL Quintiles 
Middle Fourth Highest R-Avg
Total fertility rate 
U se  o f  health services:
Births per woman age 15-49 (3.1) 2.9 2.6 2.3 1.7 2.3 34 3=2 2=6 2=3 2=9 3-1
Contraceptive prevalence among 
women:
% o f  married women aged 15-49 who use a modern 
method o f  contraception
37.3 40.4 43.4 49.4 54.9 51.2 29.1 34.6 45.1 49.8 53.7 39.9
Source o f  contraception: public sector: % o f  women users who obtain method from a public 
sector program
87.0 85.9 83.8 75.0 48.0 60.1 92.1 89.5 86.3 76.9 60.5 83.2
Source o f  contraception: private sector: 
Antenatal can visits:
% o f  women users who obtain method from the 
private sector
13.0 12.9 15.4 23.7 49.8 38.1 7.1 9.4 12.6 21.6 37.9 15.6
T o a medically trained person % o f  women with a recent birth who had 1+ visits 64.6 74.1 76.2 83.4 94.1 86.4 43.5 54.2 67.3 78.5 90.1 59.8
3+ visits to a medically trained person 
Delivery attendance:
% o f  women with a recent birth who had 3+  visits 31.5 43.4 52.9 65.3 83.6 70.1 20.8 29.8 42.4 57.4 75.3 36.9
By a medically trained person % o f  births assisted by... 43.4 39.6 55.2 68.3 88.0 73.3 15.6 25.1 39.7 56.1 76.6 33.5
In a public facility % o f  births at a public facility 23.8 21.7 30.6 35.3 25.7 29.1 6.9 11.0 15.7 19.0 19.0 12.6
In a private facility % o f  births at a private facility 8.7 11.4 15.9 24.0 54.7 36.0 3.4 6.3 13.2 25.1 42.2 12.1
At home 
Postnatal can visits:
% o f  births at home 66.4 66.4 52.7 40.3 19.2 34.5 88.9 82.0 70.5 55.6 38.4 74.7
T o a medically trained person % o f  women with recent birth who had 1+ visits 76.5 75.3 81.8 87.5 94.7 90.4 46.1 55.2 66.7 80.1 87.5 65.9
In a public facility % o f  women with recent birth who had 1+ visits 62.0 59.8 60.4 57.5 31.8 43.6 49.2 49.8 50.4 42.1 33.4 46.2
In a private facility
H o u seh o ld  decision-m aking  and free
% o f  women with recent birth who had 1+ visits 
dom  o f  m ovem ent:
34.3 34.3 36.0 39.4 66.9 54.2 33.4 36.4 40.0 52.8 63.4 43.6
Can seek own health care % o f  women age 15-49 who can decide to seek their 
own health care
33.1 32.2 33.3 34.6 35.8 35.0 24.2' 24.1 25.7 27.9 30.6 25.7
Can make large household purchases % o f  women age 15-49 who can decide to make large 
household purchases
49.2 47.9 48.9 48.4 49.5 49.0 38.5 37.4 39.0 39.8 42.8 38.9
Can travel to visit family/relatives 
E ducation
% o f  wom en age 15-49 who can decide to visit 
family/relatives
29.7 30.4 31.3 31.9 37.8 35.0 19.1 17.9 21.5 22.5 27.7 20.6
School completion among women: 
E xposure to m ass-m ed ia
% o f  women in household age 15-49 who have 
completed fifth grade
38.3 49.4 62.9 78.0 94.9. 83.8 35.9 53.7 70.2 83.7 94.8 62.4
Newspaper readership among women: % o f  women age 15-49 who read a newspaper at least 
once a week
1.9 6.4 11.3 25.1 63.9 43.5 1.7 4.4 11.5 24.8 53.8 12.8
Radio listenership among women: % o f  women age 15-49 who listen to the radio at 
least once a week
16.6 25.7 33.7 40.3 54.8 46.4 14.2 27.0 39.3 49.0 60.3 33.0
Television listenership among women: % o f  wom en age 15-49 who watch the television at 
least once a week
27.6 32.9 50.1 76.7 94.7 80.6 9.0 14.9 35.3 68.1 91.0 33.4
Notes: ( ) indicate large sampling errors due to a small number o f  cases. Source: www.genderstats.worldbank.org
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Chapter 3
The role of freedom, growth and religion 
in the taste for revolution
This chapter analyses how restrictions of individual rights affect the wellbeing of 
individuals from a different perspective. The first and second chapter have explored 
whether granting women individual rights affects their wellbeing, defined as satisfaction 
with one’s life. We have found that more personal freedom translates both into higher 
wellbeing and into higher investment in human capital and in the labour market. Here 
we investigate whether and how restrictions to political and civil rights affect individual 
wellbeing as defined by one’s satisfaction with the society he or she lives in. If 
dissatisfied, the person can express either a willingness to gradually change society by 
reforms or to radically engage in revolutionary action. In both cases the effect of 
individual rights translates into attitudes and actions which can be relevant for the 
stability and the aggregate welfare of society.
There is a certain typical degree of dissatisfaction within each society. In 1995 in 
Australia 5.7 percent of the people expressed the desire to radically change society by 
revolutionary action (which we will call from now on a “revolutionary preference”). In 
1990 this view was shared by 5.1 percent of the population in the UK, 2.1 in Japan, 4.5 
in Spain and 6.1 in Sweden. However some countries exhibit a much higher average of 
preference for revolt. This proportion varies over time even within the same country. 
For instance, in Argentina preferences for revolt were expressed by 12.4 percent of the 
people in 1984, 7.5 percent in 1991 and 5.1 percent in 1995. In South Korea they were
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shared by 22.3 percent of the people in 1982, 7.3 percent in 1990 and 12.5 percent in 
1996 (see Table A.5 in the Appendix for further comparisons).
The aim of this chapter is to we examine whether and how restrictions to political and 
civil rights affect attitudes of unrest, whether a lack of political rights can be 
compensated by economic growth (I.e. whether the threat of instability can be bought 
off) and at what cost. At all steps the analysis will only look at changes within the same 
country, in order to avoid contamination from unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries The previous chapter has shown that the repression of some (but not all) 
individual rights undermines the efficiency of individual choices and ultimately 
wellbeing. Here we investigate whether and how the repression of political and civil 
rights affects the satisfaction with the society the person lives in and how this translates 
at the country level into political instability, lower protection of property rights and less 
efficiency of a market economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the related literature. Section 2 
illustrates the data and reports several different validation tests in which we correlate 
tastes for revolt with personal and government actions. Section 3 outlines the empirical 
strategy and section 4 the main results. Section 5 concludes.
1 R elated literature
The approach taken in this paper differs from previous studies in the conflict literature 
by focusing on the micro-structure of revolutionary tastes, rather than studying the 
effect of freedom on conflict at an aggregate level.1 In terms of Hirshleifer’s (1995) 
distinction between preferences and opportunities as two of the basic ingredients for 
conflict (the third being misperceptions), we seek to identify the determinants of 
preferences. The data come from a survey that asks individuals whether they want the 
entire way their society is organised “to be radically changed by revolutionary action ”, putting 
the focus on people whose dissatisfaction is so extreme that it threatens to overturn the 
entire organization of their country.
Previous empirical studies have produced a diverse array of ambiguous findings on the 
relationship between freedom and civil conflict. Sambanis (2001) reviews the recent 
literature and states that “a number of possible causes of civil war are still being debated”. One
1 An exception is Johnson et al (2000) who use surveys to measure the security of property rights in order 
to estimate the effect of the threat of appropriation on firms’ decisions to reinvest profits.
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strand of literature argues that grievances (i.e., shared dissatisfaction of group members 
about their cultural, political and economic standing compared to other groups) and the 
lack o f democracy play a fundamental role in creating the conditions necessary for civil 
conflict. These may stem from a failure to gain the expected benefits from 
modernization, leading to ‘relative deprivation’, or from discrimination and denial of a 
group’s rights and liberties (see Gurr, 1971 and Gurr and Moore, 1997). Although 
differential treatment of groups may diminish a regime’s legitimacy, greater 
democratization and political institutions that channel and respond to grievances may be 
able to avoid civil conflict Hegre et al (2001) use cross-sectional evidence to argue that 
the most stable regimes lie at the extremes of autocracy and democracy, -with 
intermediate ones being the most prone to conflict (possibly because they allow more 
opportunities for rebels to exploit). Glaeser (2004) combines the role of grievance with 
rent-seeking by politicians. He describes how a “market for grievances” may operate 
when self-interested politicians have incentives to supply unpleasant tales about 
minority groups to a public that has a taste for hatred’.
Another strand of work describes conflict as a result o f opportunities for rent-seeking 
by interested groups. Opportunities are given by the discovery of natural resources 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), low economic growth, which may give incentives to invest 
in appropriative versus productive activities (Grossman, 1991, Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2000 and 2001, Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 1996, and Hirshleifer, 1995), rough terrains 
and large populations (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). These papers emphasise the constraints 
that geography and money may place on the opportunities for rebels to overthrow a 
regime. Unless revenues from trading diamonds or oil, for example, are available to fund 
the rebels’ movement and there is a reservoir of poor young men who can be recruited 
as foot soldiers, revolts may fail regardless of the grievances held. The political 
processes and structures that can be exploited by rebels may also influence their chances 
of success. For instance economic and political liberalisation may increase the chances 
of a revolt occurring if they create opportunities for outsiders to gain weight in the 
government. These theories generally go further in arguing that there is no relationship 
between the lack of civil liberties or democratic freedoms and the likelihood of a civil 
war. For example, Miguel et al (2004) find from panel evidence that although economic 
growth has a negative effect on the likelihood of civil conflict in Africa (using rainfall 
variation as an instrument) the relationship does not vary with the level of democracy.
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They conclude that institutional characteristics have a minimal impact in mitigating the 
effect of economic shocks, although they acknowledge that the countries in their sample 
show little variation as they are all relatively autocratic.
There are several reasons why a consensus is not reached in the literature. The data are 
noisy and sparse. Whether more civil conflict in fact erupts depends on variables that 
may be difficult to measure (such as efficiency of the security services) and also highly 
unpredictable factors. For example, ‘revolutionary bandwagons’ and ‘information 
cascades’ appear common whereby each people’s decision whether or not to join a 
revolt depends crucially on what they observe doing. These effects, studied by Kuran 
(1991) and Lohmann (1994) using the 1989 uprising in East Germany, imply that it is 
possible for many people to privately support revolt but to be unwilling to act unless 
they observe others doing so. Movements may have to rely on charismatic leaders to 
make them cohesive. Olson (1965) describes how the free-rider problem undermines 
collective action. There are other issues that may have obscured the identification o f the 
causes of civil conflict. These include “disagreement [surrounding] the very definition of a civil 
war”.2 The dependent variable used in most studies has been a threshold absolute 
number of battle deaths (usually 1,000 but it can be 25 in some datasets). This is often 
not scaled by population size and is hard to measure accurately. Only limited time 
variation in the dummy “occurrence of civil conflict” can usually be exploited. Omitted 
variables may be determinant in explaining why autocracies experience relatively less 
civil conflict even when grievances may be at the highest point. The possibility of 
endogeneity of civil liberties and democratic freedoms to the occurrence of a revolt has 
also so far been ignored. If, for example, people obtain the freedoms that they want by 
rebelling, then a positive relationship between these variables may be observed. The 
present paper can be seen as an attempt to change the approach of studying conflict 
from a broad, macro perspective to a context of micro-economic preferences and 
attitudes, where effects can be more accurately identified.
A growing literature in economics has also addressed the link between religion and the 
economy. For example, Iannaccone (1998) reviews a number of outcomes that in the
2 Sambanis (2001) discusses the idiosyncratic definitions. Since there are many different objective 
measures that could be used (such as sabotage, rallies and terrorism) it is difficult to choose between 
them. Events such as political strikes are hard to classify. Francisco (1993) uses person-days of protest per 
100,000 people per week, although he notes that most studies “of protest and revolt use other measures, 
especially political deaths”.
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literature are linked both with economically important social behaviour and religious 
attitudes. Religious beliefs are consistently associated with higher education levels, lower 
crime and anti-social behaviour, good mental and physical health. The rationale could be 
explained by characterising religious membership as a club good. Rational individuals 
may wish to join the “club” even when self-sacrifice is demanded (in the form of dress,
diet, grooming, sexual conduct, entertainment and social activities) in exchange for
support, goods and services provided by the other members. Iannaccone (1998) also 
reviews Adam Smith’s (1776) arguments in favour of ‘religious competition’ and claim 
that civil strife may arise from regulation and suppression of religious freedoms. 
Similarly, Berman (2000) models social interactions within a religious community as a 
signalling device of commitment in order to participate in a mutual insurance 
arrangement3 In this paper we test not only whether religious people are more or less 
inclined to revolt but also whether they respond differently to a denial of their freedoms 
(compared to non-religious people). To the extent that they may have willingly given up 
freedoms to join a religious ‘club’ they may rebel less; to the extent that their freedoms 
to practice religion are constrained, they may rebel more.
2 D ata description and validation
2.1 Data description
The source of data on revolutionary tastes is the World Values Survey which 
interviewed a representative sample of 168,482 people in 64 countries in three waves 
(1981-84,1990-92,1995-97).4 O f these, 130,278 individuals in 61 countries answered the 
question: “On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society in which we live in. 
Please choose the one which best describes jour own opinion”, The three possible response 
categories were: “The entire way our society is organised must be radically changed by revolutionary 
action”, “Our society must be gradually improved fry rforms” and “Our present society must be 
valiantly dfended against all subversive forces” (The (CDon't know” and “Not asked in this survey”
3 Barro and McCleary (2002) study how economic performance and political institutions are related to 
religious participation and beliefs. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) use survey data to identify the 
relation between religion and attitudes judged favorable to growth. See also Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002), 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) and Fox (1999). Huntington (1991) discusses how cultural and 
ethical norms affect the legitimacy of democratic practices.
4 The countries surveyed include almost 80 percent of the world’s population. The World Values dataset 
was also used to obtain indicators of trust and civic norms in Knack and Keefer’s (1997) study of the 
determinants of social capital.
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categories are not included in our data set). Appendix 1 contains a summary of the 
survey.
In Appendix 1, Table Al shows the proportion of individuals who desire revolutionary 
action versus those who do not (i.e., the ones who desire either gradual reforms or the 
present society valiantly defended) for the entire sample, the unemployed, religious 
persons (broken down by whether they are part o f a minority), by income quintile and 
freedom status. O f the full sample, 9.8% of respondents declare a preference for 
revolution in their country, rising to 14.1% for the unemployed. A share of 9.2% of 
those who belong to a religious denomination and 10.3% of atheists want a revolution. 
In the sample, 13.5% of the people belong to a religious minority. Among them, the 
taste for revolt is 11.9%, while among religious people who do not belong to minorities 
this amounts to 9.9%. The proportion of people who support a revolution 
monotonically declines as their income increases, ranging from 10.8% in the bottom 
category to 6.9% in the top one.
The freedom data come from two sources. The first is Freedom House, an independent 
institution that monitors political rights and civil liberties in countries across the world 
and each year publishes a rating. We use a composite measure of freedom obtained by 
averaging two separate indices, Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Political rights take 
account of the extent to which voters can make a free choice among candidates and to 
what extent the candidates are chosen independently o f the state. Civil liberties evaluate 
the degree of freedom of expression, assembly, association and religion. Each country is 
ranked on a seven-point scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), recoded here such that 
a higher rating corresponds to greater freedom. The second source of data on freedom 
is the Polity I V  Project, which measures the degree o f democratization in nations. It 
focuses on the authority patterns that characterize different countries, based on the state 
of executive recruitment, executive constraints and political competition. This index is 
on a 21-point scale and ranges from the most autocratic (-10) to the democratic ones
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2.2 Data validation
There axe some potential problems in using survey data. Although all interviews are 
conducted under anonymity, the interviewed may not be able to respond truthfully.5 
Furthermore, preferences for revolt may not be consistendy associated with actions that 
pose a credible threat to the government. They may simply reflect a general disaffection 
with society. Some of these issues can be addressed empirically and in this section we 
present several pieces of evidence that lend support for taking these data seriously.
First, Table Al shows how tastes for revolt are correlated with the level of freedom. 
Freedom House presents a simple three-way classification of countries using their 1-7 
scale, ranging from Not Free (1-2.5) to Partly Free (2.5-5.5) to Free (5.5-7). Using this split, 
the average revolutionary support recorded in the survey varies from 18.1% in Not Free 
countries to 6.2% in Free countries. The fact that N ot Free countries systematically report 
a higher taste for revolt suggests that censorship may not be a limit of this survey. 
Second, the framing of the survey is constant across countries and over time. Third, 
surveyed preferences for revolt are significantly correlated with observable measures of 
rebellion. The World Values Survey contains information on the rebellious actions that 
our sample of 106,170 individuals has undertaken, which include Joined boycotts, Attended 
demonstrations, Joined unofficial strikes, Occupied buildings/ factories and Signed petitions. The 
correlations of preferences and actions of revolt for the same individual are reported in 
Panel A of Table A4. The coefficient of correlation of the taste for revolt with Joined 
boycotts is 0.07, with Attended demonstrations is 0.08, with Joined unofficial strikes is 0.07 and 
with Occupied buildings/'factories is 0.06 (all significant at the 1 per cent level). The fact that 
the mapping from preferences to actions is far less than one-to-one is consistent with 
the free-rider problem; that is, despite many people wanting a radical change of 
government, costly participation is not individually rational (particularly when the 
benefits from a revolt may not be excludable). Interestingly, the coefficient of 
correlation between preference for revolt and Signed petitions is not significantly different 
from zero, consistently with the fact that signing a petition is a reformist and not a 
revolutionary act. The correlation coefficients between the measures of actual protest 
themselves are high. For example, the correlation between Joined unofficial strikes and
5 If the social norm is not to support revolt, subjects may bias responses towards maintaining the status 
quo. However psychologists have found evidence that indicates this concern may be exaggerated (e.g., 
Rorer, 1965 and Bradburn, 1969). Furthermore, at least part of the effect of social norms is able to be 
controlled for in our regression evidence by country fixed effects.
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Occupied buildings/'factories equals 0.32. Each of these actions can be regressed on the 
corresponding individual’s taste for revolt (controlling for country and year fixed 
effects). Wanting to revolt is a factor that significantly explains the subversive actions of 
individuals at the one per cent level across all measures of actual protest. People wanting 
a revolt have a 9 percentage point higher probability of joining in boycotts, 12 
percentage point higher probability of demonstrating, 7 percentage point higher 
probability of joining unofficial strikes and a 4 percentage point higher probability of 
occupying buildings.
A related issue concerns whether or not a self-reported preference for revolt is just 
symptomatic of a general attitude of disaffection with society. For example, the same 
people who have a revolutionary preference may be pessimists who hold negative 
beliefs about the ability of the government and the economy to deliver favourable social 
and private outcomes. We address this issue by observing the correlation of 
revolutionary tastes with beliefs that the environment needs protection, that the country 
has been captured and is run for the benefit of a few, that corruption is prevalent, that 
the authorities should not be respected, and that the future is bleak for alL The results 
are reported in Panel B in Table A4 (full variable definitions are given in Appendix 3). 
The correlation coefficient between Taste for Revolt and 'Environment Needs Protection is - 
0.001, indicating that those individuals who want a full-scale revolution in their country 
are not the same ones who feel concerned about industrial threats to the environment 
The correlation between having a revolutionary taste and holding a belief that the 
Country is run for the few is 0.05 and with a belief that Corruption is Prevalent is 0.09. The 
latter may be related to the association of high corruption with a loss o f regime 
legitimacy.6 The strong correlation between the belief that corruption is prevalent and 
that the country is being run for the few (=0.24) suggests that there are many disaffected 
people who nevertheless do not favour a revolt There are low correlations between 
wanting a revolt and other indicators of more general pessimism, Don't Respect Authority 
and Bleak Future, equal to 0.006 and -0.02, respectively.
The relationship between revolutionary preferences and personal characteristics has a 
similar structure across the different regions of the world (i.e., OECD, Asia, Africa and 
South America). In every region, men are more likely, on average, to desire a revolt than
6 A literature in political science has focused on the role o f corruption in determining legitimacy in 
political representation. Della Porta (2000) and Seligson (2002) provide empirical evidence.
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women. People who are on higher incomes, older and married are less likely, on 
average, to want a revolt. Unemployed people are more likely to want one (with the 
exception of Africa and France). Retirement has a negative effect and self-employment 
has no effect. We can test whether the same characteristics that predict revolutionary 
tastes predict beliefs that the environment needs protection, the country is being run for 
the benefit of a few and that corruption is prevalent. There is little support for this view. 
For example, wanting more protection for the environment is significantly correlated 
with being on a high income (so the concern for a polluted environment appears to be 
shared more by the rich than the poor). The unemployed tend to be less concerned 
about environmental problems. Therefore, those individuals who are worried about the 
environment are not the same ones wanting to revolt, at least in terms o f their income 
and job status. A belief that the country has been captured by the few is not significantly 
correlated with personal income, whereas a belief that corruption is prevalent is 
negatively correlated with it. The self-employed and retired perceive there to be more 
corruption than the employed, and men are less likely to think that it is widespread than 
women. The evidence does not suggest that a common set of (observable) personal 
characteristics can describe a type of person who not only wants to revolt but also 
suffers from disaffection on a range of social issues.
We explore whether there is any evidence of different governments policies in countries 
where the taste for revolt is higher. It appears that high revolutionary support is 
correlated to the weight of the military in the government, but it is not dear whether as 
a cause or as an effect. The correlation across 40 countries between the average level of 
revolutionary support and arms imports (as a proportion of total imports) is 0.47, 
between taste for revolt and military spending (as a proportion of GDP) is 0.20. High 
revolt countries also tend to spend less on education as a proportion of GDP 
(correlation—0.57). One would be tempted to think that then main explanatory variable 
for the taste for revolt is the lack of education. On the contrary, previous studies have 
found partidpation in terrorism and political violence to be either unrdated or positively 
related to an individual’s education. Russell and Miller (1983) report that about two- 
thirds of the 350 individuals engaged in terrorist activities in their sample were persons 
with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate students. Palestinian 
suicide bombers have been found to be at least as likely to come from high education 
backgrounds as low ones (Kruger and Maleckova, 2003).
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We test for the relationship between actual civil wars and revolutionary tastes using a 
data set of all civil wars in the world between 1944 and 1999 (Doyle and Sambanis, 
2000). A civil war is defined in this data set as a conflict between a government and a 
non-government claimant that resulted in at least 1,000 deaths per year. Out of the 40 
countries in the sample, we know the taste for revolt in 20. The average level of support 
for revolt is 15.9%. Another observable measure of internal conflict is the level of 
criminal activity. An advantage of using crime as a proxy for rebellion is that it does not 
necessarily rely on solving the collective action problem. A drawback is that the causes 
o f crime may be unrelated to an individual’s total rejection of the organization of 
society. For European countries we have consistent time series that measure levels of 
serious assaults and car thefts. The partial correlation coefficient between the 
proportion of people wanting a revolt and assaults is 0.26, significant at the 1 per cent 
level, and for car thefts it is 0.20, significant at the 5 per cent level (all measured at the 
national level and controlling for country and year fixed effects).
3 E m pirical strategy
3.1 Framework
We relate the individuals’ taste for revolt to their freedoms, aggregate and personal 
income and religiosity. The sample includes 20 countries in 1981-84, 36 countries in 
1990-92 and 45 countries in 1995-97. There are various possible explanations as to why 
revolutionary support may increase as freedoms are taken away. First, freedom may 
have the quality of a public good and direcdy enter people’s utility function. 
Alternatively, freedom may constrain the desired levels o f consumption of other goods 
such as food, alcohol and clothing and as such enter people’s indirect utility function. 
To the extent that lower freedoms increase the expected gain from a revolution which 
may relax these constraints, a greater proportion of the population may support one. 
Appendix 2 describes a simple model that captures these effects. Our empirical 
specification exploits both cross-country and time-series variation. The probit 
regressions are of the form:
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Taste for Pevolt?ict — a  Freedoma + (3 GDP per capita d + % 8GDP per capita a + 8  Personal 
Income Position^ + y  Religion^ + (p  Macroa + X  Microict + T]c + f l t + ^ict
where Taste for Pjevolt?ict is a dummy that takes the value 1 when individual i living in 
country c and year t  holds a belief that ‘The entire way our society is organised must be radically 
changed by revolutionary action”. The variable Freedomd is measured in different ways. First, 
we take the simple average of the two variables Political rights and Civil liberties from 
Freedom House.7 We also run regression with these two variables entered individually. 
Second, we use the Polity measure of a country’s level of political democratization (from 
-10 to +10). The coefficient of ‘"between” variation for these aggregate variables is 61
The variable GDP per capitad is measured as per capita income in 1992 US$ (in 
logarithms) and A GDP per capitaa is its first difference (i.e., A GDP per capita—\og(\ +GDP 
growth rate)~GF)P growth rate). These data come from the World Development 
Indicators of the Wodd Bank. A person’s relative income position within his country is 
proxied by five dummy variables corresponding to the income ladder in the country 
(Personal Income Position8). Pjsligioniet is a dummy indicating whether the person declares to 
be religious in the same survey.
The vector Macrod refers to a set of aggregate variables at the country level. These 
include Trade openness and Social security. The former is measured by the sum of imports 
and exports divided by the country’s total GDP and the latter by the level of social 
security taxes as a proportion of GDP. We also experimented with measures of 
inequality as proxied by the Gini coefficient from the World Bank Deininger and Squire 
(1996) "high quality’ data set. The vector Microict refers to a set of personal characteristics 
of the respondents including their age, level of education, employment and marital 
status. Appendix 3 contains a complete set of data definitions. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the country and time level, we add country (T)c) and year 
(//) fixed effects. The error term Sidr is clustered at the country level to control for 
correlation of the error term across observations that are contained within each cross­
7 We remind that the Freedom House indices are rescaled such the lowest value, 1, is assigned to countries 
with the lowest political rights/civil liberties and the highest value, 7, is assigned to the countries with the 
most.
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sectional unit (Moulton, 1990). Table A2 provides summary statistics of the variables 
used and table A3 reports the correlation coefficients among them.
The World Values Survey collects representative samples of about 1,500 respondents 
per country. By giving each respondent an equal weight in our regressions we tend to 
underestimate the weight of large countries and overestimate the weight of small ones. 
To control for this issue we have re-estimated all regressions using weighted least 
squares with sampling weights equal to the inverse of the probability that a person is 
included in her country’s sample. The results remain virtually identical to those 
presented below.
3.2 The potential for endogeneity o f freedom
Examining the effect of freedom and economic growth on attitudes to revolt cannot 
avoid taking into account the possibility of reverse causality. Increased support for 
revolt may result in changes in the level of freedom that the government allows, either 
towards more freedom if a revolt is successful or towards less freedom if repression 
prevails. Examples of regimes’ attempts at self-preservation in the theoretical literature 
include how political elites may extend voting rights to prevent revolt (e.g., Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2000 and 2001) and how land reform can be an optimal policy response 
to the threat of appropriation of the landed class’ income (e.g., Grossman, 1994).8 The 
former Communist block is also generally viewed as having opened up as a response to 
growing rebellion. These examples suggest that greater revolutionary support can lead to 
a greater freedom (i.e., a positive correlation). However there are other cases where 
regimes appear to have become more repressive in response to rebellions (e.g., China in 
the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests). The sign of the effect of reverse 
causality is thus uncertain. Similarly, strong attitudes in favour of revolt may be 
disruptive for economic activity or otherwise deter foreign investment, ultimately 
undermining economic growth. Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996) and Rodrik 
(1999) study how political instability may affect investment and growth. Gupta et al 
(2002) show that terrorism is associated with lower tax revenues, higher inflation and 
lower tax across 22 episodes of conflict. Fording (1997) provides some empirical
8 An historical example comes from early seventeenth century England where the Crown’s fiscal needs led 
to ,{expropriation of wealth through redefinition cf rights in the sovereign’sfavor” and subsequently civil war. However 
after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the winners (i.e., the Whigs) sought to redesign government
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evidence that the welfare state has expanded in the US during the 1960 in order to 
reduce protests from the civil rights movement. None of the prior empirical studies of 
the determinants of conflict have controlled for the endogeneity of variables that proxy 
for civil liberties and political or democratic rights (see Sambanis, 2001) while only 
Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) have dealt with the possible endogeneity of 
economic growth using rainfall as an instrument in the specific context of a rain-fed 
economy like the one of Sub-Saharan Africa.
To deal with these concerns we draw on the literature that studies the determinants of 
the quality of government and institutions across countries. The relevant theories can be 
categorized along economic, political and cultural dimensions. The first holds that 
institutions are created when it is efficient to do so, the second that they are shaped by 
self-interested politicians to transfer resources to themselves, and the third that 
institutions arise to reflect the beliefs and values of their society. La Porta, Lopez-de- 
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) argue that political and cultural theories offer good 
prospects for finding reasonably exogenous sources of variation in country 
characteristics that affect institutional quality. One strategy they suggest is to use 
variations in the legal system, which can be viewed as an indicator of the relative power 
of the government versus the property owners. “Common law has developed in 
England as a defence of Parliament and property owners against the attempts by the 
sovereign to regulate and expropriate them. Civil law, in contrast, has developed more 
as an instrument... for state building and controlling economic life. Finally, socialist law 
is the expression of the ultimate control of the economy by the State.” (as in La Porta et 
al’ 1999) Socialist and French civil law tend to be more interventionist and to regulate 
more.9 In our regressions we follow La Porta et al in using legal origin as an instrument 
for the degree of liberties and political freedoms that characterize the institutions of 
countries.
In addition to legal origins we use the identity of the coloniser as an instrument. 
Colonial origins are discussed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) as a 
potential determinant of development. They argue that different institutions were set up 
in colonies depending on whether their purpose was to extract resources and transfer
institutions in such a way as to control the problem of "the exercise of arbitrary and confiscatory power ly  the 
Crown” (see North and Weingast, 1989).
9 See Djankov, la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), where regulations are proxied by number of 
procedures required to start-up a firm.
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them to the colonisers (as the Belgians did in Congo) or that of creating ‘Neo-Europes” 
where Europeans could migrate (Eke the US and Australia). In the latter type checks and 
balances against government expropriation were implemented. This affected in the long 
run the quaHty of institutions which are observed today. The authors explain GDP per 
capita by legal and colonial origins as weE as an index of protection against government 
expropriation, which they instrument with settlers’ mortaHty rates between 1600 and 
1800. Their hypothesis is that high settler mortality led to the implementation of “low- 
quality” institutions that subsequently slowed development. Across the countries in our 
study greater settler mortaEty is associated with lower poEtical rights and democratic 
freedoms. It would be interesting to use this idea as an instrument in this study but 
being available only for a subset of colonial countries, over half of the sample would be 
lost. Similarly, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) use legal origin and identity of 
coloniser to explain the determinants of development, in addition to measures of 
geography and openness.
Other exogenous factors that could be used to explain institutions include ethno- 
linguistic fractionalization, since in ethnically heterogeneous societies it is common for 
groups who come to power to enact government poEcies that restrict the freedoms of 
the opposition. Mauro (1995) argues that this variable can be used as a determinant of 
corruption in growth regressions. However we do not use ethnic fractionalization as an 
instrument since it is unlikely to be excludable from revolutionary support regressions 
(these kinds of societies may be characterized by ethnic fighting, atrocities and 
expropriations that are unrelated to the shape of institutions). There also exist various 
explanations as to how the dominant reEgion of nations may have affected the shape of 
their institutions (for example, Putman, 1993, argues that the CathoEc Church has 
fought the government to regulate the citizenry). However we avoid using reEgion as an 
instrument due the possibiEty (originating from Marx’s idea of reEgion as “the opium of 
people”) that it may have a direct impact on revolutionary tastes, unrelated to its effect 
on institutional quaEty.
4 M ain results
4.1 The effect o f freedom and growth
In Table 1, columns 1 to 5 present results from probit regressions. Marginal 
probabiEties are reported and standard errors are adjusted to take account of clustering
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at the country level. The regressions control for both country and year fixed effects. 
Column 1 shows the relationship between the taste for revolt in a country and the 
corresponding levels of freedom and GDP, controlling for personal income. Here 
freedom is measured by a simple average of political rights and civil liberties. The 
coefficient on Freedom is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. An individual 
living in a country that loses one point of freedom on the 1 to 7 scale (equivalent to a 
shift from the United States to South Korea in 1995) experiences an increase in their 
probability of supporting a revolt by 2.1 percentage points. Across all countries and 
years a change in freedom of one standard deviation (equal to 1.5 points on the 1-7 scale 
and equivalent to a shift from the United States to Argentina in 1995) explains 38% of 
the standard deviation in revolutionary support.10 The level of GDP per capita is not 
significant in this specification, suggesting that the level o f development may not be an 
important factor in explaining revolutionary pressures. We do, however, observe a 
monotonically declining chance of wanting a revolt as one’s place within the income 
distribution of a particular country increases. Going from the bottom to the top in the 
income ladder implies a 2.1 percentage point lower probability of desiring revolt, 
significant at the 1 percent level.
Column 2 controls for the change (rather than the level) of GDP per capita. Growth 
rates, rather than levels, of GDP are the dominant factor explaining civil war onset in, 
for example, Miguel et al (2004). Our results are similar in finding that AGDP per capita 
has negative and significant effects (at the 1 percent level) on revolutionary tastes, i.e. a 
negative income shock increases the average support for revolution. This is consistent 
with the result found theoretically by Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) that growth is a 
politically stabilizing force. The coefficient on Freedom is now equal to -0.020 (i.e., of 
similar size to the previous specification) and retains significance at the 1 per cent level. 
In the next two columns we repeat this base specification but we separate the two 
components of the Freedom index, Civil Liberties and Political Rights. Denial of either of 
these dimensions o f freedom significantly increases the support for a revolt. Focusing 
on within-country variation, a one standard deviation change in civil liberties (equal to 
0.5 points) explains 41 percent of the standard deviation in revolutionary support (the
10 This calculation is based on the overall standard deviation in support levels across countries and years, 
equal to 0.082.
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within-country standard deviation of the taste for revolt is 0.023). The size of the 
estimated effect for political rights is virtually the same.
Table 1: The effect of freedom and growth on the taste for revolt
Dep. Variable: Taste for Revolt? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Freedom -0.021** -0.020**
(0.004) (0.003)
Political Rights -0.017**
(0.003)
Civil Liberties -0.019**
(0.003)
Democracy (Polity Score) -0.009**
(0.001)
GDP per capita 0.006
(0.013)
AGDP per capita -0.051** -0.042** -0.062* -0.092**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.035)
PersonaI Income Position: Second -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Third -0.009* -0.009 -0.009* -0.008 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Fourth -0.013* -0.013* -0.014** -0.012* -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Fifth (top) -0.021** -0.020** -0.021** -0.019** -0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Observations 106,170 106,170 106,170 106,170 103,222
Notes: 61 countries from 1981 to 1997. Marginal Probabilities from Probit regressions are reported. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level; Single-starred 
bold-face at the 5 per cent level; Double-starred bold face at the 1 percent level. The baseline category for 
the relative income position of the individual is the bottom quintile. Columns 1 to 4 use freedom data 
from Freedom House, column 5 from Polity IV.
Finally, column 5 uses the Polity measure of a country’s level of political 
democratization. The controls, A GDP per capita and Personal Income Position, retain similar 
effects to the previous estimates. The coefficient on Democracy is negative and significant 
at the 1 per cent level. A country that loses two points of ‘polity’ on the -10 to +10 scale 
(equivalent to a shift from the United States to Brazil in 1995) increases the probability 
that its citizens want a revolt by 1.8 percentage points (on average). Focusing on within-
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country variation, a one standard deviation decline in Democracy (equal to 1.3 points) 
explains 51 percent of the standard deviation in revolutionary support. We can compute 
the marginal rate of substitution between democratization and GDP growth that would 
on average keep revolutionary support constant. A one standard deviation decline in 
Democracy would have to be compensated by an increase in the GDP growth rate of 14 
percentage points. For example, the growth rate would have to rise from -4% to 10% 
per annum in order to keep the proportion of people wanting a revolt unchanged in the 
face of a loss of Democracy of this magnitude. In other words, it seems feasible to fully 
offset a loss of democratic rights, but this requires rates of economic growth that are 
hardly sustainable over time.
4.2 The effect o f religion
Table 2 investigates the role of religion on attitudes to revolt Column 1 adds a dummy, 
Religious, for the individual stating that he belongs to a religious group. It also includes 
the basic set of variables measuring freedom and income that were used in the previous 
table, as well as country and year fixed effects. Being religious has a sizeable negative 
effect on wanting to revolt, significant at the 1 percent leveL Being religious lowers the 
probability to want a revolt by 2.8 percentage points. The coefficients on the aggregate 
level variables, Freedom and AGDPper capita, remain similar in size and significance levels 
to their corresponding estimates in Table 1.
The next columns test for whether the taste for revolt amongst religious people differs 
according to the degree of freedom in their country. In column 2 the interaction term, 
Religious*Freedom, is negative but not significant at conventional levels. In columns 3 and 
4 we test whether we can identify effects on either of the two separate components, 
Civil Liberties and Political Rights. Column 3 shows that there is evidence that being 
religious only diminishes revolutionary tendencies in countries that have relatively high 
levels of political rights. The interaction term is negative and significant at the 7 per cent 
level. For example, in countries with the highest political rights score, religious 
individuals have a 3.6 percentage point lower probability o f wanting a revolt compared 
to non-religious people (=0.006-0.006*7). However in countries with the lowest levels 
of political rights there are no differences between the religious and the non-religious 
(=0.006-0.006*1). In contrast, column 4 shows that there is no evidence of religious
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individuals becoming more inclined to revolt as their civil liberties are denied (i.e., the 
interaction term is not significant).
Table 2: The effect of religion on the taste for revolt
Dep. Variable: Taste for Revolt? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Freedom -0.018**
(0.003)
-0.014**
(0.004)
Political Rights -0.010**
(0.004)
Civil Liberties -0.015**
(0.004)
Democracy (Polity Score) -0.007**
(0.001)
AGDP per capita -0.054** -0.057** -0.050** -0.067** -0.100**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.035)
Personal Income Position: Second -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Third -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.009* -0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Fourth -0.013** -0.013** -0.014** -0.012* -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Fifth (top) -0.020** -0.020** -0.021** -0.019** -0.017**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Religious -0.028** -0.002 0.006 -0.013 -0.016*
(0.006) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.008)
Religious * Freedom -0.004
(0.003)
Religious * Political Rights -0.006
(0.003)
Religious * Civil Liberties -0.003
(0.003)
Religious * Democracy (Polity Score) -0.002**
(0.001)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Observations 100,620 100,620 100,620 100,620 97,794
Notes: 61 countries from 1981 to 1997. Marginal Probabilities from Probit regressions are reported. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Bold-face denotes significant at the 10% level; Single­
starred bold-face at the 5% level; Double-starred bold face at the 1% level. The baseline category for the 
relative income position of the individual is the bottom one and for the religious variable is declaring to 
belong to no religious denomination.
Column 3 has shown a differential effect between religious and non-religious people as 
their political rights change. This is confirmed when using the Polity index of 
democratization (on the -10 to +10 scale). In column 5, being religious decreases
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revolutionary tendencies the most in countries that have the highest levels of Democracy. 
•
The interaction term is negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. In a country with 
the highest possible level of Democracy a religious person is 3.6 percentage points less 
likely to want to revolt compared to a non-religious person (=-0.016-0.002*10). 
However, in countries with the lowest possible Polity scores, being religious implies a 
0.4 percentage point higher chance of wanting to revolt (=-0.016+0.002*10).
There is a possibility that belonging to a religious minority is the real cause of this effect. 
If we include in the regression an interaction term of freedom with being religious and 
belonging to a minority, there is some weak and not conclusive effect that people from 
a Christian or Muslim minority react more strongly to the denial of freedom than if they 
were part of the majority.11
It appears that religious individuals are more offended and inclined to rebel than others 
when their democratic/political freedoms are denied. Qne possible explanation for the 
effect of religion on the taste for revolt is that less political representation could limit 
their ability to practice their religion or could lead to discrimination in public activities. 
The result is ambiguous on the theoretical argument that religious people are unaffected 
by fewer freedoms since by joining a religious ‘club’ they have willingly given these up 
anyway (it is not clear which restrictions to freedom are voluntary and which are 
imposed). Finally, it supports the view of Adam Smith (1776) that religious competition 
benefits societies by providing less civil strife and more prosperity (reported in 
Iannaccone, 1998).
4.3 Robustness tests
Table 3 performs a set of robustness checks. It uses as a base specification the 
regression in column 2 of Table 1 with Freedom, A GDP per capita and Personal Income 
Quintile as explanatory variables. Column 1 tests for the possible non-linearity of the 
effect of freedom on the taste for revolt by including a squared term, which is not 
significant.12 The next column includes both the level and the change in GDP in the same 
regression and again supports the view that economic growth is a more important 
determinant of revolutionary tastes than the level of development.
11 Regression not reported in the table for simplicity as it contains several interaction terms (freedom x  
religious group x  minority and all the second-order interactions).
12 A cubic term is also not significant
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Table 3: Robustness tests
Dep. Variable: Taste for Revolt? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Freedom -0.029** -0.021** -0.021** -0.017** -0.020** -0.009*
(0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Freedom Squared 0.001
(0.001)
GDP per capita -0.015
(0.013)
A GDP per capita -0.055** -0.066** -0.035 -0.064 -0.049** -0.027
(0.016) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.030)
Personal Income Position: Second -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Third -0.009 -0.009* -0.009 -0.010* -0.011** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Fourth -0.013* -0.014** -0.013* -0.013** -0.016** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Fifth (top) -0.020** -0.021** -0.021** -0.019** -0.024** -0.019**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Trade openness -0.112
(0.062)
Social security -0.252**
(0.120)
Employment status: Unemployed 0.020** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006)
Self-employed -3.0e-4
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
Retired -0.027**
(0.004)
0.001
(0.006)
Student 0.019**
(0.004)
0.003
(0.010)
Housewife -0.022**
(0.004)
0.007
(0.004)
Religious -0.018**
(0.006)
Marital status: Married -0.015*
(0.007)
Divorced 1.9e-4
(0.008)
Separated 0.001
(0.008)
Widowed -0.012
(0.007)
Age -8.0e-4**
(1.5e-4)
Male 0.018**
(0.004)
Education (Age finished school) 6.0e-5
(2.0e-4)
Number of children 0.001
(0.001)
Country and Year fixed effects. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09
Observations 106,170 106,170 102,059 88,486 105,484 61,466
Note: Marginal Probabilities from Probit regressions are reported. Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Bold-face denotes significant at the 10% level; Single-starred bold-face at the 5% level; 
Double-starred bold face at the 1% level. The baseline category for the relative income position of the
individual is the bottom one and for the religious variable is declaring to belong to no religious 
denomination.
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Column 3 tests for the importance of trade openness. Polachek (1980) first raised the 
idea that international trade would reduce conflict between countries by increasing 
mutual interdependencies. He found supportive evidence using a cross-section of 30 
countries over 10 years. Here we check whether trade can reduce revolutionary 
pressures within nations. To the extent that civil conflict arises from rent-seeking 
behaviour, greater openness may have a beneficial effect by increasing the level of 
competitiveness in the domestic economy.13 In column 3, Trade openness has a negative 
effect, significant at the 10 percent level. A one standard deviation change explains 39% 
of the standard deviation in revolutionary support.
Column 4 tests whether more social security (as a proportion of the country’s GDP) can 
mitigate revolutionary pressures. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 
percent level. A one standard deviation change in Social security explains 15% of the 
standard deviation in the support for revolt. This is consistent with historical evidence 
that the origins of social insurance lay primarily in defusing potential conflict and 
increasing the security of property rights.14
We also control for income inequality using Deininger and Squire’s (1996) high quality’ 
Gini coefficients. Due to limited availability our sample size falls to 69,963 people over 
32 countries and we lose the variation over time. Controlling for country effects the 
coefficient on inequality is positive at the 5 per cent level and Freedom retains a similar 
negative and significant effect to the previous estimates.
Column 5 expands the set of personal controls to include a set of variables capturing the 
employment status. Compared to working, being unemployed or a student increases the 
probability of wanting to revolt by 2.0 and 1.9 percentage points, respectively. Being 
retired decreases it by 2.7 percentage points. These coefficients are all significant at the 1 
percent level. The effects of the other variables remain largely unchanged. Column 6 
adds more personal characteristics although doing so reduces the sample size by over 
40%. The main effects are that married individuals are significantly less likely to want a 
revolution whereas being young and male increases this probability.
13 See also Ades and Di Telia (1999) who show that more openness reduces corruption by limiting 
opportunities for rent-extraction. Krugman (1995) argues that “trade politics is primarily about conflicts 
of interests within rather than between nations”.
14 A ffequendy cited example is the fact that the first mandatory old-age pension system was created in 
Germany in 1889 by Otto von Bismarck, who “was neither a reformer nor particularly liberal. The ciron- 
chancellor’ advocated social security in the hope of pacifying the proletariat and luring them away from 
socialism” (Carter and Shipman, 1997, p. 40).
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4.4 Controlling for endogeneity
Table 4 reports the results from the two-stage regressions that control for the potential 
endogeneity of freedom and growth. In column 1 Freedom and A GDP per capita are 
instrumented with the legal and colonial origins of countries. As noted earlier, the 
literature describes several instances in which more revolutionary pressures have led to 
more freedom (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000 and 2001, on the extension of voting 
rights, Grossman, 1994, on land reform, and Fording, 1997, on the expansion of the 
welfare state as attempts of regimes at self-preservation). If  this is the dominant form of 
endogeneity then we would expect the coefficient on Freedom to become smaller, i.e. 
more negative, after it is instrumented. This is what we find in column 1, in which 
freedom reduces revolutionary support by a greater amount compared to the OLS 
estimates. It also retains significance at the 1 percent level. GDP growth again has a 
negative effect, although its larger size is less easy to understand. Since the number of 
instruments is greater than the number of endogenous regressors, the equation is over­
identified, which allows us to test for the exogeneity of the instruments using a Hansen 
test. The test statistic is distributed as ^(6), where the degrees of freedom are equal to 
the number of over-identifying restrictions. Exogeneity of the over-identifying 
restrictions could not be rejected with a p-value of 0.38.
The first-stage regressions are reported in columns 2 and 3. They show the same basic 
patterns that are reported in La Porta et al (1999). In particular, countries with Socialist 
legal origins have significantly lower levels of freedom compared to the base category of 
British origin. The effect of Socialist legal origins is exactly as predicted by political 
theories, which argue that interventionist policies are enacted to enhance the power of 
the state to the expense of the efficient level of freedom. These countries tend to 
regulate more and to be less democratic than common law countries. Scandinavian legal 
origins increase freedoms while there is weak evidence that French legal origins tend to 
suppress them (here significant only at the 15 percent level, while more strongly 
significant in La Porta et al, who use a larger cross-section of 125 countries).
The bottom panel o f column 2 shows that countries once ruled by the main colonial 
powers (I.e., Britain, Spain and Portugal15) had lower levels of freedom between 1981 
and 1997 compared to countries that were never colonized. There does not appear to be
15 There axe no former French colonies in the sample.
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evidence of significant differences depending on the identity of the colonizer. However 
in the first-stage regression explaining GDP growth in column 3, being a Portuguese 
colony stands out as delivering relatively worse performance (the major colony of 
Portugal in the sample is Brazil). There are no significant effects on the rate of 
economic development depending on whether the origin of the coloniser was either 
British or Spanish.
Table 4: Exogeneity tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Taste for Freedom AGDP/ capita Taste for Freedom AGDP/bead
Revolt? (1st (1st Stage) Revolt? (1st Stage) (1st Stage)
2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS
Freedom -0.039** -0.034**
(0.010) (0.011)
A GDP per capita -0.455** -0.020
(0.160) (0.152)
External Instruments:
Legal Origins
Scandinavian 0.364 -0.029 0.192 -0.056
(0.190) (0.027) (0.157) (0.034)
French -0.600 0.020 -0.523 -0.012
(0.416) (0.029) (0.397) (0.032)
Socialist -2.489** 0.021 -2.385** -0.002
(0353) (0.055) (0.356) (0.056)
German -0.292 -0.017 -0.101 -0.038
(0.190) (0.037) (0.208) (0.040)
Colonial Origins
British -1.539* -0.015 -1.090 -0.009
(0.698) (0.029) (0.674) (0.033)
Spanish -1.392* 0.003 -1.063 -0.018
(0.533) (0.028) (0.564) (0.028)
Portuguese -1.129** -0.146** -0.512 -0.230**
(0.402) (0.020) (0.422) (0.019)
Other -1.193* 0.028 0.015 0.051**
(0.465) (0.023) (0.034) (0.017)
Personal Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.08 0.32 0.04 0.11 0.41 0.07
Observations 100,282 100,282 100,282 60,447 60,447 60,447
Notes: The Hansen test for exogeneity of the over-identifying restrictions for column 1 is %2(6)=6.4 (p- 
value=0.38). The corresponding test for column 4 is %2(6)=9.5 (p-value=0.14). The personal 
characteristic controls used in colum ns 4-6 axe the same as in Table 3, column 6. Base legal origin is 
British and the base for colonial origin is not having been a colony.
In column 4 we use the same instruments and in addition we control for the complete 
set of personal characteristics that were included in column 6 of Table 3. The number of
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observations falls by over 40% once this set of 18 additional controls is added. The 
coefficient on freedom retains its size and is still significant at the 1 percent level, 
whereas A GDP per capita maintains a negative sign and a magnitude in line with the OLS 
results but loses significance. The Hansen test of exogeneity of over-identifying 
restrictions shows that exogeneity could not be rejected (the ^(6 ) statistic is 9.5 and the 
corresponding p-value equals 0.14). In the first stage results reported in columns 5 and 
6, Socialist legal origins and Spanish colonial origins have a negative effect on the level 
of freedom.
5 C onclusion
This paper takes a new approach to answer an unsettled question concerning whether 
the lack of civil liberties and democratic freedoms are a root cause of revolutionary 
pressures in nations. It also studies the role of religious beliefs. To do so, we introduce 
micro-data based on surveys of revolutionary tastes of 106,000 people living in 61 
countries between 1981 and 1997. This approach differs from previous studies that have 
used aggregate level data on civil wars. We first provide different types of evidence that 
show how the support for revolution is correlated with observable measures of actions 
that both the people and their governments have undertaken. These include whether the 
individual has joined strikes and demonstrations, occupied buildings or factories, and 
the level of government spending on arms and in education. Levels of revolutionary 
support are also found to be significandy positively correlated with the country 
experiencing a civil war.
The paper then studies the determinants of revolutionary preferences. Controlling for 
the personal characteristics of respondents, country and year effects, less people want 
revolutionary change when their freedoms increase. A one standard deviation change in 
freedom explains 38% of the standard deviation in the proportion of people who want 
to revolt. Since governments may attempt to preserve themselves in the face of rising 
revolutionary threats, we also control for the potential endogeneity of freedom. The 
main result remains the same. The creation of institutions that promote civil liberties 
and democratic freedoms appear to be an important mechanism for defusing unrest and 
assuring the security of property rights. Without such institutions revolutionary 
pressures increase, opening up the possibility of an explosive bandwagon that can lead 
to a regime change. Higher GDP growth rates may be able to “buy o ff’ part o f the
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increase in revolutionary support when freedoms are constrained. The paper also finds 
that being religious lowers an individual’s chance of wanting to revolt in free countries, 
but the effect disappears entirely in non-free countries, where there are no significant 
differences between religious and non-religious individuals. There is also evidence 
suggesting a beneficial role for trade and social security in defusing preferences for 
conflict.
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A ppendix 1: Sum m ary statistics
Table A.1: The taste for revolution across individuals
Taste for Religious? If religious:
Revolt? An Unemployed Yes No Minority Majority
Yes 9.8 14.1 9.2 10.3 11.9 9.9
No 90.2 85.9 90.8 89.7 88.1 90.1
Freedom Status Income Quintdles
Taste for Not free Partly Free Free | S t 2nd 3rd 4th 5*
Revolt? (1-2.5) (2.5-5.5) (5.5-7) (Lowest) (Highest)
Yes 18.1 13.1 6.2 10.8 10.4 10.2 9.3 6.9
No 81.9 86.9 93.8 89.2 89.6 89.8 90.7 93.1
Note: All figures are based on the full sample of 106,170 people in 61 countries from 1981 to 1997 and 
are expressed as percentages.
Table A.2: Aggregate variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Individual variables:
Taste for Revolt? 106,170 0.098 0.082 0 1
Religious? 100,620 0.827 0.232 0 1
Religious Minority? 100,620 0.135 0.342 0 1
Macro variables:
Freedom 102 5.62 1.52 1 7
Political Rights 102 5.80 1.58 1 7
Gvil Liberties 102 5.44 1.54 1 7
Democracy (Polity Score) 102 6.83 4.95 -7 10
GDP per capita (raw level) 97 10,967 10,190 236 38,612
AGDP per capita (in logs) 97 0.03 0.14 -0.33 0.27
Trade openness 79 0.39 0.28 0.04 1.19
Social security/GDP 79 0.05 0.05 0 0.19
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Table A.3: Correlation matrix
Taste for 
Revolt? Freedom
Political
Rights
Civil
Liberties
GDP per 
capita (logs)
Freedom -0.55
Political Rights -0.53 0.99
Civil Liberties -0.54 0.99 0.96
GDP per capita (logs) -0.56 0.69 0.67 0.70
AGDP per capita -0.06 0.07 0.07 .0.06 0.07
Table A.4: The relationship between preferences for revolt and actions
Panel A: Correlation between individual preferences and individual actions
Taste for 
Revolt?
Joined
boycotts?
Attended
demonstrations?
Joined
strikes?
Occupied
orfactories?
Joined boycotts? 0.068
Attended demonstrations? 0.082 0.366
Joined unofficial strikes? 0.068 0.278 0.297
Occupied buildingsf 0.063 0.222 0.233 0.321
Signedpetitions? 0.004 0.271 0.311 0.154 0.111
Note: Data are from the World Values Survey Series and axe based on a random sample of 106,170 
people in 61 countries from 1981 to 1997.
Panel B: Correlation between individual preferences for revolt and 
five dimensions of general disaffection
Taste for 
Revolt?
Environment 
needs protect.
Country Run 
for the Few
Corruption
Prevalent
Don't Respect 
Authority •
Environment needs Protection -0.001
Country Run for the Few 0.050 0.015
Corruption is Prevalent 0.088 -0.033 0.243
Don’t Respect Authority 0.006 0.048 0.035 -0.038
Bleak Future -0.021 0.019 0.116 0.042 0.057
Note: Data are from the World Values Survey Series and are based on a sample of 42,856 people in 47 
countries in 1995.
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A ppendix 2: A sim ple m odel
In this appendix we show how lower freedom and incomes may lead a greater 
proportion of the population who want a revolution. Let j .  be individual i’s income
and F  the level of freedom she enjoys. Let LT ) be their utility function (Uc'>0 and
Uc"<0). Assume that people face a standard utility maximization problem but that, in 
addition to their budget constraint, they also face a constraint on their attainable levels 
of consumption due to government laws (for example, outlawing alcohol or restrictions 
on type of clothing). The problem each individual solves is:
maximize Ui(ci ) (1)
such that p.ci < Y i Budget Constraint
and c{ < r * ( F )  Freedom Constraint
where c. is a vector of consumption goods and p  is a vector of prices. The vector
£m“ (F) specifies the maximum consumption level allowed for each good in the vector 
due to a restriction of freedom. From problem (1) we can define an indirect utility
function, ,F,  pj .  Let an individual have a rational preference for revolt if she
would experience an expected utility gain from one:
A,. = E > 0
=> A. = E {V.(Y;RtpoA, F * 5"*,£ * •* )}  -  iV .(y .°,F0, / )  > 0  (2)
where Y ^ ^ , F Rcvolt and p ^ mli are the levels of income, freedom and prices in the
event of revolt and Y ° , F° and p° are their initial levels. Equation (2) compares the
expected utility deriving from a revolt with the utility from the status quo. If A;. > 0
then an individual has a rational preference for revolt. Post-revolt income, Y RcwZf, may 
depend on each person’s pre-revolt income (i.e. whether they are rich or poor) as well as 
on the moments of the income distribution. Post-revolt freedom, E Re*’/f ? depends on 
the policies of the new regime.
Assume that individuals have the following indirect utility function, 
K(ji>Fi)  = a i log J i  + A 1°g-F > where a ,>Pi > 0  are individual-specific parameters
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reflecting personal characteristics (such as sex, age, education level or religion). This
—ofunctional form implicitly assumes that the freedom constraint is binding. Let Y  be the
initial mean level of income and r° = j/;° /  Y  be each person’s relative income. In the 
event that a revolt occurs assume either that wealth is equally shared with no output loss 
(i.e., j f cwlt — y  —Y  >1 for Vi) or that some output is destroyed leaving all
incomes equal to unity. Assume without loss of generality that both outcomes occur 
with equal probability. Hence a rational individual has a preference for revolt if her 
expected utility gain is positive:
T7 Re volt
A, = - a , log (r,° VY ) + log (— — ) > 0 (3)
F
Comparative static conditions derived from equation (3) are:
1. d A J d F 0 <0
2. 9A, /  9r° < 0
3. dA , . / 3 r °  < 0
These conditions state that revolutionary preferences depend negatively on the initial 
level of freedom, on the individual’s relative income and on average income. Since larger 
initial freedom implies greater utility relative to what one expects to receive in the event 
of a revolt, the effect is to decrease the utility gain expected from one. Each person’s 
expected utility gain decreases with relative income due to the assumption that people 
end up with the same level of income after a revolt (so the more income one has 
initially, the less potential there is to gain). The reason for the negative effect o f average 
income is that when people become absolutely better off, even relatively poor ones have 
more to lose if the revolt does not succeed. The size of all these effects depends on the 
individual parameters, OLi and /?..
Preferences versus Actions
Having a rational preference for revolt should be distinguished from actual participation 
in one. An individual may only be willing to exert effort to achieve radical social change 
to the extent that the free-rider problem is overcome. To illustrate, assume that it costs 
an individual c(ei}F ) to exert effort ei on revolt (where ce'> 0 and<rF'< 0 ). The latter
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inequality represents a higher cost of acting against a more repressive government. Let 
the average revolutionary effort across the whole population be equal to e and the 
probability of a revolt actually occurring equalp, where p  is a function of ei and e . Each 
person chooses effort to maximize her expected utility:
b w , = ^ G , ° . - f ° ) + A  - 4 > f 0)-
The complementary slackness conditions are p'e {eise).Af -c'e (ei3F°)  < 0 and ef > 0.
If the probability of a revolt occurring is independent of any individual’s efforts then 
p\  (ei >e) ~ ® so ei ~  0 • In such a case each person hopes to free-ride on the efforts
of others but in equilibrium there is zero average effort and no actual revolt, despite the 
existence of people who may have a preference for one (i.e., for whom Ay >0) .  Only
when p\ (ej , e) > 0 can an interior solution exist. Also note that although a reduction in 
freedoms may increase the expected utility gain from a revolt (i.e., A i increases) people 
may be less willing to exert effort to achieve one due to the potentially higher costs of 
doing so (i.e., ce '(ei}F)  may also increase).
A ppendix 3: D ata description and  sources
World Values Survey (version obtained by the UK Data Archive)
It is designed to enable cross-national comparisons on a wide variety of values and 
norms and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe. The surveys 
were carried out through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of 
all adult citizens aged 18 and older designed to be representative at the country level. 
The 1981-83 survey covered 22 independent countries; the 1990-93 survey covered 42 
independent countries; the 1995-97 survey covered 53 independent countries. In total, 
64 independent countries have been surveyed in at least one wave of the investigation. 
The full set of countries covered is: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, 
Switzerland, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, East and Unified Germany, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, 
Georgia, Ghana, Croatia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Madagascar, Mexico, Macedonia, Mongolia,
CHAPTER 3. FREEDOM, GROWTH AND REVOLUTION 111
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, 
Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
United States of America, Venezuela, South Africa, Moscow, Tambov oblast, 
Montenegro, Nigeria, Romania, Moldova and Serbia.
Years: 1981-83,1990-93,1995-97.
Personal characteristics (source: World Values Survey)
Age: Dummies for age less than 20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, over 70.
Personal Income ’Position'. A set of 5 dummy variables that represent the income position of 
the individual within the country’s scale. The base category is the lowest one.
Religiour. A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent answers yes to the 
question “Do you belong to a religious denomination? I f  yes, which one?”. The specific categories 
of religion listed in the remainder of the question were “I. Roman Catholic, 2. Protestant, 3. 
Orthodox, 4. Jew, 5. Muslim, 6. Hindu, 7. Buddhist, 8. Other”. The base category is people 
who answer '0. Not a member” or ‘No religious denomination”.
Employment status: A set of dummy variables for the respondent’s employment status: 
“Unemployed”, “Self-employed”, “Retired”, “Student”, “Housewife” or “Other”. The 
base category is “Employed”.
Marital statur. A set of dummy variables on the respondent’s marital status: ‘Married”, 
‘Divorced”, “Separated” or “Widowed”. The base category is ‘Never Married”.
Age: The respondent’s age in years.
Male: A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if female. 
Education (Age finished school): The age that the respondent finished full-time education. 
Number of children: The number o f children living in the household.
Attitudes and values questions (source: World Values Survey)
Taste for Rvolt?: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent answers 
that ‘The entire way our society is organised must be radically changed ly revolutionary action ”, and 
equals 0 when the respondent answers that either “Our society must be gradually improved by 
rforms” or “Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces”. The 
distribution of the answers in the general sample is “revolutionary” 9.85%, “reformist” 
70.89%, and “conservative” 16.37% (2.89% say they do not know).
Country Run for the Few: A dummy variable equal to 1 when respondent agrees with the 1st 
answer to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a
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few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the 
people? 1. Run by a few big interests 2. Run for all the people”.
Environment Needs Protection: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with 
the 1st answer to the question: “Here are two statements people sometimes make when 
discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your 
own view? 1. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes 
slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. 2. Economic growth and creating jobs 
should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent”.
Corruption is Prevalent A discrete variable ranging from 1 to 4 depending on the reply to 
the following question: “How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in 
this country? 1. Almost no public officials are engaged in it, 2. A few public officials are 
engaged in it, 3. Most public officials are engaged in it, 4. Almost all public officials are 
engaged in it”.
Don't Respect Authority: A dummy if the respondent agrees with the second answer to the 
question (rephrased here for clarity): cTlease tell me, if it were to happen, whether you 
think that greater respect for authority in our way of life in the near future it would be 1) 
a good thing, or 2) a bad thing?”.
Bleak Future: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with the second 
answer to the question “For each of the following pairs of statements, please tell me 
which one comes closest to your own views: 1. Humanity has a bright future, 2. 
Humanity has a bleak future.”
Sources of policies and macro variables
Freedom. An index measured on a one-to-seven scale assigning 1 to the least free 
countries and 7 to the most free. This index is a composite measure obtained by 
averaging the two separate indices, Political Rights and Civil Uberties. The source is Freedom 
House.
Political Rights: An index from Freedom House measured on a one-to-seven scale with 1 
being assigned to the least free countries and 7 to the most free.
Civil 'Liberties'. An index from Freedom House measured on a one-to-seven scale with 1 
being assigned to the least free countries and 7 to the most free.
Democracy (Polity score): An index obtained from the Polity IV project whose focus is on 
the authority patterns that characterize states. The polity index is on a 21 point scale (- 
10 to +10) and ranges from the most autocratic and least democratic regimes (-10) to
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the least autocratic and most democratic ones (10). It is computed by subtracting an 
index of Autocracy (0 to 10) from an index of Democracy (0 to 10 as well). For further 
information, see the Polity I V  Dataset Users Manual (2002).
GDP per capita: The level of GDP per capita in constant 1992 US$, measured in logs, 
from the World Development Indicators o f the World Bank.
A GDP per capita'. The first difference of GDP per capita.
Trade openness-. The sum of imports and exports divided by GDP. The source is the 
World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Social security-. Social security divided by GDP. The source is the World Development 
Indicators, World Bank.
Inequality. Gini coefficient from the World Bank’s Deininger and Squire (1996) Tdgh 
quality’ data set.
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Table A.5: Data summary on preference for revolt
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Country Year Freedom Status 'Proportion of people with a Revolutionary Preference
Argentina 1984 Free 12.4
Argentina 1991 Free 7.5
Argentina 1995 Free 5.1
Armenia 1997 Pardy Free 16.0
Australia 1981 Free 4.4
Australia 1995 Free 5.7
Austria 1990 Free 2.2
Azerbaijan 1996 Not Free 23.5
Bangladesh 1996 Pardy Free 10.8
Belarus 1996 Not Free 3.7
Belgium 1981 Free 6.7
Belgium 1990 Free 4.1
Bosnia-Herzeg. 1998 Pardy Free 15.4
Brazil 1991 Free 16.4
Brazil 1997 Pardy Free 18.1
Britain 1981 Free 4.8
Britain 1990 Free 5.1
Bulgaria 1990 Pardy Free 22.1
Bulgaria 1997 Free 6.6
Canada 1981 Free 4.8
Canada 1990 Free 4.7
Chile 1990 Free 5.3
Chile 1996 Free 5.9
China 1990 Not Free 5.2
Colombia 1997 Pardy Free 7.1
Croatia 1995 Pardy Free 4.8
Czech Republic 1990 Free 44.9
Denmark 1981 Free 4.2
Denmark 1990 Free 1.6
Dominican Rep. 1996 Pardy Free 12.6
East Germany 1990 Free 12.5
East Germany 1997 Free 6.1
Estonia 1996 Free 2.9
Finland 1990 Free 2.8
Finland 1996 Free 1.8
France 1981 Free 8.6
France 1990 Free 4.3
Georgia 1996 Pardy Free 9.4
Ghana 1995 Pardy Free 13.3
Hungary 1990 Free 6.2
Iceland 1981 Free 1.8
Iceland 1990 Free 3.2
India 1990 Free 14.0
India 1996 Pardy Free 15.3
Ireland 1981 Free 4.4
Ireland 1990 Free 3.7
Italy 1981 Free 7.9
Italy 1990 Free 7.1
Japan 1981 Free 3.1
Japan 1990 Free 2.1
continued on nextpage ...
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. .. continued from previous page 
Country Year Freedom Status Proportion of people with a
Japan 1995 Free
'Revolutionary Preference
3.5
Latvia 1996 Free 10.9
Lithuania 1996 Free 9.7
Macedonia 1997 Partly Free 12.4
Mexico 1981 Partly Free 12.0
Mexico 1990 Partly Free 16.5
Mexico 1996 Partly Free 12.8
Moldova 1996 Pardy Free 10.2
Netherlands 1981 Free 3.4
Netherlands 1990 Free 1.9
Nigeria 1990 Pardy Free 28.1
Nigeria 1995 Not Free 31.6
Norway 1982 Free 2.0
Norway 1990 Free 2.4
Norway 1996 Free in
Pakistan 1997 Pardy Free 29.1
Peru 1996 Pardy-Free 8.2
Philippines 1996 Free 22.5
Poland 1989 Pardy Free 22.9
Poland 1997 Free 8.9
Portugal 1990 Free 4.7
Russia 1991 Pardy Free 17.2
Russia 1995 Pardy Free 10.9
Serbia 1996 Not Free 12.8
Slovakia 1990 Free 37.3
Slovenia 1992 Free 14.3
Slovenia 1995 Free 7.1
South Africa 1982 Not Free 16.0
South Africa 1990 Pardy Free 15.9
South Africa 1996 Free 12.1
South Korea 1982 Pardy Free 22.3
South Korea 1990 Free 7.3
South Korea 1996 Free 12.5
Spain 1981 Free 7.9
Spain 1990 Free 4.5
Spain 1995 Free 4.6
Sweden 1982 Free 4.3
Sweden 1990 Free 6.1
Sweden 1996 Free 4.4
Switzerland 1996 Free 6.6
Taiwan 1995 Pardy Free 2.9
Turkey 1990 Pardy Free 13.8
Turkey 1996 Pardy Free 21.2
Ukraine 1996 Pardy Free 8.7
Uruguay 1996 Free 8.0
USA 1982 Free 5.0
USA 1990 Free 6.5
USA 1995 • Free 4.8
Venezuela 1996 Free 11.4
West Germany 1981 Free 2.5
West Germany 1990 Free 1.7
West Germany 1997 Free 2.3
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Chapter 4
An experimental investigation into the 
causes of civil conflict
In the previous chapter we have analysed attitudes to conflict and revolt from a large 
individual-level international survey to assess the determinants of preferences for con­
flict. We have found that the repression of political and civil rights strongly affects the 
acceptance of an individual of the society he lives in. In countries with lower protection 
of political rights, individuals declare more often the willingness to support revolution­
ary action to change society. We have also found that economic growth can pardy com­
pensate the lack of political rights in curbing the preference for revolution, but only at 
very high costs, hardly sustainable over time.
This chapter brings further the study of the determinants of unrest and conflict distin­
guishing the effects of economic and political grievances on preferences from the ef­
fects on actions. Individual revolutionary preferences may not translate into actions due 
to the co-ordination problem that undermines collective action. Thus, while support for 
revolution is a necessary condition for uprisings actually breaking out, it may not be 
sufficient. Forces may even work in opposite directions on preferences and actions. 
Repression, for instance, may enhance a taste for revolt but at the same time the fear of 
its consequences may inhibit actual revolutionary behaviour. This paper aims at disen­
tangling how limitations of individual rights affect at the same time revolutionary pref­
erences in one way and revolutionary action in another. We study the impact of three
* This chapter represents my own account of a joint investigation with Klaus Abbink.
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potentially relevant factors: freedom of communication, political repression, i.e. the 
prosecution of political opposition, and the perception that the country is corrupted.
The study of the effect of these factors on preferences and actions runs in parallel, 
combining two distinct but complementary methodologies. Analysing the preferences of 
over 50,000 individuals in a regression framework, we investigate the role of political 
and economic grievances in preferences for conflict. We then address the interaction 
between preferences, actions and information observing the interaction between citizens 
and government in a laboratory experiment In a laboratory, with the expertise of an 
experimental economist, Klaus Abbink from the University of Nottingham, we re-create 
an analogous, although stylised, set of conditions and incentives where we can analyse 
whether the same economic and political grievances lead to revolutionary action. The 
restricted environment also allows us to control for reverse causality and omitted vari­
ables, which constitute the most common limitations of empirical analyses.
We introduce a simple experimental model that captures some basic features of an auto- 
catic government. The political arena is modelled as a game played by one governor and 
seven citizens. The game consists of three stages. At the first stage, the governor decides 
how to rule society on the three dimensions. He decides on the level of exploitation of 
the society choosing either an egalitarian or a selfish allocation. At the same time he 
decides on the punishment that the citizens will incur if they oppose, and chooses 
whether to restrict communication among them. At the second stage the citizens decide 
whether to communicate to their neibours that they accept the governor or that they 
intend to revolt. At the third stage the citizens decide whether to actually revolt against 
the governor. If  a sufficient number of citizens oppose the governor, the revolt is suc­
cessful; if not, those who opposed are punished. The game is played repeatedly to model 
the long-term interaction between citizens and the government.
Combining the analysis on survey data and on laboratory evidence allows us to ascertain 
the different effects that corruption, restrictions to freedom of communication and re­
pression exert on preferences and actions.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the empirical evidence on revo­
lutionary preferences derived from econometric analysis. Section 2 introduces the model 
and the experimental design. Section 3 presents the results of the experiment. Section 4 
concludes.
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1 R esults on revolutionary preferences from  survey data
In this section we investigate the role of economic and political motives on preferences for 
revolt. As later on in the experiment, we identify in the data factors that can be associ­
ated with economic and political grievances. The source of data on revolutionary prefer­
ences is the World Values Survey. Over 130,000 individuals in 61 countries were asked 
about their attitudes towards a wide range of issues. One question they answered was: 
“On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-a-vis the society in which we live in. Please choose the 
one which best describes your own opinion” The three possible responses are: ‘The entire way our 
society is organised must be radically changed ly revolutionary action ” “Our society must be gradually 
improved ly reforms”, and “Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive 
forces”.2 Matching this information with country-level data reduces the sample to 52,616 
individuals in 41 countries, covering both developed and developing countries from all 
continents3, between 1990 and 1997. The reduced form of the probit regressions used 
to analyse the determinants of preferences for revolt is as follows.
Preference for Revolt?^ — a County Run For The Few^ + (5 Political Rightsa + y Press Freedoma+
+ S Personal Income  ^+ ij GDP per capitaa + 0 interactions + A Micro^ + rjt + /it +
where Preference for Revolt?^ is a dummy that takes the value 1 when individual i in country 
c and year t holds a belief that ‘The entire way our society is organised must be radically changed Jy 
revolutionay action”.
The first three independent variables capture the main factors that we focus on in the 
combined analysis. The variable County Run For The Few^ is a dummy that proxies the 
citizen’s perception of the government’s appropriation of the resources of the country. 
In the World Values Survey, participants were asked the question: “Generally speaking 
would you say that this county is run ly a few big interests looking outfor themselves, or that it is run 
for the benefit of all the people?”. Possible answers were “Run ly a few big interests” and “Run for 
all the people”. In the regression the variable takes the value 1 if the individual answered 
that the country is run by a few big interests. The influence of repression is captured by 
the variable Political Rightsa. To identify this factor, we use the Freedom House index of 
political rights, measured on a 1 to 7 scale. Finally, freedom of communication is re­
2 “Don't know” answers are coded as missing.
3 Admittedly Middle Eastern and African countries are underrepresented in the sample.
CHAPTER 4. AN EXPERIMENT ON REVOLUTION 119
fleeted in the extent to which the country’s media are free from restrictions 
(Press Freedom )^. This is represented by the Freedom House index of press freedom, which 
ranges from 1 to 3. Both indices are rescaled such that high scores mean high levels of 
freedom. Two independent variables describe the economic circumstances that the indi­
vidual lives in. Personal Incomeict is the person’s (self-reported) income position within the 
country on a 1 to 10 scale. GDP per capitad is measured as per capita income in 1992 US$ 
(PPP) in logs. To identify more precisely the role of these factors, we generate three 
interactions: personal and aggregate income x  the individual’s perception that the county is run for the 
few, and political rights x  press freedom. All regressions include country and year fixed effects 
and cluster the standard errors by country and year. The sources of all variables are 
given in the Appendix.
Table 1 shows the regression results. Column 1 gives a cross-sectional view of the corre­
lations within the data. The only adjustment is clustering the standard errors by country 
and year of analysis. Across countries, a higher aggregate income and more political 
rights are negatively correlated to a preference for revolt, while the individual perception 
that the country is run for the interest of the few increases the preference for revolt 
Personal income and press freedom do not exhibit significant effects on the preference 
for revolt Column 2 adds the interactions of the relevant factors: personal and aggregate 
income x  the individual’s perception that the county is run for the few, and political rights x  press free­
dom. None of them is significantly different from zero. Only aggregate income maintains 
a negative effect on the preference for revolt.
Column 3 adds country and year fixed effects to explore whether a change of economic 
and political factors within the same country affects the preference for revolt among its 
citizens. Somewhat surprisingly, a growth in the aggregate income of the country in­
creases support for revolt. This contravenes the findings in the previous chapter. On the 
other hand, communicating dissent reflects pure preferences after they are mediated by 
opportunities and circumstances to express them. The effect found here is likely to re­
flect higher capabilities (i.e. resources) to express dissent rather than a direct effect on 
preferences.4
4 Another possibility is that the growth in aggregate income increases support for revolt through an in­
crease in inequality. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the findings are limited by the scarcity of reliable “high- 
quality” data on equality, such that the World Values Survey sample is reduced by over 30 percent and is 
not very representative. There we found some positive effect of inequality on preferences for conflict. 
This does not rule out other channels, for instance that the positive effect of GDP on revolt may pass 
through unemployment status, or through low class mobility.
Table 1: Regression results
Depvar: Preference for revolt (mean=0.114) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) W (8)
Country run for the few 0.034** 0.062 0.028** 0.006 0.029** 0.043 0.030** 0.006
(2.62) (1.02) (3.90) (0.17) (2.95) (0.71) (4.13) (0.19)
Political Rights (1-7) -0.016+ -0.014 -0.020** -0.015** -0.027** -0.045** -0.022** -0.018**
(1.65) (0.74) (10.13) (10.2) (45.47) (11.34) (12.54) (14.62)
Press Freedom (1-3) 0.027 0.036 -0.028** 0.009 -0.038** -0.146** -0.021** 0.014
(0.93) (0.76) (6.33) (0.92) (11.61) (9.61) (5.05) (1.58)
Personal income (1-10) -1.93e-4 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 3.6e-4 -0.003* -0.005*
(0.09) (0.95) (1.52) (0.77) (0.59) (0.14) (2.47) (2.28)
GDP per capita (logs) -0.023** -0.021** 0.083** 0.077** 0.098** 0.099** 0.073** 0.068**
(3.46) (2.64) (8.28) (12.68) (14.1) (7.28) (7.80) (10.99)
Pers. income*Country run for the few -0.004 -Z77E-04 -0.001 0.002
(1.39) (0.13) (0.3) (1.10)
GDP per capita (Logs)*Country run for the few -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002
(0.27) (0.75) (0.18) (0.50)
Political rights*Press Freedom -0.002 -0.007** 0.018** -0.006**
(0.23) (4.01) (7.98) (4.28)
Clustering by country-year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries All All All All Developing countries All All
Personal characteristics No No No No No No Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10
Observations 52,616 52,616 52,615 52,615 40,709 40,709 49,594 49,594
Note: Estimates from Probit regressions. Marginal probabilities are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. Bold-face denotes significant at the 10 percent level; single­
starred bold-face at the 5 per cent level; double-starred bold face at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are dustered by country and year. The baseline category for the relative ^
income position of the individual is the bottom one. o
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A larger perception that the country is run by the few is associated with greater prefer­
ence for revolt, as lower political rights and lower press freedom are. Column 4 adds the 
insight that holding political rights constant, a higher press freedom diminishes the sen­
timent of revolt.
Columns 5 and 6 run the basic specifications on the subset of developing countries. 
Most of the effects are unchanged but the size of the estimates is larger. A greater pref­
erence for revolt is associated with faster GDP growth, with the perception that the 
country is run by the few, with lower political rights and lower press freedom. The only 
difference is that the role of press freedom appears to be the opposite in developing 
countries.
Holding political rights constant, greater press freedom is associated with a higher pref­
erence for revolt. This suggests that in developed countries, having a free press is in­
strumental in defusing the dissent, while in developing countries it is one of the few 
channels to express it.
Finally, columns 7 and 8 add personal characteristics o f the individuals (age, gender and 
unemployment) as controls. The basic results are comparable to those on the full sam­
ple of countries, with the difference that personal income acquires significance in ex­
plaining the preference for revolt. A lower personal income increases the sentiment of 
revolt. This also increases significantly when the person is young (less than 26 years old), 
male and unemployed.
Overall an investigation on preferences for revolt highlights that political rights, the 
freedom to communicate through the press and the perception that the country is run 
for the interest of the few are important to explain attitudes to revolt within a country. 
Generally speaking, a higher level of political rights and press freedom weakens the taste 
for revolutionary action, while a feeling o f appropriation by the ruling parties strength­
ens support for revolt.
Like most empirical studies on civil conflict, these results are not totally immune from 
concerns of possible biases of endogeneity, here of press and political freedom to the 
preference for revolt itself. The previous chapter has assessed the causality of the effect 
of political rights on preferences for revolt using instrumental variables. Further effort 
should be devoted to finding an instrument for press freedom, which will be within the
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scope of future work. Here we turn to the controlled environment of a laboratory ex­
periment to assess the separate role of these factors on actions of revolt.
2 T he  experim ental m odel and design
For the experimental part of this work we devise a model that captures the essential 
features of the political situation under study, yet is simple enough to be tractable in the 
laboratory. To our knowledge the use of laboratory experiments in the study of civil 
conflict is a novelty.5 Some insights can be gained from previous experimental studies 
looking at the single influential factors we address. A dislike of exploitative distributions 
is a well-established finding in the large literature on the ultimatum game (see Camerer, 
2003 for a recent survey). Communication is found to facilitate play of Pareto-superior 
equilibria in co-ordination games (Cooper et al’ 1992) and an exogenous punishment 
opportunity can improve public good provision (Fehr and Gachter, 2000, Masclet, 
Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval, 2003). The particular situation that we intend to study 
raises the need for a new experimental design.
We construct a stylised game consisting of three stages. The players in the game are one 
Governor and a number of Citizens. The general outline is as follows.
1. At stage 1, the Governor decides on three policy issues. First he chooses the distri­
bution of a fixed number of payoffs between himself and the Citizens. The sum of the 
payoffs is the wealth of the country. Second, he decides on whether to trigger an in­
strument impeding communication among Citizens. Third, he sets the penalty against 
opposing Citizens.
2. At stage 2, the Citizens can send messages to their neighbours indicating their will­
ingness to oppose the Governor’s policy.
3. Stage 3 is the actual revolt stage. Citizens simultaneously decide whether to rise up 
against the Governor. If  sufficiently many Citizens do so, then the Governor is pun­
ished and moved out of office, and a new Governor is appointed. If the revolt fails, the 
Governor stays in power in the following round and those who have revolted may be 
punished.
5 Previous experiments on political systems focus on the emergence of regimes in a model in which citi­
zens can devote their efforts to production or appropriation (Durham, Hirshleifer and Smith, 1998, Duffy 
and Kim, 2004).
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We construct a dynamic game of eight players, one Governor and seven Citizens.6 We 
aimed at having a relatively large group of players as the real-life interaction takes place 
between many citizens of a sizeable country. On the other hand, resources (in particular 
subject pool and laboratory space) are limited. The choice of seven citizens allows us to 
run two experimental countries in parallel, a measure that increases anonymity. Players 
play the game over several repetitions (so-called rounds). The last round of each game is 
eliininated from the analysis to avoid contamination from possible end-game effects. 
The game is dynamic in that the participant who plays the role of the Governor is de­
termined by the outcome of the preceding round. Otherwise each round follows the 
same pattern. The detailed rules of the game are described below.
2.1 Stage 1
The first stage of the game is the one at which the Governor decides. As mentioned 
earlier, the Governor makes decisions in three dimensions. The first is to choose a pay­
off distribution between himself and the seven Citizens. In addition he decides the pay­
off received by Citizens opposing the government if the revolt is unsuccessful. In both 
dimensions the Governor has the choice between a “tougher” and a “softer” option. 
This leads to four possible combinations, which are labelled as policies A, B, C and D. 
Policies A and C are those with a more egalitarian distribution of payoffs, B and D are 
policies strongly favouring the Governor. Within these pairs, A and B are the policies in 
which the Governor is more lenient towards opposition, while in C and D rebels face a 
severe punishment. The precise distribution of payoffs in talers, the fictitious experimen­
tal currency, is described in table 2.
Table 2: Round payoffs for the different policies
Policy
Round payoff 
for Governor 
if < 5 Citizens 
oppose the 
policy
Round payoff for a Citizen if <5 
Citizens oppose the policy
Round payoff for a Citizen if >5 
Citizens oppose the policy
...if the Citizen 
accepts the 
policy
...if the Citizen 
opposes the 
policy
...if the Citizen 
accepts the 
policy
...if the Citizen 
opposes the 
policy
A 7 6 5 5 7
B 28 3 2 5 7
C 6 6 0 5 7
D 27 3 0 5 7
6 The choice o f a single governor to represent the ruling social groups is a simplification.
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The second column indicates the payoff that the Governor allocates to himself with the 
policy chosen. The entries in the third and fourth column are the payoffs provided to 
each of the seven Citizens. The actual payoffs depend on each Citizen’s action at the 
third stage. Note that the repressive policies C and D allocate one taler less to the gov­
ernment than their “softer” counterparts. This reflects the costs of running a repressive 
apparatus.
In addition to choosing one of the policies A to D (and therefore deciding on payoff 
distribution and political repression) the Governor takes a decision on a third dimen­
sion. He chooses whether or not to activate a so-called deduction lottery. If  the lottery is 
activated, then Citizens’ messages at the second stage are intercepted with some prob­
ability and those who have expressed opposition are penalised (see next subsection). 
Activating the lottery costs the Governor one taler, which again assumes that there are 
some costs attached to running a secret police or other surveillance measures.
2.2 Stage 2
The second stage is a communication stage. The seven Citizens are located on an ideal 
circle where each Citizen has a neighbour on the left and one on the right. Each Citizen 
has the opportunity to send a message to her right neighbour, and she receives a mes­
sage from her left neighbour.7 The circle and the left and right positions are merely figu­
rative and not physical: they do not correspond to the seating in the laboratory.
With some simplification, a Citizen can send one of two messages: either CC1 intend to 
accept the policy” or “I intend to oppose the policy”. If the deduction lottery has not 
been activated, sending a message is merely cheap talk in the game-theoretic sense, i.e. it 
may be useful as a co-ordination device, but it has no immediate consequences. If the 
Governor has activated the lottery, then each Citizen’s message is intercepted with a 
probability of 0.2. If the message was “I intend to oppose the policy”, then the citizen 
sending the message is punished with a deduction of 3 talers from her payoff. In no case 
a message establishes a commitment for actions at the third stage.
7 We restrict the communication to one message to one neighbour for two reasons. First, we wanted to 
examine the effect of a network in which interaction is local, as would be the case in absence of free mass 
media. Second, this restriction limits the number of possible scenarios the game can reach, which is im­
portant when we conduct the experiment eliciting complete strategies from the players (see section 2.5).
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2.3 Stage 3
At this stage Citizens make a decision on whether or not they will actually revolt against 
the Governor. All Citizens make this decision simultaneously without knowing what 
other Citizens decide. The simultaneous-move structure is an idealised model of a situa­
tion in which many Citizens need to take action at about the same time to gather a criti­
cal mass of opposition. The decision the Citizens need to take is, again for simplicity, 
binary. They choose to either “accept” or “oppose” the Governor’s policy. The conse­
quences an action has for a Citizen depends on how many fellow Citizens decide to 
oppose the policy. If fewer than five Citizens in total oppose the policy, then the revolt 
fails and the payoffs are implemented as determined by the Governor’s chosen policy, 
with payoffs for Citizens accepting the policy being higher than for opposing Citizens. 
In this case the Governor stays in power in the following repetition of the game.
If at least five Citizens oppose the policy, then this has several consequences. First, Citi­
zens who have opposed receive a payoff of 7 talers while Citizens who have accepted 
the policy receive 5. This difference reflects the negative consequences that “collabora­
tors” with the former regime face after a successful revolution. Second, the Governor 
receives a payoff of zero. Third, the Governor is removed from his role and becomes a 
Citizen in the following repetition of the game.8 There are a number of ways for how 
the replacement of the Governor can take place, as a leader may emerge among the re­
bels or through elections following the revolt Here for simplicity the Governor is re­
placed by a new Governor randomly drawn from the group of Citizens who have op­
posed the policy. This reflects a situation in which the new leaders emerge only after the 
revolution, and ex-ante it is not known who will form the new government.9
When the Governor is replaced, all nodes on the communication circle remain un­
changed. An exception needs to be made to add the old Governor and subtract the new 
one from the communication circle. The way this is implemented is that the players 
actually form a circle of all eight players (including the Governor), which does not
8 We implement this rule for practicality rather than realism. We thought of excluding a toppled governor 
from further play, which arguably would be more realistic. However, this would have required either 
impractical replacement procedures or would have led to a changeable number of players. The latter 
would have affected all parameters of the game and would have made it impossible to obtain comparable 
results.
9 The East German revolution of 1989 is an example of such a constellation. There was no single domi­
nant leader; the new government was formed after the old government was forced out of office. As in our 
game, however, individuals associated with the former regime were excluded from leading positions.
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change throughout the play of the game. In each repetition of the game the Governor is 
“skipped” when the connections between the players are set up. This is illustrated in 
figure 1. The left-hand side shows the constellation before, the right-hand side after the 
top-right player is replaced with the centre-left player as a Governor.
Figure 1: Order of the game 
2.4 Game theoretic analysis
For the game theoretic analysis of the model we follow a standard backward induction 
approach to characterise subgame perfect equilibria10 (Selten, 1975). Consider the last 
round of the experiment The third stage of the game has two equilibria in pure strate­
gies. If  fewer than four other Citizens oppose, then a Citizen’s best response is to accept 
the policy, as the revolution will be unsuccessful and a higher payoff is made by accept­
ing. If  four or more other Citizens oppose, then the best response is to oppose as well, 
since acquiescent Citizens are worse off after a successful revolution. Therefore, there 
are two “stage 3” equilibria in pure strategies: one in which no-one opposes, and one in 
which everybody opposes. This holds regardless of the policy the government has cho­
sen. Stage 2, the communication stage, may be used as a co-ordination device to select 
among different equilibria, but since a message does not bear any commitment, it does 
not alter the set of subgame perfect equilibria.11
From the indeterminacy of the third stage it follows that every policy choice of the 
Governor is part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. The Governor will choose the policy 
that gives the highest payoff given the selected third-stage equilibria. This policy can be
10 We focus only on subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies. There are likely to be numerous equilib­
ria in mixed strategies as well.
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any of the four policies and either of his options on whether to activate the lottery. The 
indeterminacy unravels through all earlier rounds of the game to the first round.12
2.5 The conduct o f the experiment
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Decision Research and 'Experimental Econom­
ics (CeDEx) of the University of Nottingham. The software for the experiment was de­
veloped using the Ratlmage programming package (Abbink and Sadrieh, 1995). Subjects 
were recruited by e-mail from a database of students who had previously registered at 
CeDEx as potential participants in experiments. Each subject participated in one session 
only and no subject had participated in experiments similar to the present one. The sub­
jects were undergraduate students from a wide range of disciplines. The majority of 
participants were British. Among the substantial fraction of foreign students the largest 
group were the Chinese. Virtually all subjects were aged between 19 and 25, with a bal­
anced distribution between genders.
In each session two experimental countries were run in parallel. There was no migration 
between these countries and subjects interacted in fixed groups of 8 subjects. Subjects 
were not told who of the other participants was in the same group, but they knew that 
the composition of the groups did not change. Each session began with an introductory 
talk. A research assistant read aloud the written instructions (reproduced in the Appen­
dix). The language used in the instructions was natural, i.e. it did not disguise the situa­
tion by using abstract terms. Players were labelled “Governor” and “Citizen”, and they 
decided on whether to “accept” or “oppose” the Governor’s policy. At first we had 
devised a set of instructions using abstract language, like “player A” and “player B” and 
“choose X or Y”, but with the rather complex three-stage structure the game became
11 In a game theoretical model similar to ours, Perez (2003) uses equilibrium selection criteria to identify 
plausible equilibria. His focus is on the effect of network structures.
12 In earlier rounds there is an additional complication due to the dynamic character of the game. A  Citi­
zen may find it preferable to accept a policy even though five or six other Citizens oppose, in an attempt 
to avoid becoming the Governor. However, opposing yields an additional payoff of 2, which is higher than 
the highest possible expected loss. If exactly four fellow Citizens oppose, then a Citizen’s decision be­
comes pivotal. The best response depends on the Citizen’s expectations on the other Citizens’ behaviour, 
and on the Governor’s policy choice. Whatever the best response, the resulting strategy combination 
cannot be an equilibrium. If the Gtizen accepts, then the remaining four rebels do not play a best reply, if  
she opposes, then — for the above argument — the two accepting Citizens are off equilibrium. Hence, 
consideration of the dynamic game does not change the set of third stage equilibria.
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incomprehensible. Embedded in the natural context the game turned out to be relatively 
intuitive and easy to understand.13
We conducted 12 rounds of the stage game. These were divided into two phases. In 
phase 1, which comprised of the first nine rounds, participants played the game sponta­
neously, i.e. following the move structure of the game. In phase 2, which lasted for the 
remaining three rounds, we elicited complete strategies from the players. Instead of re­
sponding to a policy choice made by the Governor, they had to specify a decision for 
every possible scenario the game could enter before the Governor’s decision was re­
vealed to them.14 Thus, citizens had to specify which message they would send to their 
neighbour for each of the eight combinations of policy and lottery activation and at the 
same time (thus before they received the message from their neighbours) they had to 
decide whether or not to revolt at stage 3. These decisions had to be taken contingent 
on (1) the Governor’s policy choice, (2) the activation of the lottery and (3) the message 
received from the neighbour. I f  the lottery was activated and the citizen sent an tcl  in­
tend to oppose” message, then the citizen had to distinguish the cases in which the mes­
sage was intercepted or no t This results in between 16 and 24 decisions to be taken for 
the third stage. After all Citizens and the Governors (for whom both phases look the 
same) had submitted their strategies, the game was played following the instructions 
made in the strategies and the participants were informed about the outcome of the 
round.
Strategy elicitation has the great advantage of leading to a much richer data set. Unlike 
with spontaneous play, the experimenter can gather decisions for all possible scenarios 
of the game, including those that are reached less frequently.15 If  a policy is rarely cho­
13 Evidence for the effects of instruction framing has been very mixed so far. In a tax evasion experiment 
Baldry (1986) finds far more evasion if  the task is presented neutrally as a gambling opportunity. Aim, 
McClelland, and Schulze (1992), however, do not find any differences. A study by Burnham, McCabe, and 
Smith (2000) reports significant less trustful choices in a reciprocity game when the other player is called 
“opponent” rather than “partner”. On the other hand, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) do not find 
significantly different behaviour between a neutrally and a naturally worded version of a bribery experi­
ment
14 The idea of gathering complete strategies from subjects goes back to Selten (1967). The strategy method 
he proposes, however, is a much more complex set-up involving subjects returning to submit strategies 
and play tournaments over a long time. For our simple set-up we speak of strategy elicitation.
15 It is sometimes argued that the elicitation of complete strategies triggers “cold” decisions, which may or 
may not be different from the “hot” decisions made when reacting to an act actually carried out by a 
previous mover. If this is the case we would expect less emotional reactions, which would make the ef­
fects possibly thinner. This may be a downside of the strategy approach. The upside is that the data be­
come so much richer that even very subtle effects can be detected. Evidence for substantially different 
behaviour triggered by the two methods is sparse in any case. Brandts and Charness (2000) examine be­
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sen, very few data points are available for Citizens’ behaviour on that node, such that 
statistical analysis cannot be applied. Strategy elicitation avoids this problem. Therefore 
we decided to include a phase with strategy elicitation in our experiment.
Subjects were granted a capital balance of 15 talers at the outset of each session to ac­
commodate for some losses, which were possible if messages were intercepted. The 
total earnings of a subject from participating in this experiment were equal to this capital 
balance plus the sum of all the payoffs he or she made during the experiment minus the 
sum of his or her losses. A session lasted for about 90 minutes (this includes the time 
spent to read the instructions). At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their 
total earnings anonymously in cash, at a conversion rate of one pound sterling for 5 
talers. Subjects earned between £6.13 and £21.20 with an average of £11.26, which is 
considerably more than students’ regular wage in Nottingham. At the time of the ex­
periment, the exchange rate to other major currencies was approximately US$1.80 and 
€1.50 for £1.
We conducted six sessions with 16 subjects each. Subjects interacted with each other 
within groups but not across groups so that each group can be considered a statistically 
independent observation. Thus, WE gathered 12 independent observations. This part of 
the analysis consists primarily of nonparametric tests performed on these data points.
3 T he results o f the experim ent
At the heart of our data analysis is the Citizens’ behaviour at the third stage, when they 
decide whether or not to take revolutionary action. Reversing the actual course of play 
we therefore begin with the analysis of stage 3. We focus on the second phase of play in 
which we used strategy elicitation. From this phase we have a much richer data set than 
from phase 1. However we also present the results from the first phase. The situation in 
the last round is different from the others, because there is no new Governor to be ap­
pointed. In order to ensure that possible end-game effects do not affect our results, we 
exclude the last round from the analysis.16 Our focus is on the effect of appropriation,
haviour in different interactive games comparing spontaneous play and complete strategy elicitation, but 
find results to be unaffected. They suggest that both procedures are equivalent for low-complexity tasks.
16 None of our conclusions changes if we include the data from the last round.
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freedom of communication, and repression on Citizens’ propensity to oppose the Gov­
ernor’s policy.
3.1 The Citizens’ decisions
Figure 2 shows the citizens’ decisions at stage 2. The figure shows the frequency of ‘1 
oppose” decisions, relative to all decisions made in that particular scenario. In the spe­
cial case that the lottery was activated and a subject had sent an “I oppose” message we 
chose the case that the message was not intercepted, as this was more likely to occur 
(with p^O.8).
Each bar represents a different scenario, where the type of allocation, the level of free­
dom of communication and repression are combined differently. The graphic setup 
helps understanding the effect o f the relevant variables by comparing two scenarios 
(=bars) which differ in only one variable.
We remind that.
A, C represent egalitarian allocations chosen by the Governor.
B, D represent exploitative allocations chosen by the Governor.
A, B are regimes where weak repression is set up if a revolution fails.
C, D are regimes where strong repression is set up if a revolution fails.
L is a regime where Citizens can communicate freely.
N is a regime where Citizens cannot communicate freely.
On the effect of the Governor implementing a non-egalitarian allocation (comparing the 
B with the corresponding A scenario, or D with the C scenario), it appears that for each 
comparison the frequency of “I oppose” decisions is substantially higher in the scenario 
with an unequal distribution of payoffs. Activating the random repression of communi­
cation among Citizens (i.e. comparing the bars with “L” with the corresponding ones 
with CN ”) has a consistently negative effect on opposition rates. The same holds for the 
punishment in the case of unsuccessful revolts. When a C policy is chosen rather than 
the corresponding A policy, this results in less opposition, and the same occurs when a 
D policy is compared to a B policy. Finally, comparing the two adjacent bars in each
pair, we can see that having received an cfI oppose” message increases a Citizen’s likeli­
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hood to oppose the Governor in all comparisons of scenario. This points to network or 
informational effects in moving from individual preferences to collective action.
Frequency of "I oppose” decisions (phase 2)
acc rev d 
opp rev'd
acc rev d
"opp" rev'd
Figure 2
Note: “acc” rev’d stands for when a Citizen has received a message from his neighbours saying “I intend 
to accept the Governor’s policy.” “opp” rev’d stands for when a Citizen has received a message from his 
neighbours saying ‘1 intend to oppose the Governor’s policy”.
There are 32 possible comparisons when only one dimension is allowed to vary (selfish­
ness of the Governor, lottery activation, repression, and message received) while all 
others are held constant. We check all effects for statistical significance, disaggregating 
the data and looking at the independent observations. Recall that each group (“coun­
try”) constitutes an independent observation in our experiment.
The results are listed in table 3. The odd columns show the 32 effects for which we test 
the significance. The direction of the comparison follows from the relationship shown 
in figure 2. Columns 2 and 4 show in how many independent observations the compari­
son is the same as in figure 2, which we call the “expected” direction. This is the num­
ber before the slash. We now compare this number with the number of observations in 
which we observe the opposite direction. This number is shown after the slash. For 
instance, “BN>BL(a) 8 /  1* ” means that opposition rates were higher in BN than in 
BL in eight groups for the scenario in which a Citizen has received an “accept” message. 
In one group there were higher opposition rates in BL, in contrast to the relationship we 
observe in figure 2.
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Table 3: Significance of effects on the propensity to oppose the Governor’s policy
Freedom  to communicate MLessage received
Comparison exp /  opp Comparison exp /  opp
AN>AL(a) 10 /  0*** AN(a<o) 11 /  0***
BN>BL(a) 8 / 1 * AL(a<o) 10 /  0***
CN>CL(a) 5 / 0 * BN(a<o) 5 / 0 *
DN>DL(a) 5 / 4 BL(a<o) 6 / 2
AN>AL(o) 9 / 1 * CN(a<o) 7 / 1 *
BN>BL(o) 7 /  0** CL(a<o) 7 /  0**
CN>CL(o) 5 / 0 * DN(a<o) 10 /  0***
DN>DL(o) 7 / 1 * DL(a<o) 9 / 0 * *
Repression Appropriation
Comparison exp /  opp Comparison exp /  opp
AN>CN(a) 12 /  0*** AN<BN(a) 10 /  0***
AL>CL(a) 11 /  0*** AL<BL(a) 12 /  0***
BN>DN(a) 10 /  0*** CN<DN(a) 12 /  0***
BL>DL(a) 10 /  1** CL<DL(a) 12 /  0***
AN>CN(o) 12 /  0*** AN<BN(o) 11 /  0***
AL>CL(o) 11 /  1** AL<BL(o) 12 /  0***
BN>DN(o) 6 / 0 * CN<DN(o) 12 /  0***
BL>DL(o) 8 / 1 * CL<DL(o) 12 /  0***
* significant at p < 0.05 (one-sided)
** significant at p < 0.01 (one-sided)
*** significant at p < 0.001 (one-sided)
We then apply the binomial test to these counts in order to obtain the significance leveL 
Under the null hypothesis there is no systematic effect of the variable in question, and 
the difference we see in figure 2 is due to random variation. So we should observe about 
as many groups exhibiting the expected as the opposite effect In the above example, 
getting eight groups out of nine showing the expected effect happens with a probability 
of less than 5%, so we can reject the null hypothesis for this effect. In all comparisons 
we observe more counts in the predicted than in the opposite direction. The binomial 
test rejects the null hypothesis of no effect for all but two comparisons at a one-sided 
significance level of 5% or lower.
Most of the effects that we see in figure 2 are also evident in the data for phase 1. Figure 
3 shows the corresponding picture, structured in the same way as figure 2.
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H "acc" rcvd 
B"opp" rcvd
saying “I intend
to accept the Governor’s policy.” “opp” rcvd stands for when a Citizen has received a message from his 
neighbours saying “I intend to oppose the Governor’s policy”.
Opposition rates are much higher after policies with an unequal payoff distribution (B 
and D) than after the egalitarian allocations (A and C). Further, at least in the scenarios 
with the policies A and C, having received an “I oppose” message increases the propen­
sity to make an “I oppose” decision. We cannot identify such a clear pattern for the 
effect o f repression if a revolt fails. However, it should be noted that some o f these bars 
represent very few data points, such that random sampling variation might explain the 
absence of effects. For example, it happened only three times that the Governor chose 
the D N  policy and a subject received a “we accept” message. Thus, although the picture 
is less clear in phase 1, we do not find statistically significant effects that contradict or 
negate the previous findings.
Figure 4 shows how the frequencies of “I oppose” decisions translate into successful 
revolutions, pooled for all rounds from both phases except the last round. As one 
would expect from the previous analysis, Governors rarely survive another term when 
they decide for very unequal allocations. All instances in which BN or D N  were chosen 
ended in a successful revolution, as did the clear majority of BL or DL. Revolutions 
against AL, CN, and BN — egalitarian policies that include some form o f repression — 
are rare. Interestingly, Governors choosing the AN policy, which can be seen as the 
most benevolent o f all policies, are overthrown in almost half o f all cases.
Frequency of "I oppose” decisions (phase 1)
"acc" rcvd
0.84 0.43opp rcvd
scenario
Figure 3
Note: “acc” rcvd stands for when a Citizen has received a message from his neighbours
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Frequency of successful revolts
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Figure 4
We can now complete the picture by relating these findings to the results from the sur­
vey data analysis presented in section 1. We find that the appropriation of the country’s 
resources (proxied by the feeling by individuals that the government operates in the 
interest o f the few in the empirical analysis) has an unambiguous effect on revolutionary 
preferences as well as actions. Individuals do not only become more willing to oppose, 
but they also engage in active opposition, as the experimental data show. Freedom of 
communication and political repression have opposite effects in the two data sets. Re­
strictions in both dimensions of freedom trigger stronger revolutionary preferences, but 
stronger preferences do not translate into more revolutionary action. While individuals 
in a more repressive environment have a stronger taste for revolt, the fear of negative 
consequences makes them less willing to actually engage in opposition. Table 4 summa­
rises the effects.
Table 4: Effects on revolutionary preferences and actions
Preferences Actions
Appropriation + +
Freedom of communication — +
Repression + -
CHAPTER 4. AN EXPERIMENT ON REVOLUTION 135
3.2 T he C itizens’ com m unication behaviour
The Citizens’ decision to communicate their intention to revolt follows a pattern similar 
to that o f actions of revolt, highlighting again the problem of the failure of collective 
action. Figure 5 shows the frequency with which the Citizens have sent the message “1 
intend to oppose the Governor’s policy” to their neighbours. This figure comprises the 
data from the rounds with strategy elicitation (phase 2) except the last round.
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
We can see that restrictions o f freedom to communicate (i.e. activating the lottery) dis­
courage Citizens from sending messages of the “I oppose” type, as indicated by the fact 
that in each scenario the bar with no lottery is higher than the one with the lottery. 
Comparing the frequencies under A versus B, as well as under C versus D, it appears 
that the Governor’s non-egalitarian allocation o f resources increases the frequency of 
such messages. The lower opposition that we observe in scenarios with high punish­
ment for revolutionaries (C and D) as compared with the more lenient ones (A and B) 
are in line with the result we observed on actions.
Table 5 shows that all the differences except two are significant at least at the 5 percent 
level. The method is analogous to the one used in table 3. We compute the frequencies 
for the independent observations separately and we apply the binomial test to check for 
statistical significance.
Frequency of "I oppose m essages 
(phase 2)
0.96
AN AL BN BL CN CL DN DL
scenario 
Figure 5
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Table 5: Significance of effects on the propensity to send an “I oppose” message
Freedom to 
communicate
Comparison pred /  rev
Repression
Comparison pred /  rev
Appropriation
Comparison pred /  rev
AN>AL
BN>BL
CN>CL
D N >D L
12 /  0*** 
12 /  0*** 
8 / 0 * *
12 /  0***
AN>CN
AL>CL
BN >D N
BL>DL
12 /  0*** 
7 / 1 *
7 /  2+
9 /  3+
AN<BN
AL<BL
CN<DN
CL<DL
10 /  0*** 
11 /  0*** 
12 /  0*** 
12 /  0***
+ weakly significant at p < 0.10 (one-sided)
* significant at p < 0.05 (one-sided)
** significant at p < 0.01 (one-sided)
*** significant at p < 0.001 (one-sided)
3.3 T he Governors’ policy choices
To conclude the analysis of the experimental results, we report the Governors’ choices 
in the first stage of the game. Figure 6 shows the frequencies with which the possible 
policies have been chosen. Since the two phases are not different for the Governors, we 
pool the data for all rounds of the experiment except for the last one.
G overnors’ p o licy  ch o ices
CL
9.1%
C N
26.5%
Figure 6
16.7%
22.0%
Two interesting facts emerge. First, the choice of egalitarian policies (A and Q  far out­
weighs the choice o f selfish ones by about three to one. The previous analysis of the
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Citizens’ behaviour indicates that the non-egalitarian choices are largely unsuccessful in 
our experiment, as Governors survive for another term only in a few cases. Second, 
even Governors choosing an egalitarian policy tend to protect themselves with some 
form of repression, either by activating the lottery (AL), by setting a punishment for 
opposition (CN), or both (CL). It seems that the fear to be overthrown prevails even 
when they choose a rather benevolent policy. The previous analysis has shown that this 
fear is not without reason: recall that Citizens rebelled against the AN policy (egalitarian 
allocation of resources with no repression and no limits to freedom of communication) 
in about half of the cases, making this choice very risky for Governors who wish to stay 
in power.
4 C onclusion
This study aims at identifying potential factors that contribute to the likelihood of revo­
lutionary outbreaks in non-democratic countries. We are particularly interested in disen­
tangling the relationship between revolutionary preferences (what makes people want to 
revolt) and revolutionary actions (what actually makes them revolt). This paper aims at 
contributing to solve this puzzle with a novel empirical approach. We use a combination 
of econometric analysis of survey data and the design of a laboratory experiment. 
Econometric analysis allows us to study the determinants of revolutionary tastes, but 
cannot extricate how these preferences turn into action. In the laboratory revolutionary 
actions can be observed directly. We set up a controlled environment that allows us to 
look at the influence of a particular variable while keeping everything else constant. The 
combined analysis shows that both revolutionary preferences and actions are exacer­
bated by the government’s “selfishness”. Restrictions to freedom of communication as 
well as political repression, however, work in different ways on preferences and actions. 
Freedom restrictions raise preferences for revolt but the likelihood of actual revolts 
decreases. This is the step that highlights the collective action problem inherent to rebel­
lion. Though people would be willing to rise up, they need to co-ordinate their behav­
iour, which is impeded by the fear of the negative consequences. The experimental data 
lead us to additional insights. Even benevolent autocratic governors face a severe threat 
to be forced out of power and tend to protect themselves with some form o f repression. 
This indicates that up to some extent revolts can arise because citizens attempt to seek 
power themselves.
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These findings have their limits. Being the first experimental study on revolutionary 
action, the model is kept simple and has to sacrifice some of the detail of real life. Field 
data have the advantage of being gathered in real life, but they suffer from noise, identi­
fication problems, and lack of control. The laboratory, on the other hand, allows the set 
up of a controlled environment in which individual factors can be tested while keeping 
all others constant Endogeneity problems do not arise. However, the data are gathered 
in an artificial environment, which inevitably raises the issue of external validity.
Another limit is that the experiment identifies only qualitative effects of the relevant 
variables. The magnitude of these effects is bound to depend on the strength of the 
relative incentives. In the experiment those parameters were invented so we cannot de­
rive stringent quantitative predictions. Hopefully future research will help shed light on 
the relative size o f these effects. The effects may also be affected by the fact that the 
experimental game is naturally played on a rather small scale, with stakes being relatively 
low. Previous evidence suggests that the qualitative effects observed in experiments are 
generally robust to transformations into environments with even very high stakes (Slo- 
nim and Roth, 1998, Fehr, Fischbacher, and Tougareva, 2002). So despite the small 
scale, the results should be informative for many political situations in question. The 
parallelism between the experiment and the real-world scenario may find its limits when 
the revolt turns into an open military conflict and the choice of behaviour becomes a 
question of life or death. Nevertheless, we have observed cases in history in which citi­
zens forced their government out of office by means of civil disobedience, as it hap­
pened, for example, in the Eastern European revolutions of the late eighties and in the 
three recent cases discussed in the introduction.
Despite these limitations, laboratory experiments can provide useful insights in the 
study of civil conflicts, both in gathering empirical data as well as testing theoretical 
models. The combination of field and experimental data seems to bear a fruitful ap­
proach. The methods are complementary and one method’s weaknesses are the other’s 
strengths. Together they can lead to deeper insights into the factors driving conflict and 
co-operation, shifting from the traditional study of aggregate variables at the macro-level 
to a more detailed microeconomic-founded analysis of how political and economic 
changes affect the behaviour of individuals.
In addition, our results can be relevant to a broader range of issues. The potential for 
dissent is inherent to all forms of organised group with decisions taken by a leader and
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applying to a number of members. Conflict can arise over wages, working conditions, or 
a company’s management. Examples are the forced resignation of Michael Eisner from 
being chairman of Walt Disney in 2004 or the shareholder rebellion at Eurotunnel in 
2003. Dissent between players and the coach in team sports can lead to the forced res­
ignation of the latter. In much the same way as our “governor”, some companies set up 
mechanisms that limit individual rights. For instance, a company may refuse to employ 
workers organised in a union to curb workers’ ability to go on strike.
A ppendix 1: Survey data
World Values Survey
Three waves are available (1981-83, 1990-93,1995-97) but only the second and the third 
can be used in this analysis because of shorter time series on the macro data. In total, 64 
independent countries have been surveyed in at least one wave of this investigation. The 
set of countries and years covered by this analysis is: Argentina 1995, Armenia 1997, 
Australia 1995, Azerbaijan 1996, Bangladesh 1996, Belarus 1996, Brazil 1997, Canada 
1990, Switzerland 1996, Chile 1990 and 1996, China 1990, Colombia 1997, Czech Re­
public 1990, Dominican Republic 1996, Spain 1990 and 1995, Estonia 1996, Finland 
1996, Georgia 1996, Ghana 1995, Croatia 1995, India 1990 and 1996, Japan 1995, South 
Korea 1996, Lithuania 1996, Latvia 1996, Moldova 1996, Mexico 1990 and 1996, Nige­
ria 1990 and 1995, Norway 1996, Peru 1996, Poland 1997, Russia 1995, Sweden 1996, 
Turkey 1990 and 1996, Taiwan 1995, Ukraine 1996, Uruguay 1996, United States of 
America 1990 and 1995, Venezuela 1996, Serbia 1996 and South Africa 1996.
Data definitions and sources
Preference for Revolt?: A dummy variable that equals 1 when the survey respondent answers 
a question on his attitudes to society by saying that “The entire way our society is organised 
must be radically changed by revolutionary action”, and equals 0 when the respondent answers 
either that “Our society must be gradually improved by reforms’’ or that “Ourpresent society must be 
valiantly defended against all subversive forces”. The source is the World Values Survey. The 
share of people who state a preference for revolution in the sample is 11.4 percent, the 
share of “reformists” is 72.9 percent and the share of “conservatives” is 15.70 percent 
(based on the sample of 52,616 individuals used in this analysis).
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Country 'Run for the Few: A dummy variable equal to 1 when respondent agrees with the 1st 
answer to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a 
few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the 
people? 1. Run by a few big interests 2. Run for all the people”. The source is the World 
Values Survey.
Political Rights: A n  index from Freedom House measured on a one-to-seven scale with 1 
being assigned to the least free countries and 7 to the most free.
Press Freedom: An index from Freedom House measured on a one-to-three scale with 1 be­
ing assigned to the least free countries and 3 to the most free.
GDP per capita: The level of GDP per capita in constant 1992 US$, measured in logs and 
in PPP, from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
Personal Income Position: A  set o f 10 dummy variables that represent the income position 
of the individual on the country’s scale. The baseline category used in the regressions is 
the lowest one. The source is the World Values Survey.
Unemployed. A  dummy variable equal to one when the respondent is unemployed. The 
source is the World Values Survey.
Age dummies: Adult (26-50 years old) and Old (51 years old and over). The baseline cate­
gory used in the regressions is Young (25 years old and younger). The source is the 
World Values Survey.
Male: A  dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent is a man and 0 if a woman. 
The source is the World Values Survey.
Table 6. Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Preference for Revolt? 52,616 0.114 0.318 0 1
Country Run for the Few 52,616 0.715 0.451 0 1
Political RJghts 52,616 5.224 1.790 1 7
Press Freedom 52,616 2.298 0.781 1 3
GDP per capita 52,616 8,443 7,366 748 25,644
Personal Income Position 52,616 4.719 2.648 0 10
Unemployed 52,027 0.072 0.258 0 1
Adult 50,225 0.545 0.498 0 1
Old 50,225 0.252 ' 0.434 0 1
Male 52,560 0.503 0.500 0 1
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A ppendix 2: W ritten instructions for the experim ent
General information
We thank you for coming to the experiment. The purpose of this session is to study how people 
make decisions in a particular situation. During the session it is not permitted to talk or commu­
nicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us 
will come to your desk to answer it. During the session you will earn money. At the end of the 
session the amount you have earned will be paid to you in cash. Payments are confidential, we 
will not inform any of the other participants of the amount you have earned. In the following, all 
amounts of money are denominated in talers, the experimental currency unit.
There are sixteen participants in this session. They are divided into two groups of eight partici­
pants. These two groups play completely independently. The composition of the two groups 
remains the same throughout the experiment. You do not know which of the other participants 
are in your group.
The experiment consists of two phases. In both phases you will interact with other participants 
according to the rules described below. These rules are exactly the same in both phases. The 
phases differ in that in the second phase you will be asked to make decisions for every possible 
situation you can be in, before the decisions are carried out.
The first phase consists of nine rounds, the second phase consists of three rounds of the same 
decision situation. Each round is structured as follows.
The decision situation
There are two types of players in this game: One Governor and seven Citizens. In the first 
round of the session, the Governor is drawn randomly.
Each round consists of three stages. At the first stage the Governor chooses a policy. At the 
second and third stage, the Citizens each make a choice between two alternatives. In particular, 
the decision the Citizens make at the third stage involves choosing either to oppose or to accept 
the Governor’s policy. The outcome of the round is affected by the number of Citizens who 
have opposed. If fewer than five Citizens have opposed, the outcome is different from the case 
that five or more Citizens have opposed. This is explained below in more detail.
Stage 1:
At the first stage, the Governor makes two decisions. First, he chooses one out of four policies. 
Each policy provides a payoff for the Governor himself and each of the Citizens, distinguishing 
between different possible outcomes of the third stage. The policies the Governor can choose 
are as follows.
Policy
Round payoff 
for Governor if 
fewer than 5 
Citizens op­
pose the policy
Round payoff for a Citizen if 
fewer than 5 Citizens oppose the 
policy
Round payoff for a Citizen if 5 
or more Citizens oppose the 
policy
...if the Citizen 
accepts the 
policy
...if the Citizen 
opposes the 
policy
...if the Citizen 
accepts the 
policy
...if the Citi­
zen opposes 
the policy
A 7 6 5 5 7
B 28 3 2 5 7
C 6 6 0 5 7
D 27 3 0 5 7
If five or more Citizens oppose the policy, the Governor’s payoff is zero. This is so for all poli­
cies the Governor may have chosen.
CHAPTER 4. AN EXPERIMENT ON REVOLUTION 142
Second, the Governor decides whether or not to activate the deduction lottery (see below). Ac­
tivating the deduction lottery decreases the Governor’s payoff by 1 taler.
Stage 2:
At the second stage, each of the Citizens can send a message to another Citizen. The message 
consists of one of the following statements:
“I intend to accept the Governor’s policy” or
“I intend to oppose the Governor’s policy”
Each Citizen sends a message to one other Citizen, and receives a message from a Citizen that is 
different from the one he/she sends a message to. More details are explained later.
Deduction Lotteries:
If the Governor has activated the deduction lottery, then for each Gtizen who has sent the mes­
sage “I intend to oppose the Governor’s policy at stage 3” a lottery is played out. With a prob­
ability of 20%, 3 talers are deducted from this Citizen’s round payoff. For those players who 
have sent the message £CI intend to accept the Governor’s policy at stage 3”, no lottery is played 
out and no deductions are made. Further, if the Governor has not activated the deduction lot­
tery, no lottery is played out and no deductions are made.
Stage 3:
At the third stage each Citizen chooses between two options: to accept or to oppose the Gov­
ernor’s policy.
If fewer than five Citizens oppose the policy, then this has the following consequences:
• The payoff distribution as implied by the Governor’s policy is implemented.
• In the next round, the Governor retains the role as Governor.
If five or more Citizens oppose the policy, then this has the following consequences:
• The Governor receives a payoff of zero. Each Gtizen who has accepted the policy re­
ceives 5 talers, each Citizen who has opposed the policy receives 7 talers.
• In the next round, the Governor becomes a Citizen, and a new Governor is selected 
randomly among those Citizens who have opposed the policy.
The phases 
Phase 1:
In the first phase, nine rounds of the game described above are played, each according to the 
same rules. At the first stage, the Governor chooses an allocation. The Citizens are told which 
allocation the Governor has chosen, and send their messages at the second stage. They are then 
told which message they have received from the other Citizen, and proceed to stage 3. At the 
end of the round, they are informed about the outcome of the round.
Phase 2:
In the second phase, three rounds of exactly the same rules are played. In this phase, however, 
the Citizens must make all decisions for stage 2 and 3 at the very beginning of the round.
Imagine you have to play this game some other time, but you cannot be present in person. Thus, 
you send an agent who carries out all decisions according to your precise instructions. This agent 
must know which message you will send for each of the four possible policies that the Governor
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may choose, each combined with the case for whether or not the Governor has activated the 
deduction lottery. Thus, you need to make 8 choices for stage 2.
For stage 3, the agent must know whether you accept or oppose the policy, for each of the pos­
sible scenarios you may find yourself in at stage 3. There are between 16 and 24 such scenarios: 
Again, the Governor may have chosen four different policies, have or have not activated the 
deduction lottery, and in each of these eight cases you may have received an “I intend to accept 
the Governor’s policy at stage 3” or an £CI intend to oppose the Governor’s policy at stage 3” 
message from the other Citizen. For some of the cases additional cases have to be considered. 
This happens when the Governor has activated the deduction lottery, and you have sent the 
message “I intend to oppose the Governor’s policy”. Then a lottery is played out determining 
whether or not 3 talers are deducted from your round payoff. For each of the two outcomes you 
need to specify separately whether you choose to accept or to oppose the Governor’s policy. 
The computer will automatically select those scenarios that are relevant to you given your 
choices, and request your decision one after the other.
Further information
For stage 2 of the game (when the messages are sent) the eight players of a group are connected 
like on a circle.
Each Citizen sends a message to one neighbouring Citizen and receives a message from the 
other neighbouring Gtizen.
The positions on this “circle” remain the same throughout the experiment. Thus, each Citizen 
sends messages to the same Citizen and receives messages from the same Citizen, with one ex­
ception: If the Governor is exchanged because five or more Gtizens have opposed the policy in 
a given round, then the connections are reinstalled as illustrated below.
The left hand size shows the flow of messages in a given round. The player on the top right 
comer is Governor in this round. The arrows depict who is sending a message to whom.
Now suppose in some round five or more Citizens have opposed the policy. Therefore, the 
previous Governor becomes a Citizen, and a new Governor is drawn randomly, in this example 
the middle left player. The direction in which messages are sent is reinstalled in a way that all 
players retain their positions on the circle, but the respective Governor is skipped.
Notice that the “circle” is merely figurative and does not in any way correspond to the seating in 
the laboratory!
Payoffs
You start with an initial capital of 15 talers to which your round payoffs are added. At the end of 
the session the talers axe converted into Sterling at an exchange rate of 20p per taler.
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Conclusion
The study of the interaction between economics and institutions is increasingly 
important but still lacks substantial empirical testing. The purpose of this work is to 
contribute to the understanding of the determinants of well-being and instability across 
countries. In particular, I have analysed how the preferences and actions of individuals 
respond to economic and institutional changes.
Using various tools o f analysis, program evaluation techniques, econometrics and 
experimental economics, I have explored in the four chapters how restrictions of 
individual rights affect the wellbeing of individuals. Wellbeing is a concept which can 
take many facets. In the first and second chapters I use measures of self-reported life 
satisfaction, level of education achieved, participation into the labour market and 
income attained. In the third and fourth chapters I use self-reported measures of 
satisfaction with the society the person lives in, of the willingness to change it and of 
actual actions taken to change it. The first chapter explores whether granting women 
individual rights affects their welfare as well as their investment in human capital and in 
the labour market in Europe. The second chapter confronts the estimates from 
European countries with those from India and find different results. The third and 
fourth chapters examine how restrictions to political and civil rights affect attitudes of 
unrest, whether this effect is exacerbated by living in a fast or slow-growing country, 
and, if any, which pattern of actions of revolt is likely to emerge.
The main finding is that restrictions to individual rights strongly affect the efficiency of 
individual choices and decrease wellbeing. This has important economic repercussions. 
When the rights of individuals are restricted, people invest less in human capital, 
participate less to the labour market, receive lower wages, and express attitudes of 
unrest. Under some conditions, restrictions of individual rights motivate the individuals
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to revolt against the society they live in. Although these results appear intuitive to some 
extent, the added value of this analysis is that it specifies a complete, coherent and 
causal chain from institutional and economic changes to individual attitudes and actions. 
It links micro and macro factors in the framework of a positive behavioural model of 
what agents do when the institutional environment changes. The outcome is that some 
assumptions on behaviour that seem intuitive are supported in the data and some are 
not. For instance, we find that among the bundle of parity rights granted to reduce 
female discrimination, birth control rights increase welfare, maternity benefits are 
neutral and no-fault divorce rights actually decrease it. However, we also find that for 
rights to have an effect, individuals need to have actual access to them. We find that 
although individuals dislike both corruption and the repression of political rights, they 
are more motivated to revolt when they face corruption than when they face repression. 
We did not know this a priori, although we can understand it as part of the wider 
problem of the failure o f collective action (repression increases the individual cost of 
revolutionary action, thus in equilibrium it lowers the effort devoted to the action itself).
Using real world data with statistical testing also allows us to define trade-offs in 
quantitative terms. For example, we find that birth control rights increase the likelihood 
to achieve a high life satisfaction by 1.5 percent. This can be then evaluated against the 
return from alternative available policies. Furthermore, in chapter 3 we compute the 
marginal rate of substitution between democratisation and GDP growth that would on 
average keep revolutionary support constant We find that one standard deviation 
decline in Democracy would have to be compensated by an increase in the GDP growth 
rate by 14 percentage points. For example, the growth rate would have to rise from 0% 
to 14% per annum in order to keep the proportion of people wanting a revolt 
unchanged in the face of a loss of Democracy of this magnitude. We can conclude that 
although it is possible to fully compensate individuals for a loss of democratic rights, it 
requires rates of economic growth that are hardly sustainable over time.
We know from the previous literature that countries with better economic and political 
institutions in the form of secure property rights, non-distortionary policies and 
competitive political processes tend to invest more in physical and human capital, use 
these factors more efficiently and achieve a greater level of income (Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson, 2001). It appears that individual rights are an important part of the 
general framework of “good governance”. As much as property rights are needed for an
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efficient market to develop, freedom of choice is necessary for the individuals to achieve 
the most efficient allocation of resources. Among institutions, individual rights can be 
considered as the political counterpart of economic competition in creating stability and 
efficiency. When individual rights are restricted, rising dissatisfaction can threaten the 
stability and the security of property rights. The results found are relevant to a broader 
range of issues. Dissatisfaction and conflict can arise in many domains, over wages, 
working conditions, or company management. These findings lead us to conclude that, 
similarly to what happens with the use of economic resources, it is most efficient to 
decentralise political rights and allow individuals to make choices responding as much as 
possible to their own incentives. Restrictions of individual rights introduce distortions to 
an efficient allocation of resources in the same way as tariffs do.1
This research has also shown that we can devise methodologies to map the effects of 
macro events in a country to changes in the behaviour of its citizens. First, learning 
about preferences can help disentangle the role of individual incentives from that of 
external opportunities and constraints in collective action. Understanding how wellbeing 
is affected allows us to build a measure of the stability and the potential for unrest 
within a country. This can contribute to our understanding of why some countries enjoy 
social cohesion and stability and some do not. Second, the study of survey data coupled 
with laboratory experiments can provide useful insights in the study of how society 
evolves. The two methods are complementary in the sense that the first brings the 
validation with real life data and the other the rigour of the controllability o f the 
environment under test. Together they can lead to deeper insights into the factors 
driving conflict and co-operation, shifting from the traditional study of aggregate 
variables at the macro-level to a more detailed microeconomic-founded analysis of how 
political and economic changes affect the behaviour of individuals.
Finally, an original contribution of this thesis is to enrich the study of public economics 
of an additional tool, i.e. the scientific analysis of data on preferences as part of welfare 
analysis. Using self-reported indicators of wellbeing allows us to quantify more precisely 
the welfare effect from a policy on the individuals affected. Once it is known which 
individuals within a country were “exposed” to a certain policy, we can confront their 
self-declared welfare with that of individuals not affected by the policy. Since surveys on
1 This holds if there are no significant spillovers involved, which are very limited in the rights analysed 
here.
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preferences also include many personal characteristics (income, gender, education and 
others), by computing differences-in-differences effects we can closely identify the 
effects of the policy on certain groups of individuals, as defined by a combination of 
their demographic data.
Each chapter has suggested interesting extensions. In particular, two strands emerge as a 
promising agenda for future research: using new empirical methods focusing on 
individual preferences to understand how a status quo bias arises for specific reforms,
i.e. why Pareto-improving reforms often fail to be adopted (Rodrik and Fernandez, 
1991, Rodrik, 1993), and analysing the way institutional change is initiated and evolves.
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